After weeks of military buildup that includes two carrier battle groups, the United States now has more air assets in the Middle East than at any point since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But the steady drift toward war against Iran is not matched by clear strategic thinking. President Donald Trump barely mentioned Iran’s nuclear and missile program in his long State of the Union  speech. And he has failed to explain why the United States might use force or what it seeks to accomplish.

By looking at Truth Social posts, past U.S. actions, and casual presidential remarks, it is possible to identify several possible objectives. Some are achievable, others impractical. But even the ones within reach are difficult, and this is made worse by the lack of clarity on the American side. Ultimately, the United States appears to be trying to achieve ambitious political outcomes at low risk and with limited use of military force, a combination that seems rife for failure.

The U.S. use of force could have at least four objectives: 1. Supporting Iranian protesters and installing a popular government; 2. Imposing limited regime change along the Venezuelan model; 3. Halting Iran’s support for terrorist and insurgent proxies and ending its missile and nuclear programs; and 4. Coercing Iran only into ending its nuclear program.

The most ambitious option would be to back Iranian protesters in their attempts to change the regime. Trump has declared that regime change “would be the best thing that could happen” and has embraced the protesters, writing on Truth Social, “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING … HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” Such an option would require ending the clerical dictatorship and replacing it with a popular government.

A less ambitious, and less comprehensive, approach to regime change would be a “Maduro model,” killing or otherwise removing key regime figures such as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei until more pliable Iranian leaders take the helm. Who the Delcy Rodríguez equivalent is in Iran remains unclear. It could range from former leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose populist style gives him some legitimacy with the poor, to Khamenei’s designated successor Ali Larijani, to a largely unknown Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leader.

The point would be for the United States to carry on with attacks until a leader emerges who is willing to do the U.S. bidding on select issues, even if that person rejects democratic principles and is otherwise tied to the old order.

Less demanding—but still ambitious—would be to bomb and otherwise put pressure on Iran until the current leadership agrees to a wide range of demands. U.S. and Israeli strikes last summer set back but did not completely destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and the United States continues to demand that Iran give up its nuclear material stockpiles and end all enrichment. At other points and in his State of the Union address, Trump has gone further and called for Iran to give up its missile program as well, and in still other instances, he has mentioned that Iran must stop backing proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.

Finally, the United States could focus solely on halting Iran’s nuclear program, putting other concerns to the side. The United States and Iran are negotiating over the status of Iranian nuclear enrichment, and Trump has warned that without a nuclear deal, “bad things will happen.” On Truth Social, he demanded that Iran “negotiate a fair and equitable deal” involving “NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS,” and threatened that the United States would do more than repeat Operation Midnight Hammer: “The next attack will be far worse!”

The Trump administration has reasons to be ambitious. Iran is weak—indeed, it may be weaker than at any time since its bitter war with Iraq in the 1980s. Last summer, Israel launched the military campaign that killed Iranian scientists and military leaders and devastated Iranian air defenses. In Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States then joined Israel in attacking and  setting back Iran’s nuclear program.

Notably, the operation did not destroy the program once and for good, and Tehran retains a stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Although Iran has repaired some military facilities and hardened others, it remains vulnerable to another round of strikes.

In addition to causing disarray in Iran’s military, the operations were humiliating for Tehran and underscored its isolation. Israel’s strikes on Iranian officers and scientists demonstrated that its intelligence services had deeply penetrated the regime. After decades of declaring that the regime was ready for war with Israel and the United States, the feeble Iranian response— mainly missile and rocket strikes on Israel that the Israelis, with U.S. help, mostly shot down— revealed weakness.

Iran’s proxies in Iraq and the Lebanese Hezbollah, among others, sat the war out rather than risk further devastation at U.S. or Israeli hands. Russia and China, part of a vaunted “axis of upheaval,” issued empty rhetorical statements while remaining on the sidelines.

The Iranian people, far from rallying around the flag after the Israeli and U.S. strikes, turned their ire on the clerical leadership. Years of sanctions, corruption, and economic mismanagement led to economic stagnation and eventually rampant inflation, with Iran’s currency plummeting along with other problems such as water shortages. These problems, along with general dissatisfaction with the corrupt and brutal regime, led to mass protests throughout Iran in January. The regime slaughtered more than 7,000 Iranians, perhaps many more, and arrested tens of thousands—for now suppressing the unrest.

The Iranian regime, however, is not completely helpless. It is difficult to judge the popularity of a regime that uses brute force and unfree elections to stay in power, but, in contrast to many dictatorships, Iran relies on a broad elite to maintain authority, including leaders of the IRGC, senior clerics, quasi-state economic conglomerates, government officials, and some from the business community.

There are many different power centers that back the regime: Regime change thus requires removing larger numbers of people, not simply a single dictator and his followers. The most difficult to remove are the IRGC and the security services, which have a stranglehold on the economy and on political life. They even control smuggling networks, giving them an interest in continued sanctions.

The opposition, while brave in the face of regime repression, lacks unity. There is no political party or charismatic individual leading the protests. Indeed, the fact that both Iranians and outsiders are turning to the son of the late shah is a sign not only of how desperate they are for anyone but the current leadership but also an indicator of how little political structure there is for those opposing the government.

