A meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and several Latin American leaders over the weekend marked a shift in how Washington organizes hemispheric diplomacy. The Shield of the Americas Summit, held in Florida, suggested that Trump is shunning large multilateral forums in favor of smaller coalitions of governments aligned with U.S. security and geopolitical priorities. One might call it strategic minilateralism.

The Shield of the Americas, also known as the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, expands security coordination among 17 countries in the region. They signed a joint declaration during the summit, agreeing to expand intelligence-sharing and maritime interdiction across the Caribbean and Pacific. The Trump administration framed the initiative as designed to confront what U.S. officials now increasingly describe as “narco-terrorist” organizations. At the summit’s conclusion, Trump signed a proclamation establishing the initiative’s framework. “We need your help,” he told participating leaders, “You have to just tell us where [the cartels] are.”

A meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and several Latin American leaders over the weekend marked a shift in how Washington organizes hemispheric diplomacy. The Shield of the Americas Summit, held in Florida, suggested that Trump is shunning large multilateral forums in favor of smaller coalitions of governments aligned with U.S. security and geopolitical priorities. One might call it strategic minilateralism.

The Shield of the Americas, also known as the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, expands security coordination among 17 countries in the region. They signed a joint declaration during the summit, agreeing to expand intelligence-sharing and maritime interdiction across the Caribbean and Pacific. The Trump administration framed the initiative as designed to confront what U.S. officials now increasingly describe as “narco-terrorist” organizations. At the summit’s conclusion, Trump signed a proclamation establishing the initiative’s framework. “We need your help,” he told participating leaders, “You have to just tell us where [the cartels] are.”

The composition of the summit made Trump’s partisan logic clear. The presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago attended, as well as the incoming president of Chile. Most of these leaders are conservative or right-wing. Conspicuously absent were the region’s three largest powers: Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, which are governed by leftists. The gathering was not designed to produce hemispheric consensus. It was designed to assemble a coalition.

For much of the post-Cold War era, hemispheric diplomacy revolved around large multilateral forums such as the Organization of American States. But ideological polarization and political fragmentation have limited these bodies’ ability to generate agreement. The Shield reflects Washington’s growing preference for smaller coalitions that can move quickly and coordinate more closely around shared priorities. Security sits at the center of this emerging framework.

Washington has already begun testing elements of this approach through expanded maritime interdiction operations targeting cartel trafficking vessels across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. Since last year, U.S. forces and partner governments have carried out dozens of strikes against suspected drug-smuggling boats along major trafficking routes. News reports indicate that the operations—whose legality is disputed—have so far resulted in more than 150 casualties. The United States has also carried out deeper security cooperation with governments confronting cartel violence, such as recent joint operations in Ecuador.

For the United States, the Shield has an unmistakable domestic political dimension. The administration’s focus on cartels, migration, and the use of military force throughout the hemisphere aligns closely with Trump’s law-and-order narrative at home—and reinforces his broader message of restoring control at the U.S. southern border.

That political angle is also visible in a key personnel decision surrounding the summit. Trump appointed former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem as special envoy for the Shield of the Americas. A close political ally of the president and a central figure in the administration’s immigration enforcement agenda, Noem’s new role extends the administration’s border security framework into hemispheric diplomacy.

For participating governments, Noem’s appointment may also carry practical significance. Access to the president’s political circle often matters in Washington, particularly for smaller and middle-income countries. Closer alignment could translate into expanded security cooperation, greater access to U.S. development finance, and deeper integration into supply chains that Washington hopes to shift closer to the hemisphere. As homeland security secretary, Noem developed working relationships with several leaders in the initiative, including Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele.

The Shield offers an opportunity for regional leaders to cultivate even closer ties with U.S. officials, bringing together Trump, Noem, and other senior administration members, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

Yet the summit’s strategic implications extend beyond security cooperation. The initiative also reflects Washington’s growing concern over China’s expanding presence in Latin America. The summit’s proclamation said the Shield would ward off “malign foreign influences from outside the Western Hemisphere,” Politicoreported. Trade between Beijing and the region has grown dramatically over the past two decades, from roughly $12 billion in 2000 to more than $500 billion today, while Chinese investment has expanded across infrastructure and strategic sectors in the region.

Infrastructure projects illustrate the scale of that expansion. The Port of Chancay in Peru, majority-owned by the Chinese conglomerate COSCO Shipping and inaugurated in 2024, is expected to reshape maritime trade routes linking South America and Asia while expanding Beijing’s logistical footprint along the Pacific coast. Political developments in Peru, including general elections scheduled for April, could influence whether another strategically positioned Pacific economy moves closer to Washington’s emerging coalition.

U.S.-China competition reflects a structural difference in how both powers project economic influence abroad. Chinese companies often operate with direct backing from the state, allowing Beijing to deploy infrastructure investment as an instrument of geopolitical strategy. American companies operate under a different logic. Corporate boards and shareholders determine where capital flows, based on risk assessments, rule of law, and security conditions.

Strengthening security cooperation through the Shield may function as a prerequisite for deeper economic engagement from U.S. companies by stabilizing investment environments and allowing private capital to enter infrastructure and supply chains across the region. But the success of the initiative may depend on whether Washington can complement its security framework with credible economic incentives capable of competing with China’s.

The Shield’s durability is far from guaranteed. Many Latin American governments maintain deep commercial ties with China and are unlikely to frame their foreign policy in openly confrontational terms. In Chile, for instance, incoming far-right President José Antonio Kast has aligned rhetorically with U.S. priorities on crime and border security but pledged to maintain deep economic ties with China, Santiago’s largest trading partner. Security cooperation with Washington will likely coexist alongside continued economic engagement with Beijing.

The Shield will require more than military ties to succeed. If Washington can translate security cooperation into credible economic partnerships, then this weekend’s summit in Florida may be remembered as the moment when the United States stopped chasing hemispheric consensus and began organizing hemispheric power.