As Iranian missiles and drones retaliated against the United States’ strikes earlier this month, U.S. diplomats in the region were still largely in place—as were the likely hundreds of thousands of American citizens who visit or live in the Middle East.

“It was a predictable contingency that there should have been planning for,” said Yael Lempert, a former U.S. ambassador who oversaw evacuation efforts from Libya during its 2011 revolution. “It’s kind of fundamental in emergency planning that you move nonessential diplomatic personnel and families out early while commercial flights are still available.”

Ultimately, no U.S. diplomats or American civilians were killed due to the delayed evacuations, and the State Department arranged almost 50 charter flights by March 12 as well as provided either guidance or assistance to nearly 50,000 U.S. citizens.

“Our highest priority is the safety and security of Americans, including our diplomats. Many hundreds of experienced personnel have been working 24/7 to live up to this commitment,” Tommy Pigott, State Department principal deputy spokesperson, told Foreign Policy.

Still, U.S. citizens were placed at a higher level of risk than was necessary, argued five former State Department officials. The officials, who served under both Democratic and Republican administrations, suggested that there had likely been a breakdown in State Department operations—from a lack of qualified senior staff in the region to a perceived elevation of loyalty above experience within the department.

U.S. President Donald Trump said that his administration did not make more moves to evacuate Americans before the war began because “it happened all very quickly.” But, in fact, the White House had been preparing for the war for weeks prior to the first attacks on Iran on Feb. 28.

By Feb. 18, the United States had built up a massive military force in the Middle East amid negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. On Feb. 23, the U.S. evacuated nonessential staff from the embassy in Lebanon, where Iran supports the militant group Hezbollah, and then did the same in Israel on Feb. 27.

When U.S. and Israeli bombs struck Iran on Feb. 28, however, most other U.S. embassies in the region were fully staffed. U.S. Embassy advice to U.S. citizens in the region recommended caution for many countries but did not advise against travel. The United Arab Emirates, a major tourism destination, was set at the same level of caution as France, as was Jordan—while Qatar’s level of caution was equal to Norway’s.

That quickly became a problem as Iran retaliated with drone and missile strikes across the region, targeting Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and even Crete. U.S. embassies came under attack, with a drone hitting the embassy in Saudi Arabia and one hitting near the consulate in Dubai.

In response, the State Department began to gradually withdraw nonessential staff from embassies—although not all at once. The State Department did not order nonessential staff to leave Saudi Arabia until March 8, and from Oman until March 13.

Asked why the State Department had not evacuated diplomats ahead of the strike, a State Department spokesperson, granted anonymity to discuss internal decision-making, responded that “the State Department continuously assesses the security environment at our posts and adjusts posture as conditions warrant. As conditions evolved, we moved quickly to reduce our footprint while maintaining core mission functions and ensuring the safety of our personnel and American citizens.”

On March 2, the State Department told U.S. citizens to leave the region via a social media post—but reportedly failed to first communicate the information across the State Department. With much of the region’s airspace closed, many struggled to get out, forcing the State Department to send charter flights with a reported budget of up to $40 million in emergency funding.

In response to a question as to why the United States had not increased warnings to travelers, the State Department spokesperson said that it “has been issuing travel alerts and caution for the Middle East since January. In the weeks leading up to the strikes, the State Department adjusted travel advisories to caution American citizens against traveling to various nations in the Middle East, reflecting the evolving security environment.”

The State Department spokesperson also said that prior to the attack on Iran, embassies “took prudent steps to prepare for potential disruptions, including reviewing security procedures, ensuring continuity of operations, and preparing to assist American citizens if needed.”

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The U.S. and Israeli strikes themselves seemed to take Iran by surprise—with then-Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and over 40 senior officials killed on the first day of war in a single strike.

Yet former U.S. diplomats FP spoke to discounted the idea that the military surprise was worth potentially endangering the lives of U.S. diplomats and citizens in the Middle East. For one, the enormous number of military assets in the region, including two aircraft carrier strike groups, was far more of a tipoff that Washington was seriously considering military action, Lempert argued.

Removing diplomats, meanwhile, would likely have made Iran take the U.S. threats more seriously, said a former State Department official with experience in the Middle East, who, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic decisions. “If anything, evacuating would have tipped the Iranians off that we were serious,” he said.

Nor would evacuations need to be precisely tied to U.S. military action, said a former consular affairs official who served under the current Trump administration. Such moves could be easily explained as related to potential Iranian military action.

“We should automatically be sending out a message clearly to American citizens that there’s a lot of instability in the area, and we don’t know what’s going to happen,” they said. Indeed, Trump has claimed that he decided to attack Iran because he “thought we were going to have a situation where we were going to be attacked” by Iran first.

