As the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel continues to escalate, reports emerged that Washington had decided to enlist the support of Iranian Kurdish political parties. The plan seems to envision these groups acting as ground forces operating inside Iran’s Kurdish region, known among Kurds as Rojhelat. These reports gained further credibility following a phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Mustafa Hijri, the head of a coalition of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed in late February. The call elevated the status and visibility of the Kurds in Iran in an unprecedented manner, as Hijri appears to have been the only leader of an Iranian opposition group to have held a direct conversation with Trump during the conflict.
Alongside these developments, the U.S.-Israeli air campaign has intensified strikes against regime targets across Iranian Kurdistan. The scope of these strikes suggests they are strategically devised to dismantle the totality of the regime’s security architecture in the Kurdish region, including installations belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), regular army (Artesh), border guard commands, intelligence centers, and even police stations. The apparent objective is to weaken the regime’s capacity to resist should a popular uprising occur or should Kurdish opposition forces move into Iranian territory from neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan.
As the war between Iran, the United States, and Israel continues to escalate, reports emerged that Washington had decided to enlist the support of Iranian Kurdish political parties. The plan seems to envision these groups acting as ground forces operating inside Iran’s Kurdish region, known among Kurds as Rojhelat. These reports gained further credibility following a phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Mustafa Hijri, the head of a coalition of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties formed in late February. The call elevated the status and visibility of the Kurds in Iran in an unprecedented manner, as Hijri appears to have been the only leader of an Iranian opposition group to have held a direct conversation with Trump during the conflict.
Alongside these developments, the U.S.-Israeli air campaign has intensified strikes against regime targets across Iranian Kurdistan. The scope of these strikes suggests they are strategically devised to dismantle the totality of the regime’s security architecture in the Kurdish region, including installations belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), regular army (Artesh), border guard commands, intelligence centers, and even police stations. The apparent objective is to weaken the regime’s capacity to resist should a popular uprising occur or should Kurdish opposition forces move into Iranian territory from neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan.
Monitoring reactions in Kurdish media and social media spaces, as well as conversations with Kurdish observers across the region, indicates that many Kurds view potential participation in the conflict as both a risky gambit and a historic opportunity. If successful, such involvement could improve the political status and prospects of Kurds within Iran. If it fails, however, the consequences could be disastrous, creating significant liabilities for Kurdish communities in both Iran and Iraq. At this fraught moment, the best path for Iranian Kurds—and a democratic Iran—requires cooperation between ethnic minority groups and the broader Iranian opposition.
For any armed intervention by Iranian Kurdish political parties to succeed—at least from the from the Kurdish perspective—sustained U.S.-Israeli military cover would be essential. Additionally, political support would be needed not only during the current phase of the conflict but also in the event that the Islamic Republic either collapses or survives in a weakened or transformed state. If decision-makers in Washington were to withdraw their support after encouraging Kurdish participation on the ground, the consequences could be catastrophic, potentially exposing Kurdish communities across the region to large-scale reprisals by the Iranian state. This is not far-fetched, as a similar situation occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1990-91. At that time, Kurds rose up against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein following encouragement from then-U.S. President George H. W. Bush but were left exposed to military operations by Hussein’s regime. Only scenes of a mass exodus of Kurdish civilians and children dying of cold in the mountains prompted an international intervention to halt Hussein’s brutal campaign.
Traumatic memories of the Syrian conflict also remain vivid among Kurds across the region. In Syria, Kurdish forces at times appeared close to abandonment by international partners as they faced attacks by Syrian government forces and allied militias just this past January. As a result, many Kurdish observers question whether Washington’s support in the Iranian case would prove durable or merely temporary and transactional. Without a sustained commitment from the United States and its allies to support Kurdish communities in both Iran and Iraq, the Kurdish view is that involvement in the conflict could be grave for them.
Indeed, the risks extend beyond Iranian Kurds themselves. The potential involvement of Iranian Kurdish groups in the current conflict carries significant regional implications. Iraqi Kurds could also face significant repercussions if the conflict escalates. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq remains vulnerable to pressure and attacks from Iran and from Shiite militia groups in Iraq aligned with Tehran. Statements from Iraqi Kurdish leadership reveal that it has limited ability to shape the broader strategic decisions made in Washington. Cooperation between U.S. forces and Iranian Kurdish opposition groups will proceed regardless of the position taken by authorities in Erbil. The Kurdistan Region, home to more than 6 million people, remains highly dependent on the United States for security and political backing and therefore has little room to openly reject American initiatives. Since Feb. 28, when U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran began, Iraqi Kurdistan has already been subjected to a progressively intensifying campaign of attacks by Iran and allied Iraqi militia groups. The scope and intensity of these attacks would likely grow if Iranian Kurdish opposition forces enter the fray.
