The United Arab Emirates is steadily expanding its investment footprint in Syria as it positions itself for a larger role in shaping the country’s economic future and regional orientation. Beyond reconstruction, the UAE increasingly views post-Assad Syria as a strategic arena through which it can expand its influence, strengthen trade networks beyond the Strait of Hormuz, and secure a greater role in the emerging regional order with the decline of Iranian influence. In this context, Emirati engagement in Syria is also becoming part of a broader geopolitical competition with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey over the future political and economic direction of Damascus, Syria’s capital.

The Emirati role in Syria has arguably been the most fluid and adaptive among the six Gulf Cooperation Council states since 2011. While some Gulf states, most notably Qatar and Kuwait, remained firmly committed to isolating Damascus under former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, others, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, gradually shifted toward cautious engagement after 2020 in an effort to manage security risks. Oman, meanwhile, largely maintained its traditional policy of neutrality and engagement with the de facto authorities in Damascus regardless of political orientation.

The United Arab Emirates is steadily expanding its investment footprint in Syria as it positions itself for a larger role in shaping the country’s economic future and regional orientation. Beyond reconstruction, the UAE increasingly views post-Assad Syria as a strategic arena through which it can expand its influence, strengthen trade networks beyond the Strait of Hormuz, and secure a greater role in the emerging regional order with the decline of Iranian influence. In this context, Emirati engagement in Syria is also becoming part of a broader geopolitical competition with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey over the future political and economic direction of Damascus, Syria’s capital.

The Emirati role in Syria has arguably been the most fluid and adaptive among the six Gulf Cooperation Council states since 2011. While some Gulf states, most notably Qatar and Kuwait, remained firmly committed to isolating Damascus under former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, others, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, gradually shifted toward cautious engagement after 2020 in an effort to manage security risks. Oman, meanwhile, largely maintained its traditional policy of neutrality and engagement with the de facto authorities in Damascus regardless of political orientation.

The Emirati approach, by contrast, has shifted in response to developments. In the early years of the uprising, the Emirati government in Abu Dhabi backed the Syrian opposition and called for the removal of Assad. Over time, however, the UAE diverged from Saudi and Qatari preferences over who should succeed Assad and gradually recalibrated its position. It later supported Russian intervention as a counterterrorism necessity, diplomatically reengaged with Assad while the Saudi government in Riyadh remained more hesitant, and eventually became one of the principal Arab advocates for Syria’s reintegration into the regional order. Emirati diplomacy played a direct and indirect role in Syria’s return to the Arab League.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the UAE again adjusted to the new political landscape. Abu Dhabi approached the new leadership in Damascus cautiously at first. Syria’s transitional ruler, a former jihadist who has since sought to project moderation, reformism, and a willingness to govern a pluralistic state, was initially viewed skeptically. Yet the Emiratis ultimately chose to throw their economic and diplomatic weight behind the new government. For Abu Dhabi, influence in Damascus represented too significant an opportunity to forgo, particularly as Syria entered a transitional phase in which regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, were vying to shape reconstruction efforts and the country’s future regional orientation.

The clearest sign of this shift came with the announcement of major Emirati investments in Syria last week. Emirati conglomerate Emaar Properties announced plans to invest approximately $11 billion in Damascus and its surrounding areas, alongside up to an additional $7 billion in projects along the Syrian coast. And back in July 2025, DP World committed to invest $800 million to expand the capacity of the Port of Tartus, the first major agreement the Syrian transitional authority signed. While these investments may reflect confidence in the Syrian government’s improving position, they mainly reflect Abu Dhabi’s broader geopolitical ambitions.

The strategic value of Syrian ports has become particularly evident following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq has already begun using Syrian infrastructure, including Baniyas Port, as an alternative export route to European markets. For the UAE, Syria’s coastline is increasingly viewed as part of a broader regional connectivity strategy designed to hedge against maritime vulnerabilities in the Gulf. The UAE has spent years expanding its influence over maritime infrastructure and logistics corridors across the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and beyond. With Syria’s transitional government now controlling most of the country, the UAE is eager to incorporate Syria into that network.

The timing of Emirati investments also reflects growing confidence that the Syrian transitional government is consolidating control. Damascus recently finalized a merger agreement with the Syria Democratic Forces, while the United States has shifted aspects of its counterterrorism coordination to Damascus rather than its Kurdish allies. Together, these developments signal greater international and regional confidence in the government’s ability to preserve stability and launch an economic and political plan to stabilize the country beyond the expected three- to five-year transition period.

In this context, the Emirati investment approach in Syria increasingly resembles the UAE’s earlier economic strategy in Egypt. There, Gulf capital served not only as a tool for economic stabilization but also as a mechanism for expanding long-term political influence and strategic economic leverage in a financially strained Egypt. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, the Cairo model has largely validated the strategic use of Gulf capital as a tool of both influence and economic return. Emaar Properties alone has invested more than $18 billion in Egypt, with its projects generating returns of roughly $103 million in 2025 and $290 million in 2024. Emaar Properties’ founder and CEO has openly expressed hopes of replicating aspects of Egypt’s coastal development model in Syria, underscoring Abu Dhabi’s belief that strategic investments in Syria can generate both geopolitical leverage and long-term economic returns.

Competition with Saudi Arabia is another major driver of Emirati activism in Syria. Syria’s transitional president has thus far attempted to signal independence from competing regional blocs while simultaneously purging Iranian influence from the country. Although Turkey and Saudi Arabia are widely viewed as holding the greatest political influence in Syria, both face constraints. Turkey continues to struggle economically and may lack the resources for large-scale reconstruction investments, while many Saudi financial pledges have yet to materialize.

As a result, the growing competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over regional influence and economic dominance has increasingly extended into Syria. Control over investment flows into Syrian ports, infrastructure, and logistics corridors could shape Damascus’s future relationships with its Gulf partners. The success of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, for example, is closely tied to the development of Syria’s southern land crossings in the city of Daraa and the ports of Tartus and Latakia. This helps explain why Emirati investments have focused heavily on both the Syrian coast and Damascus itself.

Yet these ambitions face a structural constraint: Any Gulf-to-Syria land corridor must pass through Jordan and southern Syria, an area increasingly complicated by Israeli military activity and political tensions. This, in turn, may create a unique role for the UAE as a mediator in the evolving Israeli-Syrian file. There is a growing likelihood that Syria’s transitional leaders view Emirati investment not only as an economic lifeline but also as a form of political insurance, raising the diplomatic and strategic costs of potential Israeli destabilization efforts inside Syria.

As Israel’s only regional partner, the UAE could potentially use its growing investments and political leverage in Syria to pressure Israel to adopt a less coercive posture in southern Syria. Additionally, with the Syrians and Israelis hitting a stalemate in their negotiations for a new security arrangement, the Emiratis may play a facilitating role with the Americans in these talks. At the same time, Israel itself may view a stronger Emirati presence in Syria as preferable to an expanding Turkish role—an outcome that has become a growing concern among Israeli policymakers following the collapse of Iran’s regional network.

Whether Abu Dhabi’s strategy ultimately succeeds will depend on factors largely outside Emirati control: Syria’s fragile internal stability, unresolved Israeli-Syrian tensions, and Turkish and Saudi competition. Still, the UAE enters this competition with significant advantages. It possesses greater financial liquidity than Turkey and maintains closer ties with Israel—the region’s emerging hegemonic power—than any other Gulf or Arab state. While Emirati investments alone are unlikely to stabilize Syria or fully insulate Gulf trade from future regional shocks, they could nevertheless prove effective in gradually expanding Abu Dhabi’s geopolitical leverage.