“No limits partnership.” Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin used this phrase in February 2022, striking a celebratory note just weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than four years later, the countries’ ties indeed appear to be thriving. Putin’s recent trip to Beijing, his first international visit in 2026, was the latest reminder of this relationship.
But the visit also put on display how asymmetric the Beijing-Moscow relationship has grown. With Russia entangled in an unwinnable war and burdened by a stagnating economy, China is deciding what partnership looks like and what “no limits” actually means. It is Xi, not Putin, driving the proverbial bus.
“No limits partnership.” Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin used this phrase in February 2022, striking a celebratory note just weeks before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More than four years later, the countries’ ties indeed appear to be thriving. Putin’s recent trip to Beijing, his first international visit in 2026, was the latest reminder of this relationship.
But the visit also put on display how asymmetric the Beijing-Moscow relationship has grown. With Russia entangled in an unwinnable war and burdened by a stagnating economy, China is deciding what partnership looks like and what “no limits” actually means. It is Xi, not Putin, driving the proverbial bus.
The big picture is clear. Both China and Russia have long had a problem with U.S. primacy and are joining forces to counterbalance it. They see the West as declining and a more multipolar world emerging, with U.S. President Donald Trump—to use a Leninist term— serving as the midwife of history.
This alignment of views translates into policy. Since 2022, Beijing has thrown a lifeline to the Russian economy, providing a market for hydrocarbons and supplying critical goods, such as machinery, and dual-use products, such as electronic components. Moscow’s defense industries—notably, those making the drones and missiles pummeling Ukrainian cities—would not survive without China. And thanks to energy exports, the Russian economy has managed to blunt the impact of Western sanctions. Russia even runs a trade surplus with China.
The economic and strategic linkage is enduring and will outlast the Ukraine war. All talk of a “reverse Kissinger”—Washington enlisting Russia as an ally in pressuring China—misses the mark. To the contrary, Putin is quite clearly courting Xi, just as Trump did during his own high-profile visit to Beijing.
Yet Putin’s pilgrimage to Zhongnanhai also made it obvious that Russia is not getting the deal that it wants from China. In fact, Putin came back empty-handed. Specifically, there was no grand announcement about the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. This natural gas connection, designed to ship 50 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas annually over 2,600 kilometers (1,616 miles) from western Siberia to northeastern China, has been approved in principle by Gazprom and China’s CNPC.
If implemented, the project would roughly double the current volume of gas that China buys from Russia, which covers about a fifth of Chinese imports. Yet, as ever, the devil is in the details: The Chinese are driving a hard bargain on price and on the take-or-pay quotas. Russia had hoped that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz putting in jeopardy much of the flow of liquefied natural gas would soften Beijing’s position, but so far, these hopes have been misplaced.
At the end of the day, Russia, having largely lost the European markets, needs China more than the other way around. The Beijing is profiting from a surge of investment into renewables, which generate about 40 percent of its electricity. China has large coal reserves, too. Gas—which is used mainly in industrial production and for residential heating—could replace some of those.
As in Europe, the Chinese look at natural gas as a transition fuel smoothing the switch from coal to renewables. As a result, its utility very much depends on the price. And Beijing also believes that flexibility is key to securing stable and affordable gas. This means that Chinese companies are setting up terminals and signing long-term contracts with Australian, Malaysian, and Indonesian suppliers along with those in the United States and Russia. All this means that they have alternatives to the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline.
The Chinese leadership surely remembers the precedent set by Power of Siberia 1. Negotiations lasted more than a decade, but eventually, Putin accepted China’s terms. Those included a price lower than the one paid by Gazprom customers in Europe, plus Russia bearing the financial cost of laying thousands of kilometers of pipeline. What eventually made Putin budge was Russia’s worsening relationship with Europe and the United States following the annexation of Crimea. China took advantage then and has even stronger leverage now.
Russia’s oil exports, which are critical to its state budget and overall fiscal balance, mirror its gas sales. China is now the main market for Russian crude. It purchases 50 percent of Russia’s oil exports, representing 18 percent of Chinese imports. Amid this heavy trade, Beijing has been able to squeeze out a discount from Russian firms, which have come under G-7 sanctions. Despite the closure of Hormuz, crude from the Urals is reportedly selling at an growing discount. Here too, Russia needs China much more than China does Russia.
The asymmetry between the two countries is reflected in the structure and dynamics of their trading relationship. Russia exports commodities: oil, gas, agricultural products, and minerals. What comes back is electronics, vehicles, industrial equipment, and consumer goods. What’s more, Chinese companies have essentially replaced the Western, Japanese, and South Korean firms that exited Russia after 2022. The share of new Chinese cars sold in Russia rose from less than 20 percent to 57 percent between 2022 and 2025. Chinese automotive companies have frequently joined forces with the Russian outfits that took over Western-owned assets. Now, for example, the former Volkswagen plant near Kaluga assembles models for the Chinese manufacturer Chery.
Chinese investment is not of the type that brings technology transfer or boosts Russian productivity. Instead, the Russian economy has entered a spell of low growth. Now, even the Chinese firms that have invested in Russia are worried about losing business amid Russia’s declining economic fortunes.
There are those in Russia who see the disadvantages of tying their country’s fortunes to an increasingly dominant China. Prominent foreign-policy analyst Dmitri Trenin has said, “It’s absolutely essential for us to maintain an equal footing in our relations and to remember that Russia is a great power which cannot be a junior partner.”
In this light, Russia sees its relationship with India, which includes both an economic and political dimension, as a hedge against overreliance on China.
Likewise, strategists are aware no doubt that Beijing’s support regarding Ukraine is not unqualified. China formally insists that it is neutral, provides rhetorical support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and maintains a relationship with Kyiv. And Moscow knows that if there is settlement, Chinese contractors will be lining up the next day for reconstruction projects in Ukraine.
Finally, Russian businesses are also unhappy about Chinese competition, particularly when Chinese firms profit from the indirect or direct blessing of the Kremlin. Sergei Chemezov, the head of the state-owned defense industrial conglomerate Rostec, has been one of the skeptical voices.
Once the Ukraine war ends, Russian concerns about the unequal nature of the relationship will gain more traction. Yet Moscow’s room for maneuver will have narrowed even further by then. Having overtaken the EU, China will remain Russia’s top economic partner. Chinese technology will have penetrated much deeper. People-to-people links will have expanded, with China becoming an increasingly popular destination for Russian travelers.
More importantly, Putin’s obsession with grand geopolitics and waging civilizational war against the West will ensure that Beijing remains his inescapable partner. In short, Beijing has options, but for the Kremlin, there’s no limit to the relationship in sight.
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