Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Southeast Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Indonesia floats a Malacca toll, Duterte stands trial over crimes against humanity, China’s foreign minister visits three countries, and Russian oil continues to flow.
Why Did Indonesia Float a Malacca Toll?
An apparently off-the-cuff observation by Indonesian Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa sparked a flurry of consternation across the region this week.
“We sit along a key global trade and energy route, yet ships passing through the Malacca Strait are not charged,” the minister said on April 22. “I don’t know if that’s right or wrong.” Purbaya went on to suggest that the toll could be split with Malaysia and Singapore, which also border the strait.
Earlier this month, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto had made his own puckish observations about the Strait of Malacca. “Are we aware that 70 percent of East Asia’s energy needs and 70 percent of trade pass through Indonesian seas?” Prabowo mused in a televised speech on April 8.
Admittedly, Indonesian ministers have a latitude to independently float policies not endorsed by the government to a degree that is unthinkable in many other countries. And Purbaya is known to have an outspoken temperament. But Purbaya is also seen as Prabowo’s man at the Finance Ministry. Some detect a whiff of a minister currying favor by floating ideas the presidential palace might like to hear—even if just as a provocation.
Malaysia and Singapore both stated their opposition to Purbaya’s suggestion. Within 24 hours, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono disavowed the comment. Purbaya later said that he was joking. And for numerous reasons, this proposal is unlikely to ever happen.
But the fact it was floated at all is telling, for two reasons.
First, with the crisis over the Strait of Hormuz—yet another herald of the crumbling of the post-World War II order—international actors are considering how it might be revised to their advantage.
Indonesia’s sprawling archipelago gives it control of numerous strategic straits—not just Malacca, but also Sunda and Makassar. And as the Economist has pointed out, Indonesia has flirted with similar ideas before. In the early 2000s, when piracy became an issue in the straits, Indonesia suggested that ships might pay to be escorted through. At the time, Malaysia and Singapore teamed up to squash the idea.
Second, Purbaya’s comments speak to Indonesia’s deteriorating fiscal situation—which bodes ill for the region.
It seems not coincidental that the idea was floated by Indonesia’s finance minister. The country’s ’s fiscal positions look increasingly shaky. Earlier in April, S&P Global Ratings flagged Indonesia as the country in the region that it deems most at risk of a credit rating downgrade.
In 2025, the budget was already creaking as the president pushed for generous new welfare programs and increased military spending even as government revenue dropped. The advent of the fuel shock this year has only intensified these trends—and makes any new source of revenue especially tempting.
For now, the prospect of Indonesia actually attempting to charge tolls looks highly unlikely. It would cause squawks not just from neighbors but also from every country with a stake in the global trading system—most notably, the United States and China. Indonesia’s relatively weak naval forces are also an issue. The country cannot effectively police its vast territorial waters.
This means that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which gives Indonesia sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, is an important tool in its arsenal.
Still, these developments will disturb the equanimity of many in the region.
With a population more than half the size of that of the next-largest country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has long been a source of geopolitical anxieties in the area. Indonesia’s domestic troubles and politicians flirting—however gently—with revisionism are destabilizing.
What We’re Watching
Duterte to face trial. On April 23, the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed its charges against former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on three counts of crime against humanity.
The pretrial judges concluded that there are substantial grounds to believe that Duterte is responsible for the crimes, thus determining that he should stand trial.
Duterte faces charges related to 76 murders and two attempted murders. However, the defense has said this comprises a “non-exhaustive list,” in that they are specific examples of what is alleged to be a much wider campaign of murder. The number of extrajudicial killings during Duterte’s presidency is thought to be in the tens of thousands.
Under Duterte, the Philippines began the process of leaving the ICC in 2018. However, the ICC ruled earlier that it has jurisdiction over crimes committed prior to the Philippines’ exit, a decision that it confirmed on April 22.
Meanwhile in the Philippines, Duterte’s daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, is also in trouble, with an impeachment case against her gathering steam.
The latest round of committee hearings in the House of Representatives has zeroed in on allegations of unexplained wealth.
Her defense team said on April 26 that it will only respond to allegations in the Senate, effectively admitting that it expects the House to advance the case.
Thailand cozies up to the Myanmar junta. Thailand has backed Myanmar’s bid to normalize relations with ASEAN, which have been on ice since the 2021 coup. And the junta is considering “good things” for imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
This is according to Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who visited Myanmar from April 21-22.
