At the outset of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, the Arab Gulf states found themselves thrust into a shared crisis. Under the shock of Iran’s sweeping retaliatory campaign—targeting U.S. military bases on their soil, striking civilian infrastructure, and threatening their collective economic models based on ensuring stability and the free flow of commodities—the Gulf closed ranks. States that often differ over regional strategy swiftly coordinated their defenses and diplomacy, securing a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the attacks, while adopting a shared position of neutrality. The collective priority was to insulate their territories, stabilize their economies, and prevent a broader regional collapse.

As the conflict has expanded and hardened into a war of attrition, however, the Gulf is no longer responding to immediate shock but confronting strategic choices that are exposing its underlying differences. First and foremost, is how to navigate a war the Gulf states did not initiate and sought to prevent but which they cannot escape and has no end in sight. Beyond that lie deeper questions—how to move forward with the U.S. security umbrella, how to navigate Israel’s regional ambitions, and how to balance between coexistence and deterrence with Iran—for which there are no shared Gulf answers.

At the outset of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, the Arab Gulf states found themselves thrust into a shared crisis. Under the shock of Iran’s sweeping retaliatory campaign—targeting U.S. military bases on their soil, striking civilian infrastructure, and threatening their collective economic models based on ensuring stability and the free flow of commodities—the Gulf closed ranks. States that often differ over regional strategy swiftly coordinated their defenses and diplomacy, securing a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the attacks, while adopting a shared position of neutrality. The collective priority was to insulate their territories, stabilize their economies, and prevent a broader regional collapse.

As the conflict has expanded and hardened into a war of attrition, however, the Gulf is no longer responding to immediate shock but confronting strategic choices that are exposing its underlying differences. First and foremost, is how to navigate a war the Gulf states did not initiate and sought to prevent but which they cannot escape and has no end in sight. Beyond that lie deeper questions—how to move forward with the U.S. security umbrella, how to navigate Israel’s regional ambitions, and how to balance between coexistence and deterrence with Iran—for which there are no shared Gulf answers.

After their initial exposure to war produced internal alignment, the pressures of sustained conflict are beginning to generate divergences. Three broad positions are now emerging across the Gulf.

The first is a restraint-oriented approach, most clearly reflected in Qatar and Oman. These states have strongly condemned Iran’s attacks, which in the case of Qatar have caused enormous material damage, but have also emphasized the dangers of escalation and the need for diplomacy. Top officials like the prime minister of Qatar and the foreign minister of Oman have signaled an understanding that Iran is acting under existential pressure, while placing significant blame on the initiators of the war—Israel and the United States. They have also articulated a more pointed critique: that Israel’s strategy is to draw the Gulf into direct confrontation with Iran, thereby exhausting both and reshaping the regional balance of power in its favor—a perspective also echoed by Turkey’s foreign minister. From this perspective, entering the war would only deepen the Gulf’s security dilemma.

In contrast, an escalation-leaning camp is emerging, most prominently represented by the United Arab Emirates. With the Emirates facing the highest volume of Iranian attacks of any country, officials like Anwar Gargash and Amb. Yousef al-Otaiba have stated their country’s openness to joining military efforts to confront Tehran—at the very least in ending its ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz—and producing a decisive outcome that is no longer limited to containing threats from Iran. This position stems from the imperative to reassert deterrence, which these countries believe can best be done through deeper engagement with the United States and Israel, while assuming that the UAE can withstand even more severe retaliation from Iran. Abu Dhabi may well have concluded that its past efforts to reengage Tehran proved worthless when put to the test, and that there is limited value in pivoting away from its strategic decision to normalize relations with Israel.

Between these poles sits a third group—the hedging states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and to some extent Bahrain in practice—whose positions have been more deliberately ambiguous. These states have avoided clear public alignment with either escalation or restraint but appear to be quietly facilitating U.S. operations. Western and Israeli officials have stated that these leaders privately support continued military pressure on Tehran. It is highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in particular, sought a war with Iran that would undoubtedly put their interests in grave peril, but it is possible that the pressures of time and escalating costs are leading to more entanglement. In any case, their silence may be working against them as it allows others to define the narrative of their involvement and the implications that stem from it.

