European politics is full of promises to “give power back to the people”. Populist leaders present themselves as shortcuts to democracy: they claim they will cut through bureaucracy, bypass elites, and restore popular sovereignty. Yet, research on contemporary European political economy suggests that this rhetoric has a less visible institutional dimension. In a comparative study of five countries — Austria, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain — I examined how populist dynamics interact with systems of industrial relations and economic democracy. The findings point to a common pattern: populist politics often bypasses not only technocrats and parties but also workers’ collective representation.

Trade unions, collective bargaining, and social dialogue are not marginal features of European capitalism; they are part of its democratic infrastructure. They mediate conflict, organise interests, and transform social demands into negotiated outcomes. They make democracy pluralist rather than purely majoritarian. When populism frames politics as a direct relationship between a leader and an undifferentiated “people”, it casts suspicion on all intermediaries.

Across the five countries analysed, unions and social partners are recurrently portrayed as insiders, relics of a corporatist past, or bureaucratic obstacles to swift decision-making. This anti-pluralist logic converges with a broader political strategy that has become increasingly visible: disintermediation. Rather than abolishing institutions outright, disintermediation seeks to render them politically secondary. It shifts legitimacy away from negotiation and compromise toward immediacy, personalisation, and unilateral initiative.

In this sense, disintermediation is not merely a communication style amplified by digital media; it is a governing logic that treats mediation as a cost and rewards leaders who present decisions as direct responses to popular demand. The result, as the comparative evidence suggests, is rarely dramatic institutional rupture. More often, it is a gradual weakening of the mediating structures that allow workers to exercise organised power in the economy.

Three mechanisms of erosion

The research identifies three mechanisms through which populist disintermediation reshapes economic democracy across different institutional settings.

The first is delegitimisation. In France and Italy, for example, unions are frequently framed in political discourse as defenders of insiders or as part of an establishment resistant to change. In Poland, delegitimisation can combine with broader politicisation, narrowing the perceived autonomy of pluralist actors. Even in Austria, where social partnership remains deeply embedded, rhetorical pressure questions the relevance of intermediaries. The point is not always to dismantle unions; it is to undermine their normative authority and to recode mediation as undemocratic.

The second mechanism is a political bypass. In Italy and Spain, where labour-market fragmentation and segmentation create representational gaps, governments have repeatedly relied on direct policy announcements and selective engagement with social partners. Negotiation becomes episodic rather than constitutive of governance. In France, reform processes have often reduced the agenda-setting power of unions, shifting the balance between negotiated and state-driven change. Even in Austria, where institutions are more resilient, episodes of unilateral initiative signal that social dialogue is no longer taken for granted.

The third mechanism is procedural marginalisation. Across the cases, formal institutions typically survive, but their effective influence narrows. Consultation may occur later in decision-making processes; decentralisation may fragment bargaining coverage; or access to key arenas may become more selective.

The cross-country comparison shows that outcomes vary depending on institutional embeddedness. Austria illustrates resilience: strong social partnership constrains sustained bypass. France shows reconfiguration: institutions persist but are reshaped through reform-driven procedural change. Italy and Spain reveal a more fragile equilibrium, characterised by selective or episodic intermediation. Poland represents the highest erosion risk, where delegitimisation and politicisation converge in ways that can weaken pluralist space more fundamentally. The most striking finding, however, is that outright dismantling is rare. The dominant trajectory is reconfiguration — an incremental hollowing of mediated governance.

Why the stakes extend far beyond industrial relations

The implications of these findings reach well beyond the world of industrial relations. Economic democracy is not only about wage-setting or labour law; it concerns how citizens experience voice and power in everyday economic life. In all five countries examined, collective bargaining and workplace representation remain among the few institutionalised spaces where workers can participate in rule-making and contest authority in structured ways. When these spaces are weakened — whether through delegitimisation, bypass, or procedural downgrading — conflict becomes more individualised and inequalities in voice widen.

The research suggests that populist disintermediation does not necessarily abolish unions, but it can hollow out their democratic function. The alternative to mediation is not pure popular sovereignty; it is often executive dominance and personalised leadership. Disintermediation is politically attractive because it promises immediacy. Yet democracy, particularly in complex capitalist societies, depends on organised pluralism.

Austria’s resilience shows that embedded institutions can buffer political pressure, but even there, rhetorical contestation matters. France’s experience demonstrates how reform politics can gradually narrow the space of negotiated governance. Italy and Spain reveal how fragmentation and segmentation create fertile ground for bypass strategies. Poland highlights how politicisation can heighten the erosion risk of pluralist arrangements.

Taken together, these cases indicate that the central risk for European democracies is not sudden authoritarian rupture but gradual democratic hollowing in the economic sphere. Defending economic democracy therefore requires more than preserving formal institutions. It requires renewing the inclusiveness and legitimacy of collective representation, especially in fragmented labour markets. If mediation in the economy continues to lose ground — quietly, procedurally, incrementally — democracy itself becomes thinner and more fragile. The struggle over populism is not only a constitutional battle; it is also a contest over whether European societies continue to govern economic power through organised, pluralist mediation or shift toward increasingly personalised and unilateral forms of rule.

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