Other conflicts initiated by the United States, including the June 2025 attack on Iran and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, saw the U.S. draw down embassies across the Middle East and warn American citizens ahead of attacks.

In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. Embassy staff in Jerusalem “planned down to the letter how to respond to counterstrikes from Iraq,” said Jeffrey Feltman, a former U.S. ambassador. “We had constant trainings. We had supplies sent to us and pre-positioned. We had investigations to make sure that our safe rooms were as safe as possible.”

Former State Department employees pointed to a lack of experienced personnel in key positions across the region as one likely explanation for the late evacuations in the Iran conflict.

The process for evacuating staff from embassies can be initiated either by embassies themselves, which make a request to Washington, or by the State Department’s leadership in Washington. Ambassadors, therefore, play a key role in advocating to Washington about whether or not an evacuation should take place.

But the U.S. embassies in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait have no confirmed ambassadors, and are instead led by officers who previously served as the embassies’ second-most senior official. In some cases, embassy leadership are new to the job. In Qatar, a key U.S. partner, the embassy’s top official has only been in the role since January.

The absence of confirmed ambassadors weakens those embassies, said the former State Department official with experience in the Middle East. “There’s an experience element, and there’s a confidence element. And there is an understanding of how to coordinate with Washington that is just missing at the top of all of these missions.”

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Former officers also pointed to a lack of experienced consular affairs leadership in Washington as a potential culprit. Consular affairs leadership helps coordinate assistance for U.S. citizens, as well as overall emergency response efforts.

The State Department’s top consular officer is Mora Namdar, a lawyer and beauty salon owner who previously served in a consular role for one month in the first Trump administration. Namdar’s appointment came amid a stronger focus for the State Department’s consular service on immigration.

Such top consular roles are usually led by long-term State Department employees with significant experience in consular affairs. Feltman pointed to the example of Maura Harty, a State Department officer who climbed the ranks to eventually hold Namdar’s position during the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War and the 2006 Lebanon War.

“She could walk into any meeting at the White House, State Department, [Department of Defense] with credibility and experience and gravitas,” Feltman said. “It’s a completely different thing to have Mora Namdar be at the head of consular affairs versus Maura Harty.”

A State Department spokesperson, asked for comment, said: “The work of Consular Affairs speaks for itself. Outside critics did nothing to help evacuations. While they lobbed meaningless critiques from the back row, our experienced, fast-acting professionals worked 24/7 to help the American people.”

Others suggested that the State Department may have favored political loyalty above other considerations when making key consular office appointments.

The current leader of overseas citizens services, John Grondelski, was brought back from retirement, an unusual move for a position that has historically been staffed by currently serving State Department officials.

Grondelski’s appointment is also unusual in that the role is more typically staffed by someone who has held senior consular positions in the State Department’s headquarters, added the former consular official. Former officials in his position include Karin King, who served in a lower-ranked role in her office before taking her job, and Michele Bond, who likewise did the same

Grondelski’s State Department biography, by contrast, does not list previous jobs in overseas citizens services, instead primarily noting his work in non-consular fields.

A former senior State Department official suggested that Grondelski may have been brought out of retirement to the post because he is a member of the Ben Franklin Fellowship—an association of current and former State Department officials that leans conservative. He is also known as a scholar advocating conservative positions in Catholic publications, and a vocal supporter of Trump.

All other senior members of the State Department’s consular service leadership are also Ben Franklin Fellowship members, as are a number of other key State Department officials.

The State Department is putting some career officers “in senior roles because of their perceived fealty, rather than their proven expertise and experience, essentially politicizing those appointments. This runs wholly contrary to the argument of current Department leadership that they are taking a merit-based approach,” Lempert said.

A State Department spokesperson, asked for comment, replied that “[t]he Trump Administration chooses individuals based on their ability and merit to represent our nation and carry out the President’s foreign policy priorities. The successful results of this ongoing operation demonstrate that.”

Some former State Department officers also pointed to lack of trust as possibly making it difficult for embassies to raise issues or to get information on what course the White House will take.

“The current leadership does not accept doubt—it does not accept, ‘Hey, what if we did this instead,’” said the former consular officer who served under the current Trump administration.

“People in the State Department are afraid to not just make any decisions, but to even offer ideas,” said a former State Department official who now regularly interacts with the State Department.

“It’s clear that anyone that served at senior levels under Democratic administrations is not trusted by this crowd,” said Feltman, pointing to an earlier purge of 30 top State Department officials who took their jobs under the administration of former U.S. President Joe Biden.