On April 9, the 23rd anniversary of the day Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, the Iraqi government found itself confronting an acute political and security crisis. That day, a senior U.S. official summoned Iraq’s ambassador to condemn “egregious terrorist attacks by Iran-aligned militia groups launched from Iraqi territory against U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities.” The governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait also summoned Iraqi diplomats with a similar complaint: These countries had all been targeted by drones launched from Iraqi soil.
Two days later, while Iraqi diplomats were still busy trying to explain why their country’s territory was being used in a war it was not a party to, the country’s parliament announced a new president. Despite deep political divisions, Nizar Amidi was selected in a secret ballot, more than two months after the constitutional deadline passed for picking the president. On April 27, after nearly six months of deliberation, Iraq’s dominant political bloc, the Coordination Framework, named Ali al-Zaidi as its nominee for prime minister—missing the constitutional deadline by one day.
On April 9, the 23rd anniversary of the day Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, the Iraqi government found itself confronting an acute political and security crisis. That day, a senior U.S. official summoned Iraq’s ambassador to condemn “egregious terrorist attacks by Iran-aligned militia groups launched from Iraqi territory against U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities.” The governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait also summoned Iraqi diplomats with a similar complaint: These countries had all been targeted by drones launched from Iraqi soil.
Two days later, while Iraqi diplomats were still busy trying to explain why their country’s territory was being used in a war it was not a party to, the country’s parliament announced a new president. Despite deep political divisions, Nizar Amidi was selected in a secret ballot, more than two months after the constitutional deadline passed for picking the president. On April 27, after nearly six months of deliberation, Iraq’s dominant political bloc, the Coordination Framework, named Ali al-Zaidi as its nominee for prime minister—missing the constitutional deadline by one day.
Upon his election by parliament, Amidi swore an oath to protect “Iraq’s independence and its sovereignty.” If he is able to form a government within the 30-day deadline set for him, so will Zaidi. It won’t be easy for either man. The country is suffering from repeated constitutional violations by the very people tasked with protecting it, not to mention high-profile assassinations and fighting between domestic militias and foreign powers. Although these crises predate the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran—and will certainly outlast it—the spiraling effects of the regional conflict have only pushed Iraq deeper into its own troubles.
Despite the complaints of U.S. and Gulf diplomats, the attacks launched from Iraqi territory since the war on Iran broke out on Feb. 28 have not been limited to American assets or Iraq’s neighbors. From the outset, armed groups have also targeted Iraqi interests and facilities, from Baghdad and Erbil airports to cafes and housing complexes in the Kurdistan region, at the behest of Iran. Similarly, U.S. strikes targeting militia groups in Iraq have undermined Iraq’s sovereignty and left the state to conduct damage control.
Militias carrying out kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and internal attacks is, unfortunately, nothing new for Iraq. But the country’s weak judiciary and cowed law enforcement allow these attacks to continue with no accountability.
That only emboldens militias at a time when their fragmentation is already challenging Iraq’s integrity as a state. Not all militias in Iraq are directly beholden to Iran. However, the vast majority are publicly aligned with Tehran, and some are under direct command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Some are known, such as Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Brigades. Others are newer, shadier, and don’t have publicly known leaders. When groups like Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (formerly known as Ashab al-Kahf) and Saraya Awliya al-Dam claim responsibility for attacks, they help Iran’s so-called axis of resistance destabilize the region.
The blame, however, is not Iran’s alone. During the war on the Islamic State, the U.S.-led coalition worked with the Iraqi state-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), which included many Iran-affiliated militias and armed wings of political groups. Even after the defeat of the Islamic State in 2017, the Iraqi government continued to arm and fund the PMU with budgets up to $3.6 billion annually.
As the PMU has become more empowered, candidates directly linked to it won some 50 seats in November’s election. Now amid the war, the Iraqi government announced that militia groups under the PMU umbrella were allowed to use force as “self-defense” in retaliation to any attacks. While the Iraqi government statement did not specify who was targeting the PMU, it did mention attacks by “war planes or drones,” which are usually American. There are elements of the PMU that play a benign role, like protecting holy sites in Najaf and Karbala, but the greater number of groups are politically motivated and aligned with Iran. For the sake of short-term convenience, the Iraqi state is further empowering groups that will only undermine its authority.