These divergences are not new. They reflect long-standing differences in how Gulf states perceive threats, manage risk, and position themselves within the regional order.

Despite their shared institutional framework in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Gulf states have rarely operated as a cohesive strategic bloc. Unity has historically been episodic—strongest during crisis, and weakest when longer-term strategic choices come into play. Just weeks before the current war, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen underscored the persistence of intra-Gulf rivalry, shaped by both geopolitical differences and intensifying economic competition.

At the core of the emerging fragmentation are a set of shared dilemmas that do not allow for a single answer.

The first concerns the U.S. security umbrella. For decades, the presence of American military bases in the Gulf has been understood as a source of deterrence and protection. In recent years, that underlying assumption has repeatedly been undermined by Washington’s failure to hold up its end, raising uncomfortable questions about the reliability and costs of the existing security architecture. The current war, however, has shattered the assumption, as U.S. military bases have become targets and a liability rather than a safeguard. Moreover, when choices made in Washington draw the region into conflict and leave the Gulf states to absorb the consequences, the logic of hosting those bases becomes far less tenable. U.S. President Donald Trump’s erratic behavior and messaging as the war has dragged on—and the lack of institutional restraint—are only adding to the sense that Washington cannot be trusted.

The second dilemma centers on Israel. While the Abraham Accords have not been a source of open contention within the GCC, the Israeli regional aggression that followed the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks has sharpened the lines of discord. The UAE and Bahrain have chosen to maintain formal ties with Israel through its destruction of Gaza, attacks on Lebanon and Syria, its strike on Qatar, and the initiation of two wars with Iran that have upset regional stability. The rest of the GCC views Israel’s regional posture and hegemonic ambitions with serious concern. Given the centrality of Israeli interests to U.S. foreign policy, and the endurance of Gulf-Israel, differences over Israel make a united Gulf strategy almost impossible.

The third dilemma concerns Iran. Despite the rupture caused by the current confrontation, Iran remains a permanent geographic and strategic neighbor—one the Gulf cannot isolate or escape from. This reality forces Gulf states to navigate a difficult balance between responding to immediate attacks and preserving the possibility of long-term coexistence. That balance is becoming harder to sustain. Iran’s wartime posture has raised deeper concerns about its intentions, particularly as it has asserted sovereignty demands over the Strait of Hormuz, a shared and vital waterway for all Gulf economies. Should Iran emerge from the war with renewed confidence or even hegemonic ambitions—an enduring fear among Arab Gulf states—the pressure to shift from restraint toward active balancing will grow. Yet overcorrection carries its own risks. Excessive restraint could weaken deterrence and invite further coercion, while escalation risks entrenching a cycle of confrontation that the Gulf is ill-positioned to sustain. Whether the appropriate strategy is containment, deterrence, or eventual reintegration into a regional framework is a question on which Gulf states are unlikely to converge.

These dilemmas are structural, and they are intensified by a core constraint: The Gulf states are entangled in a war they did not choose and do not control. Their territory has become a battlefield, their infrastructure a target, yet their influence over the conflict remains limited. This imbalance is driving divergence. Some are seeking insulation, others see strategic opportunity, and still others are hedging between the two. What unites them is not a shared strategy, but a shared predicament.

The fraying of Gulf unity should not be overstated. The GCC is not collapsing, nor are its members reverting to open confrontation. But the current moment, which remains incredibly fluid, is revealing the limits of Gulf cohesion as a strategic concept.

Although the war has produced recognition among many in the region that their collective defense would be best served through genuine integration, its feasibility remains an open question.

Unity in the Gulf has always been reactive, driven by immediate threats and external shocks. It has rarely extended to deeper alignment on long-term strategy, where differences in political orientation and threat perception, as well as deep-seated rivalries, invariably reassert themselves.

The immense implications of the war with Iran are putting these dynamics to the test. Although the opening phase forced the Gulf states into rapid alignment, the sustained pressure and cost are now pushing them back toward differentiated paths.