Taiwan is facing the most serious test of its political system in decades. What began as a routine outcome of a democratic election—a divided government following the 2024 elections—has evolved into a sustained period of institutional confrontation. The presidency and legislature are locked in procedural combat, with budget bills stalled and the Constitutional Court effectively paralyzed. Taipei’s crisis is weakening public trust at home and undermining its strategic credibility abroad.
The paralysis over defense spending is the latest manifestation of the political crisis, the roots of which can be traced back to the 2024 elections, which delivered a split verdict. In the three-way presidential race, Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won with 40 percent of the vote, but in the Legislative Yuan, the DPP lost its majority. Of the legislature’s 113 seats, the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang (KMT) secured 52, the DPP won 51, and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) won eight. Two KMT-leaning independent candidates also entered the chamber. As such, no party reached the 57-seat threshold required to pass legislation, approve budgets, and confirm executive appointments.
Taiwan is facing the most serious test of its political system in decades. What began as a routine outcome of a democratic election—a divided government following the 2024 elections—has evolved into a sustained period of institutional confrontation. The presidency and legislature are locked in procedural combat, with budget bills stalled and the Constitutional Court effectively paralyzed. Taipei’s crisis is weakening public trust at home and undermining its strategic credibility abroad.
The paralysis over defense spending is the latest manifestation of the political crisis, the roots of which can be traced back to the 2024 elections, which delivered a split verdict. In the three-way presidential race, Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won with 40 percent of the vote, but in the Legislative Yuan, the DPP lost its majority. Of the legislature’s 113 seats, the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as the Kuomintang (KMT) secured 52, the DPP won 51, and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) won eight. Two KMT-leaning independent candidates also entered the chamber. As such, no party reached the 57-seat threshold required to pass legislation, approve budgets, and confirm executive appointments.
Taiwan’s semi-presidential system further amplifies tensions between the executive and legislative branches. The president cannot dissolve the legislature proactively: Dissolution is only permitted if the legislature passes a no-confidence motion against the premier and the premier then requests dissolution. Nor can the president veto bills passed by the legislature.
However, legislation requires the premier’s countersignature to take effect, creating a de facto veto authority that has historically gone unused. More commonly, the premier may request reconsideration of legislation once it is passed but must approve the bill if the Legislative Yuan reaffirms its position. The executive branch may also petition the Constitutional Court for review if legislation is believed to be unconstitutional.
Under this institutional design, the outcome of the 2024 elections created the opportunity for the opposition coalition to use its legislative advantages to constrain the executive. A KMT-TPP partnership has done just that, blocking executive priorities while advancing measures that expand legislative authority.
The current manifestation of this crisis is an ongoing dispute, since late November 2025, over the 2026 central government budget. The executive branch proposed a budget of a little more than 3 trillion new Taiwan dollars ($96 billion in USD), alongside a 1.25 trillion NTD ($40 billion) special defense package, significantly larger than any of its predecessors, spread over eight years. The opposition coalition has blocked both proposals 10 times, using the budgetary process to pressure the government over various policy disputes.
The need is urgent, since the regular defense budget is not enough to fund large-scale procurement of mobile, survivable systems, which would be vital in any clash with China. Special defense budgets are not unusual in Taiwan. The Budget Act permits such measures to address national defense emergencies, and past examples include the 2019 fighter jet procurement package and the 2021 naval and air capability enhancement program. Today, there is a growing bipartisan consensus that special defense budgets are a necessary tool for enhancing Taiwan’s military readiness—but there are fierce disputes over the scale needed.
The ruling DPP’s proposed special defense budget is significantly larger than any of its predecessors. The plan aims to front-load and sustain investment in asymmetric systems. The KMT countered with a significantly smaller 380 billion NTD ($12 billion) budget, which would fund only the eight weapons systems included in the $11 billion arms package announced by the Trump administration in December. The KMT’s draft only runs until 2028, but it includes a clause that allows for a second-stage special defense budget to be proposed if additional weapons are required.
There are, however, differing views within the KMT, with some party figures emphasizing the need to increase investment in military capabilities, including through a larger special defense budget. The TPP’s version stands at 400 billion NTD ($12.7 billion), listing purchases of most of the military equipment put forward in the DPP package, but with caps on spending by category. The ruling party has argued that a smaller budget would constrain the military to short-term planning cycles and is inadequate to support long-term domestic production of drones.
The three parties’ proposals reflect deeper divergences over balancing economic stability and security risks. The DPP’s plan prioritizes expanding self-defense capabilities and closer alignment with the United States to strengthen deterrence and resilience in protracted warfare, while the opposition parties demand legislative oversight and argue that excessive defense spending could come at the expense of social welfare, health care, and public services.
In addition, the KMT and TPP place greater emphasis on reducing cross-strait tensions through engagement with China, whereas the DPP favors closer security coordination with the United States.
All this takes place against especially divided politics—even by Taiwan’s contentious standards. After the new Legislative Yuan was sworn in on Feb. 1, 2024, and before Lai’s inauguration on May 20, there were early signs that relations between the executive and legislature would be particularly bitter. The KMT and TPP introduced and passed a series of controversial legislative reform bills expanding legislative oversight in ways that significantly curtailed executive branch authority. This created a toxic atmosphere and set the stage for subsequent escalation.