Tehran also retains some capacity to strike back. Last summer, Iran used proxies and missile attacks in a limited way, telegraphing some counterstrikes to ensure that the United States and its allies were prepared, thus avoiding escalation. Although U.S. and Israeli air defense proved effective at stopping most missiles, they did not stop all of them: Israel lost 28 people, with thousands more wounded.

This time, Iran might attack Washington’s Arab allies as well, broadening the target set and thus stretching defenses. Taking Iran’s missiles out completely would require hitting hundreds of targets that are dispersed across a large country, and many are mobile.

Similarly, although Iran’s proxies sat out the last war, that conflict had limited goals, focused on Iran’s nuclear program. If, as seems possible, this round truly is about regime change (or is at least perceived to be), then Iran will call in all its favors, and its proxies might strike at the United States and its allies wherever they can, hitting U.S. embassies, bases, and civilian facilities.

For Iranian leaders, the more ambitious U.S. demands, even excluding open regime change, seem existential. Abandoning proxy forces and ending the country’s missile program would make Iran even weaker, opening it up to future Israeli or other outside pressure with no means of responding. Indeed, it is possible that at least some elements of the Iranian regime might welcome conflict. They may be convinced they can withstand what the United States can dole out and, in so doing, deter future attacks while bolstering their credibility at home.

As a result, Iranian leaders may believe that the tit-for-tat approach that they used in the past to limit escalation was a failure and try this time around to restore deterrence by killing U.S. personnel, destroying or disrupting the regional energy infrastructure, or otherwise imposing higher costs that touch on Trump’s domestic sensitivities.

The United States, too, has limits. Although it is massing air and naval forces, there are no substantial ground forces being deployed, clearly signaling that the United States is not planning to invade and occupy Iran. There are no special operations forces reported in the region, so there may be no plans to seize senior leaders, a difficult task in any case because Tehran is much farther from potential launch points than Caracas.

The United States also has shortfalls in key munitions—notably, air defense such as the Patriot missile defense system and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptors—both of which are needed in Ukraine and were used to defend Israel in past sparring with Iran. Washington depends heavily on regional allies for basing and access, and there are reports that at least some Arab countries will not allow their bases to be used, fearing the Iranian response. Finally, Washington has competing security demands from Ukraine, the Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere. Acting in Iran will use scarce resources that are wanted elsewhere.

Making this all more difficult, Iranian leaders have little faith in U.S. promises and guarantees. Part of this is long-standing Iranian paranoia about the United States, but the Trump administration’s pullout of the Obama-negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—known as the  “Iran nuclear deal”—in 2018 fed the view that U.S. leaders won’t uphold agreements. In addition, Iranians believe that past negotiations with the United States were simply cover for Israel to launch a surprise attack on Iran in 2025. Thus, they are wary that negotiations today are simply a scam.

With these limits and concerns in mind, the difficulties for the more ambitious U.S. objectives become clear. The United States can kill Iranian leaders—as Israel did in 2025—possibly including Khamenei. It can destroy parts of the country’s remaining nuclear program and missile facilities. In addition to this devastation, the war and accompanying pressure will further set back Iran’s economy as trade and commerce come to a halt.

But without ground troops, more ambitious objectives become more difficult or even impossible. Historically, air attacks alone have been insufficient for regime change without the reality or threat of ground attack. The United States can remove leaders, but it cannot control who takes their place. To help protesters, for example, the United States would have to kill police and military forces deployed in small groups throughout the country, a near-impossible task without large numbers of ground forces. Decapitation strikes and continued bombing might result in a more pliable regime led by someone willing to make concessions, but the system would remain intact—and Iranian protesters would gain nothing for their bravery other than a dictator with a different name. A state collapse is also possible as different leaders vie for power, though thankfully, Iran does not have the types of divisions that plunged Iraq and Syria into civil war.

Without true regime change, moreover, it will be hard to ensure that any Iranian concessions endure. Iran’s ties to proxies go back to the founding of the Islamic Republic, and almost any conceivable successor to Khamenei would value the power and reach that these proxies give. Similarly, Iran might simply restart its nuclear program when it feels the time is right.

The opaque U.S. goals and Iranian suspicions also complicate coercion, making it harder for the Iranians to say yes to any American demands. Iranian clearly worry that U.S. promises in response to Iranian concessions are not made in good faith and that the United States might simply expand its objectives once Iran gives in.

It is also possible that the Iranian regime might survive the war largely intact. In contrast to the summer campaign, this war will probably not catch Iranian leaders by surprise, increasing the survival rate of senior figures. In addition, the regime’s decision to decentralize command and control increase its ability to endure, and local leaders on their own may prove able to suppress any unrest. The United States is not postured, militarily or politically, for a long campaign. Trump may run out of patience before Iran does.

Ultimately, the United States faces a familiar strategic dilemma: Military power can impose costs on Iran, but it cannot reliably deliver durable political outcomes at acceptable risk. Even under favorable conditions, strikes are more likely to degrade capabilities than to compel lasting strategic change or produce a stable post-Khamenei order. Absent a willingness to commit ground forces and accept the burdens of long-term stabilization, Washington’s leverage will remain inherently limited.

For U.S. policymakers, the central task is therefore not simply to ask what can be hit, but to ask what outcomes are realistically achievable and sustainable. Narrower goals, particularly focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program, offer the clearest alignment between means and ends, though even these will require credible follow-through and diplomatic off-ramps to endure.