The Iranian regime is suffering heavy blows as a result of the U.S.-Israeli military campaign, but it is not on the verge of collapse. A prolonged war lasting months would increase the probability that it could fall, but it now appears that the war will end before that, with Iran’s current government in place. This means the Islamic Republic is likely to emerge weaker but more violent, aggressive, and vengeful.

What would that mean? Nothing good—for the United States, Israel, the Gulf, or Iran.

The Iranian regime is suffering heavy blows as a result of the U.S.-Israeli military campaign, but it is not on the verge of collapse. A prolonged war lasting months would increase the probability that it could fall, but it now appears that the war will end before that, with Iran’s current government in place. This means the Islamic Republic is likely to emerge weaker but more violent, aggressive, and vengeful.

What would that mean? Nothing good—for the United States, Israel, the Gulf, or Iran.

At the domestic level, the Iranian regime’s survival will not buy it any new legitimacy. It is a question of when, not if, protesters will return to the streets to demonstrate again. They are unlikely to do so as long as bombs are falling. But the deep reservoir of opposition to the regime will not disappear; no temporary rally-around-the-flag effect will change this. The rise to the supreme leader position of the widely reviled Mojtaba Khamenei will only harden widespread resentment.

Yet the regime has clearly signaled that it will not tolerate any dissent, during or after the war. Given its acute vulnerability and the apparent consolidation of power in the hands of hard-liners, future repression will be at least as brutal as the crackdown that killed thousands, and possibly tens of thousands, of people in January.

Beyond its borders, Iran will be forced to adapt some aspects of its foreign policy while striving to maintain others. It will likely be emboldened by having shown that it can almost completely close the Strait of Hormuz and dramatically impact global energy prices. Having lost several of its power projection assets, it will therefore rapidly invest in rebuilding the capabilities it needs to threaten shipping in the strait again, specifically its missile and drone programs. It will also enthusiastically remind whoever listens that it could renew its campaign in response to future pressure or threats.

For two decades, the so-called Axis of Resistance—the Iran-led network of armed nonstate actors throughout the Middle East—was widely viewed as one of the Islamic Republic’s chief deterrents. The Axis, however, has suffered heavy blows, with Hamas and Hezbollah weakened and the Assad regime in Syria gone. There is one exception: The Houthis in Yemen are the only Axis member to be in a stronger position today compared with 2023. This will make the Houthis even more important in Tehran’s eyes. Their growing regional influence, now reaching to the Horn of Africa, as well as their demonstrated ability to pressure Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and to target maritime shipping in the Red Sea, strongly suggests that the Islamic Republic will continue to support them and will likely increase this support.

The Iranian regime’s aggressive retaliatory campaign against the six Arab states of the Persian Gulf’s southern shore will leave a bitter legacy and make their long-standing security challenges even more difficult to manage. They will still be on the front lines against the Islamic Republic and will not forget the thousands of drones and missiles sent from the Gulf’s northern shore. That will further intensify their dependence on the United States, notably to replenish their air defenses. But many in the region will also remember that the Trump administration launched this war against their preferences and thus will continue their efforts to diversify their security partnerships.

A weaker and more aggressive Islamic Republic also impacts Russian and Chinese interests in the Gulf. Russia and China stand to lose from the weakening of a partner with which they have had close ties for decades. But they both stand to gain from growing frustrations with the United States among the Gulf Arab states. With Washington perceived as increasingly unreliable, these countries are likely to continue to discretely deepen their partnerships with Moscow and Beijing.

After the war, the Iranian regime’s campaign to suppress dissent will undoubtedly extend beyond its borders, with implications for countries with large Iranian diasporas. In the past, the combination of heightened regime vulnerability domestically and geopolitically with enhanced diaspora mobilization (at the time of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022-23, for example) led to intensified transnational repression. As Iranian diaspora communities in North America and Europe inevitably organize against the regime after the war, they should expect to be victims of even harsher than usual campaigns of pressure, threats, intimidation, defamation, and disinformation. European governments, in particular, should be prepared to protect their citizens and residents.

Finally, a weaker but vengeful Islamic Republic, under the consolidated control of hard-liners, will be even more distrustful of the United States than it already was. It will remember that in both June 2025 and February 2026, Washington used diplomatic talks as a pretext to prepare for war. Tehran will be more intransigent and less likely to compromise on what it will view as ever more essential pillars of its deterrent posture, especially its missile and drone programs. It will be very unlikely to consider concessions on its nuclear program and might even decide that further progress with its nuclear program, even testing a nuclear device, is the only way to ward off future attacks.

In the meantime, Iran’s ability to project power regionally will be curtailed because of the severe losses that U.S. and Israeli airstrikes are imposing. Its missile and nuclear programs have been severely degraded, its economy will be struggling even more than before, and popular discontent will continue to represent a permanent threat to the regime. But the fundamental tension between Iran and the United States will not be resolved. Future rounds of violence between the United States and Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, will therefore be likely.

Consider Lebanon, where Israel also has locked itself into a cycle of recurring interventions to “mow the lawn” by repeatedly hitting Hezbollah after the group rearms. This has been a catastrophe for the Lebanese people. But the consequences of such a cycle would be even worse in Iran, not only for 92 million Iranians but also for regional stability. What’s more, the period between the end of the current war and the next round of violence would most likely be marked by an intensification of various gray-zone tactics by all sides, including cyberattacks, sabotage, and Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks abroad.

The United States embarked on a war against the Islamic Republic in the pursuit of laudable but vague and incoherent hopes: to weaken the regime and, maybe, to overthrow it. Hope, however, is not a strategy. The war risks leaving in power a weaker but worse government that will pose a severe threat to its own people and to its neighbors.