“We want to support their return to ASEAN. Our policy is to have steps in our interactions to bring them back,” he told reporters, though he added that the junta would have to address ASEAN concerns.
One outstanding issue has been the fate of Aung Saan Suu Kyi, who has not been seen since in public the coup. Sihasak told reporters that junta leader-turned-President Min Aung Hlaing had assured him she was well looked after and “said they are considering good things.”
Sihasak has previously said that it would be “difficult” to reengage with Myanmar without Aung Saan Suu Kyi’s release.
This follows the junta’s decision earlier this month to release the imprisoned president who was overthrown in 2021 and cut Aung San Suu Kyi’s 27-year sentence by a sixth as part of a mass amnesty.
During his trip, Sihasak also laid out Thailand’s priorities in Myanmar, which he described as a “lasting peace” within the country as well as closer cooperation on border security and fighting transnational crime.
Chinese FM tours region. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar last week.
Cambodia saw its first “2+2” strategic dialogue involving both countries’ defense and foreign ministers, as proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping when he visited Cambodia last year.
During the trip, it was announced that this would be upgraded to a 3+3 dialogue involving the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and Cambodian Ministry of Interior.
Notably, this 3+3 format may be becoming China’s new standard for engagement with other authoritarian countries. Analysts noted that March saw the first ever trilateral meeting between Vietnam and China.
While in Cambodia, Wang also called for the complete eradication of scam centers.
China has also been pushing for a crackdown on the criminal syndicates behind these centers, which often both target Chinese citizens and involve Chinese nationals at the top level.
However, scam issues have also made China a target for ire within Cambodia. Protesters—many of them reportedly Chinese nationals—gathered outside the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh to protest Wang’s visit.
The issue was that they had lost access to their deposits in a financial conglomerate that had its banking license revoked over scam center links. The group’s chair was extradited to China on April 1.
After Cambodia, Wang traveled to Thailand, where he met with Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as well as Sihasak, the aforementioned foreign minister, on April 24.
Anutin said China indicated that Phnom Penh appeared open to easing tensions with Bangkok. However, Thailand’s own hard-line stance—which last week entailed tearing up a 2001 memorandum of understanding with Cambodia on maritime borders—could complicate this.
Plans for further cooperation on technology, including tech related to electric vehicles, renewable energy, and green technology, were also announced.
Finally, Wang met with Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s junta leader-turned-president, and Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe.
According to China’s readout, Myanmar declared that it “will never allow any actions that harm China’s interests within its borders,” and Wang told the junta that China would “firmly support” Myanmar’s security and sovereignty.
Photo of the Week
Chinese and Cambodian nationals believed to be Huione Pay creditors clash with police and security personnel during a protest near the National Bank of Cambodia headquarters in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on April 27.Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images
Unable to access their savings, Cambodians and Chinese nationals have been protesting ever since Huione’s banking license was revoked in December over alleged links to scam syndicates helmed by Chinese nationals. See above for more.
FP’s Most Read This Week
- Who Wants to Be an American Diplomat?by Sam Skove and Rachel Oswald
- What if China Succeeds?by Matthew Kroenig
- The Quad Is on the Brink of Extinctionby Derek Grossman
What We’re Reading
“This is not about us taking sides in the geopolitical competition. It’s about what the U.S. is doing, which is forcing us to rethink some relationships.” Washington Post reporter Rebecca Tan snags an exclusive interview with Sihasak.
Some Filipina cowgirls are taking sexism by the horns. A fun piece by AFP about the women taking part in the Masbate rodeo was republished in the Straits Times.
Millions of Southeast Asians work in the Middle East, but the Iran war is sending them home and hitting remittances hard, especially for the Philippines. A great piece in Nikkei Asia by Akira Kitado, Ramon Royandoyan, Rezha Hadyan, and Natsumi Kawasaki.
Number of the Week
150 million. The number of barrels of Russian that oil Indonesia will import this year, according to Deputy Energy Minister Yuliot Tanjung.
The announcement follows President Prabowo Subianto’s meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Russia earlier in April.
Indonesia is just one of a number of Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, looking to Russia for energy supplies.
This could become a flash point with the European Union. On April 23, the EU announced that it was sanctioning Karimun Oil Port in Indonesia over its connections to Russia’s shadow fleet, marking the bloc’s first sanctions against a third-party port.
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