The time has come for Iraq to tackle the fundamental contradiction in its security apparatus—paying the wages and propping up armed groups that ultimately undercut its own sovereignty. It should adopt measures that include holding those responsible for crimes accountable and ensuring that no armed group is able to launch attacks on Iraqi or American installations, especially as the latter are in Iraq at the request of the government. Furthermore, any group targeting a neighboring country—and potentially dragging Iraq into a state of war—must be stopped, and those giving the orders to attack need to be detained.
It is, admittedly, a difficult moment to confront the militias. The reality is that Iraqi state structures are too weakened and infiltrated by some of these groups. That is why the United States has played—and will continue to play—an instrumental role. In the last several weeks, the U.S. government has announced four $10 million rewards for information on Iraqi militia leaders as part of its broader campaign against Iran. The rewards indicate that the United States could take these leaders out, which would add to a long list of extrajudicial killings in the country. But they also send a strong external signal to the incoming Iraqi government that it cannot allow these groups to operate freely in the country.
International threats of boycotts and sanctions can limit militias’ public operations. But most importantly, there must be a domestic effort to tackle lawlessness, especially with a new government coming in. This is a tall order, given that most militias have political leaders inside the parliamentary system. The previous two governments, under Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Mohamed Shia al-Sudani, made clear their inability to carry out government military action against the militias for fear of internal strife and bloodletting. As for Zaidi, if he is able to form a government, he will likely be indebted to the political allies of these very militias. Still, strengthening the rule of law in Iraq, including in helping protect lawyers and judges pursuing these militias, will be vital and should be a key domestic and international demand of the new government.
Adding to the complicated security dynamic is the fact that a number of agreements that once underpinned Iraq’s politics are unraveling. Take the new president, for example. By convention, the position is usually filled by a Kurd, with the agreement of the two main Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Amidi, a member of the PUK, was elected despite the objections of the KDP, the Kurdish party with the highest number of votes in the last elections.
As Iraq’s Islamist Shiite actors have strengthened their alliance with the PUK, they have worked to keep the Iran-skeptical KDP sidelined. Amidi’s presidential selection coincides with repeated attacks by Iran and Iranian-aligned groups on Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, in the last two months. Taken together, these developments represent an Iranian-backed effort to undercut the largely stable Kurdistan Region and its KDP leadership.
What’s more, it took close to six months for the Coordination Framework to agree on a candidate for prime minister—a reflection of internal dysfunction as much as foreign influence. The United States had made its opposition to a comeback for Iran-aligned Nouri al-Maliki forming the next government very public. Zaidi’s nomination, on the other hand, represents the introduction of a candidate who has never held an official government position before but is nominated by the Coordination Framework grouping, Iran’s strongest ally in Baghdad. Since he was named prime minister-designate, however, phone calls from key leaders, including U.S. President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, indicate a desire and effort to work with him.
Iran will continue to seek to strengthen its grip in Iraq with the new government being named. In the past two years, it has lost its hold over Syria and now has a much-reduced role in Lebanon, where its ambassador faces expulsion. Tehran is adamant about retaining and increasing its hold on Iraq. After becoming Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei made a point to thank Iraq for its support. Iraq is instrumental in allowing Iran to circumvent sanctions, from purchasing Iranian gas via a U.S. special waiver (terminated after the war began) to giving Tehran access to U.S. dollars.
On paper, Iraq’s political system has the checks and balances and weakened central power to avoid a return to dictatorship. However, the fractured system put in place by the United States and the Iraqi political parties it cultivated have allowed for the state to become vulnerable to sectarian militias and foreign influence. Iraqis themselves are the ones paying the ultimate price for the dysfunction, from drone attacks to a crippling of the economy, especially as the United States has now suspended the country’s access to dollars.
As a fragile regional cease-fire holds, Iraq finds itself still in an unending war, devastated by internal battles over the very nature of the country. Perceptions and expectations will greatly influence the coming days. As Iraqi political parties continue their horse-trading to form a new government, the tone set by the new government will either seek Iraq’s independence or signal that it’s beholden to Tehran.
Should he ascend to the role of prime minister, Zaidi will have his work cut out for him. He has not previously held a government role but is deeply embedded in the political system. He will need to form a government before the end of May, and it will need to include other political parties, in line with the consensus governments formed by the largest blocs in parliament. He will have to balance internal rivalries, including within the Coordination Framework, which named him as a compromise candidate, and between Iranian and U.S. interests. Who joins the government in Baghdad, whether militias can be curtailed, and how its economy can be weaned off Iranian gas and electricity will all set the tone for Iraq’s next chapter.
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