How Ukraine Benefited from Trump’s Iran War

    On March 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave a speech to the British Parliament. “The regimes in Russia and Iran are brothers in hatred—and that is why they are brothers in weapons,” Zelensky told lawmakers. “And we want regimes built on hatred to never, never win—in anything.”

    As Zelensky went on to explain, Ukraine’s contempt for the Iranian regime was not just moral and political. For the past three years, he noted, Ukraine has been fighting off swarms of cheap but effective Iranian-designed drones launched at its cities by the Russians, giving it far more experience countering them than any other country in the world.

    On March 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave a speech to the British Parliament. “The regimes in Russia and Iran are brothers in hatred—and that is why they are brothers in weapons,” Zelensky told lawmakers. “And we want regimes built on hatred to never, never win—in anything.”

    As Zelensky went on to explain, Ukraine’s contempt for the Iranian regime was not just moral and political. For the past three years, he noted, Ukraine has been fighting off swarms of cheap but effective Iranian-designed drones launched at its cities by the Russians, giving it far more experience countering them than any other country in the world.

    By the end of his remarks, the Ukrainian president had presented a stirring statement of principles—and an advertisement for his country as a 21st century arsenal of democracy. It was a moment that illustrates, perhaps better than any other, how Kyiv has managed to turn U.S. President Donald Trump’s chaotic war against Iran to its own benefit.

    Buyers were quick to line up. Within days, Zelensky was in the Middle East, where he quickly signed long-term agreements on military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar as well as launching trade talks with four other countries. His experts offered these new partners the possibility of battle-tested and cost-efficient drone defenses at the same moment when the Persian Gulf countries were confronting the limitations of their U.S.-supplied systems: too costly, too fancy, and already running low on the munitions needed to ensure consistent protection. Ukrainians, by contrast, have perfected the art of quickly ramping up production in response to battlefield needs—and specifically against Shaheds, the lumbering but hard-to-track Iranian drones.

    The unflattering contrast might help to explain Trump’s defensiveness on the subject of Ukrainian weapons. “We don’t need their help in drone defense,” Trump declared on March 13. “We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.”

    Yet Trump’s skepticism doesn’t seem to have hurt Kyiv’s marketing pitch. In a region where it has previously enjoyed little influence, Ukraine suddenly looks like everyone’s new best friend. Its partners in the Middle East are not just offering the promise of urgently needed cash and other forms of assistance. They have also handed Ukraine an upgrade of its international status.

    Nothing beats success on the front lines. Ukraine’s hard-won international prominence is a tribute to the ingenuity of Zelensky’s compatriots, who continue to demonstrate their fighting skill more than four years into the war.

    In recent weeks, they have derailed the start of a long-planned Russian offensive, recapturing some 150 square miles of territory—“their most significant gains on the battlefield” since Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory in August 2024, according to a recent report from the Institute for the Study of War. They have pulled off long-range attacks on factories at the heart of the Russian military-industrial complex. And they have managed to knock out an estimated 40 percent of Russian oil export capacity with powerful strikes on refineries and terminals (which can also be seen as the Ukrainian response to a less welcome consequence of the Iran war—a spike in oil prices that has hugely benefited Moscow).

    In early March, Ukrainian forces operating out of Libya even managed to disable a Russian natural gas tanker in the Mediterranean using a naval drone—just one more reminder of how Kyiv has humiliated the Russians at sea even though they don’t have a navy. Indeed, the Ukrainians’ improbable success at freeing up the Black Sea for their trade has boosted the appeal of their pitch to the Gulf states: If anyone can help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, surely it’s the Ukrainians. (That argument still holds despite the Iranian pledge to reopen the strait as part of the cease-fire announced on April 7; the fundamental vulnerabilities revealed by the recent crisis are still there.)

    Ukraine has done all this at a moment when relations between the United States and its European allies in NATO are hitting a new low—yet another consequence of the Iran war. Trump’s latest rants against the Europeans, whom he accuses of failing to come to the United States’ aid in a war that none of them wanted, have once again shown that they cannot rely on Washington in a pinch. And a Europe that can no longer depend on the Americans urgently needs to find other ways of bolstering its security.

    The Ukrainians are only too happy to fill the gap. They have already established an array of defense-tech joint ventures with the Europeans, and more are on the way—apparently making some members of the hidebound European defense industry nervous. One German executive recently sneered at the allegedly primitive nature of Ukrainian military innovation. “It’s Ukrainian housewives. They have 3-D printers in the kitchen, and they produce parts for drones,” said Armin Papperger, the CEO of Germany’s biggest arms manufacturer, Rheinmetall.

    Zelensky’s reply: “If every Ukrainian housewife can really produce drones, then every Ukrainian housewife could also be the CEO of Rheinmetall.” Former CIA Director David Petraeus, who recently traveled to Ukraine, had his own take on the matter. He said the war in Ukraine shows that Western militaries urgently need to embrace a “whole new concept of warfare.”

    In February, the Wall Street Journalrevealed details about a NATO field exercise in Estonia last year that dramatized the dangers of dismissing Kyiv’s hard-won experience. A handful of Ukrainian drone operators who took part effectively wiped out Western warriors, who had clearly failed to absorb the lessons of the war to the east. Europe, in short, can no longer afford to ignore Kyiv’s military expertise. As the United States moves to decouple from NATO, the Europeans will increasingly need the Ukrainians as much as the Ukrainians need them.

    That means that Ukraine can no longer be treated merely as a supplicant or petitioner; it’s increasingly becoming a partner in its own right. Kyiv is not quite as dependent on its Western partners as it used to be. Trump’s decision to throttle U.S. military assistance to the country has had at least one unintended consequence. Kyiv now relies less on American supplies, manufacturing some 60 percent of its own weapons domestically, with other foreign partners making up the rest. (That might explain why Zelensky has been increasingly willing to push back against U.S. demands for territorial concessions to end the war.)

    The trend of diversification away from the United States is likely to accelerate in the coming months as countries beyond the Gulf learn the lessons of the Iran war. A Japanese drone manufacturer recently announced a partnership with a Ukrainian company—the first time that a Japanese firm has invested in Ukraine’s defense industry. Tokyo has been a strong but low-profile supporters of Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.

    The head of the Japanese company specifically cited the U.S. war on Iran, with its stark mismatch between cheap Iranian drones and costly American interceptors, as added justification for the deal. (Growing Japanese anxiety about a possible attack on Taiwan by drone superpower China may also have something to do with it.) And even the South Koreans, hitherto extremely cautious about overt support for Kyiv, are considering directly financing the purchase of weapons for Ukraine. In addition to their technological expertise, the Ukrainians also offer unique experience fighting North Korean troops—valuable knowledge for Seoul.

    There’s no question that the Ukrainians still face countless problems in their struggle against the Russian juggernaut. Their growing reliance on automated systems, for example, reflects a deepening manpower crisis. Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure continue to take a harsh toll. Kyiv still depends on European funding to shore up its public finances.

    Even so, it’s hard to ignore the sense that Ukraine has managed to leverage the global situation to its resounding advantage. Four years into the war with Russia, Ukraine is looking less like a bit player and more like a force to be reckoned with.

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