Since the United States and Israel launched coordinated military operations against Iran on Feb. 28, the war has progressed unevenly.
The two countries have gained air superiority over Iran and degraded its offensive capabilities, and Iran’s navy has been unable to challenge U.S. naval forces in the Gulf. At the same time, the United States lost three aircraft to friendly fire, and Iran has struck U.S. military installations and embassies in the region. Israel is absorbing similar attacks, and the White House admits behind closed doors that the United States will have trouble intercepting all of Iran’s attack drones.
Since the United States and Israel launched coordinated military operations against Iran on Feb. 28, the war has progressed unevenly.
The two countries have gained air superiority over Iran and degraded its offensive capabilities, and Iran’s navy has been unable to challenge U.S. naval forces in the Gulf. At the same time, the United States lost three aircraft to friendly fire, and Iran has struck U.S. military installations and embassies in the region. Israel is absorbing similar attacks, and the White House admits behind closed doors that the United States will have trouble intercepting all of Iran’s attack drones.
The conflict has grown into a regional war that poses serious questions about stability in Iran, U.S. national security, and the domestic political situation in the United States. On the global stage, it also raises questions about nuclear proliferation and China’s behavior toward Taiwan.
This week, researchers from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute and the University of Georgia surveyed international relations (IR) scholars working at U.S. colleges and universities on their views on the Iran war and its implications.
The results we report below are based on the responses of 949 experts surveyed between March 3 and March 5. (Read the full report to see the top-line results for all the questions.)
Though public opinion polls show that most Americans do not support the U.S. decision to attack Iran, the IR experts we surveyed are even more skeptical. These scholars believe that the decision to use military force will harm U.S. security, increase the risk of terrorist attacks against the United States or its allies, and increase the likelihood that China will attack Taiwan.
IR Experts Strongly Oppose the Iran War
Our survey asked IR scholars if they supported the U.S. decision to attack Iran. The answer was unambiguous: Eighty-six percent of respondents oppose the coordinated strikes, with 70 percent expressing strong opposition. Only 10 percent of the experts support the attack on Iran, and the remaining 4 percent said they neither supported nor opposed the decision.
Expert opposition to the Iran war dwarfs disapproval among the U.S. public. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found that when respondents could indicate that they don’t know if they support military force against Iran, a plurality of Americans (43 percent) disapprove, while 27 percent approve. In a CNN survey that forced respondents to choose, Americans were largely unwilling to endorse the war, with 59 percent reporting disapproval.
U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed the hope that the war will lead to regime change in Iran and “freedom” for the Iranian people. But U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth maintains that the U.S. goals in Iran are more limited. The IR experts judge that Hegseth’s hedge about the war’s outcome is more likely than the president’s more ambitious goals.
Nearly 23 percent of respondents think the conflict will improve the odds of democracy in Iran. In contrast, 32 percent of the experts worry that the U.S. attack on Iran will definitely or probably decrease the likelihood of a democratic regime in the next five years, and another 46 percent say U.S. military action will not affect the likelihood of a democratic Iran.
Increased Security Risks
Given their opposition, it is unsurprising that the IR experts anticipate that the Iran war will negatively affect U.S. national security. When asked if the attacks on Iran would “make the United States more secure, less secure, or have no impact on U.S. security,” 81 percent of respondents said the attacks will “definitely” or “probably” reduce U.S. security.
The survey underscored IR scholars’ concerns about the risk of terrorism aimed at the United States, with 89 percent of respondents indicating that U.S. military operations in Iran will definitely or probably increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the United States, its interests, citizens, or allies in the next year.
Trump has offered shifting justifications for the war, but a core stated reason for the decision to strike Iran last June—and repeated earlier this week—was preventing the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This will likely be successful in the short run, but what are this war’s lessons for other states that might seek a nuclear weapon?
The IR experts are not optimistic: Only 16 percent of respondents think the U.S. attack on Iran will probably or definitely decrease the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by one or more countries over the next five years. A majority of the experts (57 percent), meanwhile, believe the attack will probably or definitely increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by one or more countries over the next five years.
Is China Watching?
Some observers are concerned that the Iran war will make a Chinese invasion of Taiwan more likely. For one, the United States and its partners are rapidly diminishing their stocks of advanced offensive and defensive weapons that might be needed to confront China. And some argue that the war “stretches the boundaries of self-defense” in ways that would make it easier for China to legitimize efforts to take Taiwan by force.
In contrast, other figures maintain confronting Iran militarily will make Taiwan more secure. In the weeks leading up to the war, Sen. Lindsey Graham argued that removing the Iranian government from power would make U.S. deterrent threats against China more credible.
We asked our respondents to consider, on balance, how the U.S. attack on Iran will affect China’s calculus on Taiwan over two different time horizons: the next year and the next five years. In the short run, nearly half (48 percent) of IR scholars anticipate that the Iran war will have no effect on the probability that China uses military force against Taiwan. Around 31 percent said they believe the conflict increases the odds that China moves against Taiwan, while 8 percent said it will decrease those odds.
In the longer run, IR scholars are somewhat more concerned. Forty-five percent of scholars believe the Iran war will increase the likelihood that China uses force against Taiwan in the next five years, while around 35 percent anticipate no effects and 5 percent believe the war will reduce the odds of a Chinese invasion over that period.
TRIP conducted another survey of IR experts just before the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites last June, including questions about the likelihood of different retaliatory actions from Iran in response to what was at the time still a hypothetical U.S. attack.
Recent events have borne out those predictions, which included: a 35 percent chance that Iran would respond by targeting other countries in the region, a 63 percent chance that it would launch attacks against U.S. forces, a 66 percent chance that it would try to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and a 68 percent chance that it would initiate cyberattacks against the United States.
If the experts are right about the current war, the U.S. attack on Iran was ill-advised. Though Trump has shared conflicting or inconsistent goals, IR scholars are skeptical that this military action will achieve any of those objectives—and will instead decrease U.S. security and increase the risk of attacks against its interests, citizens, and allies.
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