Is Europe a lost cause? Euro-bashing is clearly de rigueur within the current U.S. administration. For U.S. President Donald Trump and his team, Europe is woke, elitist, overly bureaucratic, hostile to tech innovation, and out of sync with the fast-paced and ruthless geopolitics of the new era. Trump’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS) warned Europeans against civilizational erasure, called for regime change in favor of illiberal parties, and promoted strategic stability with Russia. And now, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has essentially told Europe that it and the United States can remain allies, but it needs to convert to MAGA—as he did himself.

Yet, if anything, the last year demonstrated that Europe remains a hugely consequential player on the world stage, in part because of the values that Trump condemns. In a world marred by uncertainty and flux, the European Union’s rules- and values-based geoeconomic toolbox remains as relevant as ever. Taken collectively, European states have demonstrated a capacity to manage Trump and push back against Russia. The looming multipolar world order is not something that Europeans are cheering for, but they have no reason to despair either.

Is Europe a lost cause? Euro-bashing is clearly de rigueur within the current U.S. administration. For U.S. President Donald Trump and his team, Europe is woke, elitist, overly bureaucratic, hostile to tech innovation, and out of sync with the fast-paced and ruthless geopolitics of the new era. Trump’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS) warned Europeans against civilizational erasure, called for regime change in favor of illiberal parties, and promoted strategic stability with Russia. And now, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has essentially told Europe that it and the United States can remain allies, but it needs to convert to MAGA—as he did himself.

Yet, if anything, the last year demonstrated that Europe remains a hugely consequential player on the world stage, in part because of the values that Trump condemns. In a world marred by uncertainty and flux, the European Union’s rules- and values-based geoeconomic toolbox remains as relevant as ever. Taken collectively, European states have demonstrated a capacity to manage Trump and push back against Russia. The looming multipolar world order is not something that Europeans are cheering for, but they have no reason to despair either.

The EU provides daily examples of its power and influence. Globalization may be in retreat, with multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organization hollowed out and protectionism setting in. But bilateral trade liberalization is moving forward. In the space of several weeks, the EU managed to sign a free trade agreement with Mercosur, a South American trading bloc, and all but complete talks with India. The “mother of all deals” unveiled at the recent EU-India summit in New Delhi will create a free trade area of some 2 billion consumers, the largest in the world. The EU already has free trade agreements with Japan, Canada, Indonesia, and New Zealand, along with other smaller partners. Negotiations with Australia are in the final stage, with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates next in the queue. The unequal agreement with the United States, which was concluded between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Trump, may also be up for revision now that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled against Trump’s tariffs.

Of course, all those free trade agreements, actual or potential, involve a great deal of small print. But it’s the big picture that matters: The EU is continuing to expand market access and finding partners at a time when Europeans are squeezed by both the United States and China.

On the military front, things are also not as bad as they might appear. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine continues to threaten the continent. But one year into Trump’s second term, Europe continues to provide Ukraine with enough support for it to hold its own. And European diplomacy has helped prevent Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin from reaching a Yalta-style deal to divide up Ukraine over their heads.

Indeed, European leaders appear to have found the right approach to the White House’s current occupant. This involves a mix of flattery and pushback where needed (for example, over Greenland) combined with pledges to boost defense spending, increase purchases of U.S. arms and energy, and invest in the U.S. economy. Some of those promises will materialize, others won’t. But what counts is the headlines, not number crunching. Europeans have publicly given Trump the benefit of the doubt with regard to talks with the Kremlin and are no doubt ready to support a cease-fire deal if one is to be had. But leaders like British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have consistently stood by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s side to make sure that Ukraine is not cornered.

At the same time, Europe and the United States are working together on issues, like critical minerals, where their interests overlap, and they will continue to trade and invest in each other’s market. Europeans are also working to find U.S. partners wherever they can. In Munich, California Gov. Gavin Newsom, a Democrat eyeing a 2028 presidential run, met Merz, Starmer, and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Newsom and Starmer even announced a $1 billion green investment project for a British energy firm in California. The trans-Atlantic pair might be undergoing “conscious uncoupling,” as Jeremy Shapiro called it, but Europe is doing its best to smoothen the transition.

This all goes to show that, overall, Europe’s foreign-policy scorecard is pretty decent. This is not thanks to luck or top-notch leadership. Rather, it is a product of structural factors.

First, it is the size of the European economy. Sure, the EU has seen its share of global GDP decline from close to 30 percent in the early 2000s to a little under 15 percent in 2025. But this is as much a reflection of China’s rapid rise and the United States’ high growth as it is a sign of European malaise. Despite all known problems identified in the widely quoted report on European competitiveness penned by Mario Draghi, an economist and former Italian prime minister, Europe remains the third-largest market worldwide. All things being equal, partners like Brazil and India wish to deepen economic ties and expand access. The sort of protectionist policies pursued by China and now the United States provide an extra incentive for them to do so.

Second, Europe’s well-known handicaps—institutional rigidity, too many layers of bureaucracy, and so on—are also its strength. The EU’s fetish for norms and rules creates certainty, something else that’s in short supply today. The EU is a tough negotiator, and as seen in the case of Mercosur, vested interests such as the farming lobby have outsized influence. But once a free trade agreement is signed, it is embedded in law and highly unlikely to be cast aside by a social media post at 3 a.m. local time from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen or Macron.

Time and again, EU norms and institutions have proven sticky. Even with illiberal and anti-establishment parties on the cusp of taking power in key member states like France, this is unlikely to change. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, for example, did not drop her hawkish rhetoric on migrants after coming to power. But she did not block any key EU decision either, much less threaten to pull Italy out of the 27-strong bloc. And for good reason. Access to generous subsidies and a vast consumer market have given Rome ample incentive to adopt a more centrist outlook on Europe. As a result, Meloni’s goal remains shaping the EU from within, not destroying it.

Finally, Eurosceptics continue to point out the continent’s lack of hard power. But that is changing. NATO members are now rearming and putting aside extra money for defense against Russia. The EU is putting forward money for industries manufacturing ammunition, tanks, and drones. It is already churning out enough armor and will start filling the gap on high-end capabilities like missile defense systems, spy satellites, and deep strike weapons. In aggregate terms, Europe outspends Russia by a factor of three, with expenditures of $480 billion compared to Russia’s $149 billion. Even alone, Europeans can repel a Russian invasion, which is why Moscow prefers applying softer and less risky forms of coercion, such as sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, etc.

What’s more, if Europe’s military might is not widely seen as threatening, that’s part of its appeal. Rearmament will not give Europeans the capacity or the will to project power overseas, as they did until the mid-20th century. As a result, rising middle powers in the global south have little reason to fear that gunships will be coming back. This helps make Europe an ideal partner for defense cooperation, and countries like France, Germany, and now even Ukraine have a lot to offer by way of military technology. France has become India’s second-largest supplier of military technology after Russia, whose role is gradually decreasing. As Europe becomes less and less preachy and sanctimonious on human rights issues, i role as a defense partner will only grow.

Europe now has an emerging strategy for global engagement. Reaching out to the rest of the world in search of economic opportunities and technology partnerships has become an article of faith in Brussels and around the continent. Macron just visited New Delhi to attend the AI Impact Summit hosted by India. He was following in the footsteps of von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, and European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas, as well as Germany’s Friedrich Merz in January.

In an environment where hard-elbowed geopolitics rules, it does not hurt to have the odd friend. Europe’s global engagement will not replace the United States as the linchpin of the multilateral order. But, in conjunction with like-minded states such as Japan, Canada, and Australia, as well as ambitious middle powers like India and Brazil, these efforts can help secure a global order that’s conducive to European interests.