Turkey would likely also view such developments with concern, and this could further complicate the situation. Ankara has historically been wary of political gains by Kurdish groups anywhere in the region, viewing such developments through the lens of its own domestic Kurdish issue. As a result, Turkish policymakers will likely resist an expanded Kurdish political role in Iran. The potential involvement of Baloch groups in southeastern Iran, if it occurs, could also draw Pakistan into the picture, as Islamabad is wary of Baloch ethnic activism.
Yet despite all this, for Kurds in Iran, the current moment of cooperation with Washington carries considerable appeal. For a community that has long experienced political marginalization, restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights, and economic underdevelopment, this is a rare opening to pursue political rights that have remained elusive throughout a century of modern Iranian history.
While some commentary in Western media and policy circles falsely portrays Kurdish or other ethnic activism as separatism or implies that they are a tool of external powers, Kurdish involvement in the current war reflects a deeper political dynamic inside Iran that cannot be understood purely in military terms. The Kurds are dealing with this situation within the context of their history and legitimate grievances.
Over the past decade, particularly, ethnicity has steadily grown in importance as a factor in Iran’s domestic political landscape. This shift has been visible in successive waves of protest since 2017, which have seen ethnic-majority regions—particularly Kurdish, Baloch, and Arab areas—become the centers of gravity. Although Iran does not publish official statistics on the ethnic composition of its population, many estimates suggest that roughly half of the country’s inhabitants belong to non-Persian communities such as Azeri Turks, Kurds, Lors, Arabs, Baloch, Turkmen, and others. These communities largely inhabit Iran’s border regions, forming a geographic ring around the country’s center. Persians, who are predominantly Shiite, remain the politically dominant community within the state’s governing institutions.
Characterizing Kurdish or other ethnic opposition groups as separatists acting at the behest of foreign powers ignores the deeper structural context in which these groups operate. Many of them emerged in response to decades of systematic and systemic discriminatory state policies. After decades of unsuccessful activism, many in these communities believe prospects for meaningful reform within Iran’s existing political system appear limited.
This is particularly true when even prominent opposition figures outside Iran display limited willingness to address the political and cultural claims of ethnic minorities. Former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, for example, has shown no meaningful political or rhetorical flexibility regarding the question of minority rights. Both Islamic Republic officials and segments of the exiled opposition frequently accuse minority activists of “separatism,” a charge that carries serious consequences in Iran. Over the years, numerous Kurdish and other ethnic political activists have been executed under accusations of separatism by both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic.
Any durable political transition in Iran will likely require a redefinition of Iranian national identity. The current state narrative emphasizes the primacy of the Persian language and culture alongside Shiite Islam as the central pillars of Iranian identity. In a country that is in reality a complex mosaic of ethnic and religious communities, a more pluralistic and inclusive understanding of national identity may be essential for long-term stability. Developing such an inclusive political framework would be critical to ensuring that diverse communities see themselves represented in the future of the Iranian state.
Even if Washington and its allies seek to weaken or ultimately remove the current regime, Kurdish groups alone would not be able to determine Iran’s political future. Kurdish organizations are influential primarily within the Kurdish region. For any broader transformation of the Iranian political order, cooperation among a wide range of opposition actors would be necessary. Encouraging coordination among ethnic opposition groups and more mainstream Iranian political movements is therefore an essential step in shaping any future political transition. Kurds have repeatedly signaled their willingness to engage in dialogue with other opposition actors and to support a political framework for Iran that is democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive.
Kurdish actors appear well aware of the risks involved in entering the current conflict and will likely proceed with caution. Yet the deeper driver of instability in Iran—and across much of the Middle East—remains the region’s rigidly centralized and violent authoritarian state structures, which have long denied meaningful political and cultural rights to large segments of their populations. Any discussion of the future of these states and the minority question that ignores these structural realities risks reproducing the same cycles of repression, instability, and desperate political gambits that have shaped the region’s politics for decades.
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