Across Europe and beyond, governments are promising greater control over migration. Stricter return policies, new border procedures and externalisation measures are presented as solutions to a problem that has dominated political debate since the 2015 migration crisis. But there is a growing risk that these policies create expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

Recent political statements illustrate the dynamic. German chancellor Friedrich Merz, for example, suggested that up to 80 per cent of Syrian refugees could return within three years. Such claims may reassure voters in the short run. But they are highly implausible in light of existing evidence — and they may ultimately undermine trust in public institutions.

Long-term research shows that return to the country of origin is typically limited among refugees and irregular migrants, the two groups increasingly securitised in political discourse. Among asylum migrants who received protection in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s, only a relatively small share — roughly in the range of 4–10 per cent — returned over a period of 15 to 20 years, while many either remained or moved elsewhere, mostly within Europe. The European Court of Auditors has estimated that, according to registrations, 29 per cent of all return decisions issued to foreign nationals resulted in “voluntary” or “forced” returns to third countries. If only returns to non-European countries are counted, the registered return rate drops to around 19 per cent.

This gap between political expectations and empirical reality points to what might be called an expectation trap: a situation in which governments promise levels of migration control that they cannot realistically deliver.

Recent EU reforms must be understood in this light. The new Return Regulation and the forthcoming Migration Pact both aim to strengthen control over irregular migration. They introduce stricter return procedures, expand detention possibilities and create new mechanisms for processing asylum claims at the EU’s external borders, where asylum seekers from countries with low recognition rates may be held in “controlled facilities” while their applications are processed. The political logic behind these reforms is clear: governments seek to demonstrate that they are regaining control after years of political tension and electoral pressure.

Yet migration policy cannot rely only on tough language and force. It also depends on cooperation. Migrants must cooperate with return procedures, and countries of origin must be willing to readmit their nationals. Without such cooperation, many return decisions remain impossible to implement in practice. Research has long shown that states face clear limits in enforcing migration control unilaterally, while more recent studies highlight the continued dependence of EU return policy on cooperation with third countries.

At the same time, asylum migration flows are largely driven by factors such as war, political instability and transnational networks. A large body of research shows that these structural drivers, rather than policy restrictiveness alone, shape migration patterns. Stricter enforcement does little to address these underlying dynamics.

A strong emphasis on coercion may even be counterproductive. Migrants who fear detention may avoid contact with authorities altogether, making governance more difficult. Countries of origin and transit, in turn, may become less willing to cooperate if return policies are perceived as unfair or excessively coercive. These countries are often critical of forced removals, but more willing to cooperate with relatively voluntary forms of return. Emerging evidence suggests that perceptions of fairness and partnership play an important role in securing such cooperation. Yet these countries of origin and transit have hardly been involved in shaping Europe’s new migration policies.

A fragile internal bargain

The Migration Pact also depends heavily on political cooperation within the European Union. It assumes that countries at the EU’s external borders will organise reception and asylum procedures, while other member states contribute through relocation or financial support. How much solidarity will materialise in practice remains uncertain.

This creates the risk that countries of first arrival — particularly in southern and eastern Europe — will carry a disproportionate share of both reception and return responsibilities. If these countries come to view the system as unfair, political support may erode, potentially undermining the functioning of the entire framework.

If these reforms fail to deliver the promised level of control, the political consequences may be significant. Migration debates in Europe have increasingly been driven by the expectation that stricter policies will produce clear and visible results. When such expectations are not met, frustration can escalate quickly. In that situation, pressure for ever more restrictive measures is likely to grow. Some political actors may even call into question the right to asylum itself.

Here the expectation trap becomes particularly dangerous. The right to asylum is deeply embedded in international treaties and European law. It cannot simply be abolished. When political expectations collide with legal realities, courts and other institutions may be blamed for the perceived failure of policies that were never fully feasible in the first place.

From enforcement to honesty

In this way, frustration with migration policy risks spilling over into a broader crisis of legitimacy. If citizens come to believe that democratic institutions are unable to deliver what politicians promise — and that legal constraints merely stand in the way — trust in the rule of law and in the European Union itself may begin to erode.

None of this means that migration policy cannot be strict. States have both the right and the responsibility to regulate migration. Nor does it rule out alternative approaches, such as greater reliance on refugee resettlement or community sponsorship schemes. But effective policy requires a realistic understanding of what migration control can achieve.

This also requires greater political honesty. Policymakers should be more transparent about the limits of migration control — not only because enforcement is inherently constrained, but also because migration policy must balance multiple, sometimes competing, objectives: humanitarian protection, economic needs, international cooperation and domestic political concerns.

In this context, Europe’s current policy focus appears increasingly narrow. At a time of demographic ageing and labour shortages across many sectors, the near-exclusive emphasis on enforcement and return seems difficult to justify. Migration is not only a challenge to be controlled but also a structural feature of high-income societies — and, in many cases, part of the solution.

Migration governance is ultimately a balancing act. It must combine enforcement with procedural fairness, national interests with international cooperation, and control with the rule of law. In that delicate balance, a broad understanding of legitimacy — one that considers the perspectives of citizens and non-citizens, authorities and migrants — is not a luxury but a practical necessity.

If Europe ignores that lesson, its migration policies may not restore control but instead erode the very foundations of political trust and democratic legitimacy on which its institutions ultimately depend.

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