Political confrontation intensified during the “Great Recall” movement in July 2025. Recalls for elected politicians are permitted under the Republic of China Constitution and are not uncommon in Taiwan. Beginning in late 2024, civic activists who were angered by KMT and TPP attempts to amend legislative procedures and block government budget proposals had launched recall petitions targeting KMT legislators.
Seeing an opportunity to gain a legislative majority, the DPP aligned itself with the movement, with party leaders and the president publicly endorsing recall efforts. The KMT accused the ruling party of political manipulation and undermining democratic norms. Although the recalls ultimately failed, they deepened partisan polarization and mistrust.
Compounding these issues is the paralysis of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court. Following the resignation of seven grand justices at the end of their terms in October 2024, the legislature rejected all of Lai’s nominees, leaving the court below its functional quorum for major constitutional rulings. Amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act in late 2024 had raised the quorum requirement, rendering the court unable to function with only eight sitting justices.
The court has long served as an arbiter in executive-legislative disputes, and its diminished capacity directly harms the functioning of Taiwan’s democratic system, as political conflict risks becoming self-perpetuating. In December 2025, the court itself struck down the legislative changes that had imposed the high quorum requirements, enabling the resumption of operations. However, the legislature has continued to block or delay new judicial appointments, leaving the Constitutional Court understaffed and its authority weakened.
Tensions between the executive and legislature deepened as the Lai administration made increasingly assertive use of procedural tools available under Taiwan’s constitutional framework. In December, Premier Cho Jung-tai declined to countersign amendments to the Fiscal Planning Act, effectively blocking their implementation. This move followed eight unsuccessful requests for reconsideration of bills previously passed by the legislature—the highest number submitted by any previous premier.
Opposition lawmakers argued that this refusal was unconstitutional, but the paralysis of the court at the time precluded judicial review. Cho subsequently invited the legislature to initiate a no-confidence motion, but the opposition parties were reluctant to risk dissolution of the legislature, particularly given that the president could appoint another premier with similar political views.
Even after the court resumed operations, Cho continued to withhold countersignature for several additional bills without first seeking reconsideration, citing concerns that the legislation undermined principles of separation of powers and fiscal discipline. Opposition lawmakers criticized this approach, arguing that it circumvented established constitutional procedures.
The political deadlock is unfolding alongside a notable shift among younger voters away from positions traditionally associated with the DPP—namely, an emphasis on a distinct Taiwanese identity and strong support for independence. Polling conducted by My Formosa and the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) reveals evolving attitudes toward identity and cross-strait relations, particularly among voters in their 20s and early 30s.
The data indicates growing acceptance of the view that both Taiwan and the mainland belong to “one China,” as well as declining identification with pro-independence positions within this demographic. Support for the “one China” formulation has risen across the political spectrum, with the most pronounced shift occurring among TPP supporters, many of whom are young, although this shift has not translated into increased support for unification. At the same time, TPOF polling found that identification with independence declined from 52 percent to 44 percent between December 2024 and October 2025, suggesting a more cautious and pragmatic posture on questions of sovereignty. The downturn was again most prominent among younger respondents.
Electoral preferences among younger voters have also become increasingly fluid. Since the Great Recall movement, respondents aged 20-29 have generally shown a stronger relative preference for the KMT over the DPP, with brief exceptions following Cheng Li-wun’s election as KMT chair and the conclusion of tariff negotiations with the United States. At the same time, a large share of this demographic remains politically unaligned.
Declining support for independence among younger voters and rising electoral fluidity have emboldened the KMT-TPP alliance to adopt a more confrontational legislative strategy. At the same time, these trends may reflect growing public concerns about Taiwan’s security environment. Political gridlock delays decisions on defense spending, eroding public and U.S. confidence in Taiwan’s resolve and ability to defend itself.
Increasing uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the United States as a partner reinforces the public’s insecurity. In this context, reduced support for independence among some voters may reflect risk aversion rather than ideological realignment.
The prolonged budget risks eroding U.S. confidence in Taiwan’s political will to defend the island and may reinforce perceptions that Taiwan cannot sustain the investments in defense required for credible deterrence. Continued budgetary gridlock could also delay procurement and delivery timelines, complicating Taiwan’s coordination with U.S. defense planners.
Most critically, Taiwan’s deepening political polarization increases its vulnerability to exploitation by China. Beijing stands to benefit when Taiwan’s internal divisions undermine trust in democratic institutions or raise doubts in Washington about Taipei’s strategic reliability. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Cheng highlights how Beijing can engage selectively with Taiwan’s political figures at moments of heightened domestic division to accentuate existing differences over cross-strait policy and national security priorities.
Taiwan’s situation is increasingly precarious. Absent a resolution to the political impasse, Taiwan risks becoming more vulnerable as it navigates intensifying pressure from Beijing, where internal unity is increasingly inseparable from national security.
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