The Iran war is just over a month old, and the prevailing opinion among the commentariat is that it’s already a “quagmire,” if not a “catastrophe.” Critics have compared the conflict to the United States’ invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, its intervention in the Korean War, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and, of course, the most traumatic U.S. foreign-policy debacle, Vietnam.

But the Iran war is not a debacle. It is a dilemma.

From an operational perspective, the war is going reasonably well: The United States and Israel are destroying much of what they aimed to hit at the outset. To the extent that the operation has struggled, it’s not because the United States lacks options. Rather, it’s because each pathway comes with trade-offs.

In his announcement of the attack on Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump stated four objectives for the war: To “destroy [Iran’s] missiles and raze their missile industry,” “annihilate [Iran’s] navy,” “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon,” and degrade Iran’s proxy network so it cannot destabilize the region. A month into the war, the United States and Israel have made significant progress toward three of those objectives.

Let’s start with missiles. Iran’s ballistic missile launches dropped by 90 percent within the first week of the campaign. On the first day of the war, Iran fired more than 400 missiles, but that was already the peak. The last several weeks have seen just 20 to 40 Iranian missile launches per day. To place those numbers in context, Iran went into the war with an estimated stockpile of 2,500 to 6,000 missiles. More than 1,500 have been spent, plus an unknown number destroyed in U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Moreover, Israel claimed it has destroyed or disabled roughly 70 percent of Iran’s missile launchers, while the United States said that it has destroyed about two-thirds of Iran’s arms manufacturing capacity. On March 30, Israel announced that it had struck dozens of additional Iranian defense industry sites.

This degradation will likely have two important effects. Unless Iran can restore its manufacturing ability in the near term, it will eventually struggle to sustain even its current rate of missile fire. It can rely more on drones—which it has in greater abundance and which are easier to produce—but those are slower and easier to intercept. Drone strikes, too, are down sharply from earlier in the war. After the war ends, Iran will still be able to build strike drones and missiles—bombing cannot destroy the underlying technical know-how—but it will need time to rebuild facilities, replace personnel, and restore supply chains to come back online.

Naval capacity tells a similar story. The United States claimed that it destroyed more than 140 Iranian naval vessels140 Iranian naval vessels—or 92 percent of its entire fleet—and also struck Iran’s shipyardsshipyards. That may matter less for the fight in the Strait of Hormuz. After all, there are multiple ways to target large, slow-moving tankers in the narrow strip of sea off Iran’s shores. But it does limit Iran’s ability to project power much beyond that. And while Iran can eventually rebuild its fleet, that also takes time.

The same is true for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s foreign minister declared last November that the country could no longer enrich uranium after the U.S. and Israeli attacks of June 2025. As for the current war, International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi stated, “One cannot deny that this has really rolled back the program considerably.” But Grossi also notednoted that Iran retains technical expertise, and so it can rebuild its program in time, as with missiles and ships.

The least progress has been made in rolling back Iran’s proxy network, but that may be changing. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran-backed militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen remain largely intact. If anything, Hezbollah has ramped up its strikes on Israel over the course of the war. Iran-backed militias have actively targeted Kurdish areas and U.S. positions throughout Iraq. But even here, the results are mixed. Israel is ramping up its military intervention in Lebanon, so Hezbollah’s strength may look very different in a few weeks.

On the diplomatic front, the United States and Israel have already notched some key wins. A conglomeration of Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—plus Jordan have become increasingly vocal in condemning Iranian proxies. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam blamed Hezbollah for the current conflict, doubled down on calling for the group’s disarmament, and expelled Iran’s designated ambassador from the country.

By contrast, Iran’s escalation strategy—bombard U.S. regional allies in hopes that they pressure Trump to end the war—has largely backfired. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait are all pushing for the United States to keep fighting Iran until it is decisively defeated. Iran’s actions haven’t fractured the Abraham Accords or the rapprochement between Israel and additional Gulf states. If anything, the opposite may be true.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz, however, has proven moderately successful for Iran. It has wreakedhavoc on global energy markets, complicated the endgame for the war, and will do even more economic damage the longer it continues. But it has not pushed the Trump administration to fold. Even skeptical U.S. allies have slowly warmed to the need to reopen the strait, although in what form remains unclear.

Where the United States and Israel have struggled in this war, though, is termination. It seems that both countries had hoped that as the Iranian regime was degraded, the Iranian public would rise up and overthrow the government. To date, that has not happened.

That shouldn’t be surprising. Air wars rarely prompt regime change. The Kosovo air war indirectly led to the downfall of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, but it took more than a year after that war concluded. Similarly, the Libya air war helped overthrow Libyan dictator Moammar al-Qaddafi, but it was only after ground forces assisted. In general, being bombed tends to produce a rally-around-the-flag effect rather than mass rebellion. In the case of Iran specifically, the regime massacred what some estimate to be 30,000 or more protesters in January—the people most likely to stick their neck out to oppose the government. So, it’s hardly a wonder that the U.S.-Israeli attacks failed to immediately overthrow the regime.

But just because there has been no wholesale regime change does not mean that the United States lacks options.

First, the United States could simply walk away. That would functionally leave Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz and allow it to tax maritime traffic, as it has begun to do with the few oil tankers that it has permitted to pass unharmed. That would provide the regime with another revenue stream it could potentially put to destructive use. In time, Iran would rebuild its arsenal, and the question would be when—not if—the United States and its allies find themselves in the same situation as they did prior to the war. And it would set a dangerous precedent for other states to claim contested waterways, such as China claiming the Taiwan Strait. Still, Washington might decide that the inherent risks of more military action outweigh those costs. Moreover, if Iran’s new shipping fees were too high, Gulf countries would likely double down on other ways—like additional overland pipelines circumventing Hormuz—to bring their oil to market.

Second, the United States could continue its air campaign on the assumption that the Iranian leadership will eventually come to the table. That theory is not unreasonable. While a comprehensive assessment of the damage to Iran’s economy is hard to come by, it’s certainly extensive. And the costs to Iran only grow as the war goes on. Moreover, Israeli decapitation strikes have killed much of Iran’s top command, giving current leaders a very personal reason to cut a deal. And if the United States successfully forced such a deal, then there is a higher likelihood that it could lock in some of the gains it made during the war.

The downside of prolonging the war while awaiting an Iranian change of heart is the cost. Operationally, the United States and Israel need to worry about their own munition supplies, but so do the Iranians. Then there’s also an economic cost around the world, although the economic fallout will also increase the pressure on European and Asian countries to help reopen Hormuz to shipping—if only because their own economic self-interest. And there would be lost lives, as well, although U.S. casualties have been limited so far.

Finally, the United States could escalate. It could attack new categories of targets, like Iran’s electricity grid, or employ ground troops to seize Iranian territory. This may press Iran into negotiating a deal or even topple the regime. Such moves might shorten the conflict or, in case they set off regime change, provide a decisive outcome. But they risk more in terms of blood, treasure, and unintended consequences.

Within these three basic options, there are a host of possible nuances. But the point is that the month-old war is not the catastrophe that some make it out to be, nor is the United States stuck in a quagmire. The war has already succeeded in setting the Iranian threat back, and the United States retains multiple pathways forward. The real question is how much more risk should Washington accept—and over what time frame. It can push for a quick exit and acknowledge that the Iran problem will return in time, or it can push for a more lasting solution but accept a costlier and likely longer war today. That’s a dilemma, no doubt, but all wars are about dilemmas.