While discussing the future of Hezbollah recently, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested that Syria could play a role in facilitating “more surgical” strikes against the group in Lebanon. Trump did not spell out what such a Syrian mission might entail. His hope, it appears, is to secure Damascus’s support in defeating one of Iran’s most important proxies.
Back in March, the United States had discussed the possibility of a Syrian incursion into eastern Lebanon. At the time, Damascus reportedly resisted the proposal. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government was wary of being drawn into a new regional confrontation and concerned that any direct involvement against Hezbollah might spark political and sectarian tensions in Syria.
While discussing the future of Hezbollah recently, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested that Syria could play a role in facilitating “more surgical” strikes against the group in Lebanon. Trump did not spell out what such a Syrian mission might entail. His hope, it appears, is to secure Damascus’s support in defeating one of Iran’s most important proxies.
Back in March, the United States had discussed the possibility of a Syrian incursion into eastern Lebanon. At the time, Damascus reportedly resisted the proposal. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government was wary of being drawn into a new regional confrontation and concerned that any direct involvement against Hezbollah might spark political and sectarian tensions in Syria.
Still, the idea has an obvious appeal for Damascus. Syrian commentators quickly framed Trump’s latest remarks as evidence that Washington “wants a larger Syrian role in Lebanon.” Indeed Syria’s new rulers have incentives to curb Hezbollah: The group backed the former Assad regime, relied on Syrian territory for weapons transfers, and has offered protection for Assad-era officials in Lebanon. In this light, Syrian officials have expressed frustration that Lebanon has not done more to halt the group’s activities. What’s more, a tougher line against Hezbollah could help the new Syrian government make the case for further U.S. sanctions relief and show Washington that it has broken with Iran’s regional network.
So, what’s wrong with Trump’s proposal? Whatever the temptation, a Syrian intervention is exactly the thing that could rescue Hezbollah in a moment of weakness. If Syrian forces crossed the border, it would allow Hezbollah to recast its arsenal not as a challenge to the Lebanese state but as a shield against foreign intervention. It would reopen traumatic memories from the 1975-90 Lebanese Civil War, when Syrian forces invaded Lebanon and proceeded to stayed for almost three decades, and in doing so alarm Lebanese communities that otherwise oppose Hezbollah. And on top of all this, it would place Syria’s armed forces in a combustible environment, potentially weakening them when they are needed most to maintain Syria’s territorial integrity at home.
Damascus is a useful partner against Hezbollah—but only on its own side of the border. Syria can help block Hezbollah’s regeneration by closing smuggling routes and interdicting weapons. Indeed, Syrian forces have already intercepted hundreds of rockets and weapons bound for Hezbollah and blocked an alleged plan to target the Golan Heights from Syrian territory. But the moment Syrian forces move into Lebanon, the issue becomes less about Hezbollah’s arsenal and more about Hezbollah’s resistance narrative and the trauma of Syria’s 29-year occupation of Lebanon.
From 1976 until 2005, Syria was the primary arbiter of Lebanese politics. Damascus entered during the civil war under the banner of restoring order, but its presence developed into an era of tutelage. Presidents were chosen under Syrian pressure, and opponents of Syrian influence were imprisoned, exiled, or even killed, including Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. For many ordinary Lebanese, Syria’s return would evoke associations of troops abusing civilians at checkpoints and military intelligence officers torturing Lebanese prisoners.
An expanded Syrian operation across the border would also hand Hezbollah the justification it has used for decades to preserve its arsenal. Former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah always claimed to be wielding the group’s “weapons of the resistance” to “protect Lebanon and all Lebanese.” At a moment when Hezbollah is under pressure to explain why its weapons should remain outside state control, a Syrian incursion would give it an excuse to argue that Lebanon is under threat from the outside.
After Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Nasrallah successor, Naim Qassem, described the new authorities in Damascus as “takfiri groups” used by the United States and Israel, warning that Syria was being moved into a position that would serve the Israeli enemy. Since then, Hezbollah and its support base have repeatedly leaned on this frame, portraying the new Syrian government as a potential instrument of an Israeli-U.S. fearmongering project.
Hezbollah’s media ecosystem has presented the possibility of a Syrian incursion further evidence of Lebanon’s encirclement: Israel pressing down from the south, Sharaa’s forces coming in from the Bekaa Valley, and Lebanon’s Shiites trapped between the two. In the words of one Lebanese historian, Hezbollah is working to “frighten” the people with “a jihadi threat represented by Sharaa’s forces.”
Sharaa may now speak as a head of state, but many Lebanese still see him as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the former leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. In a country where sectarian memory sits close to the surface, that distinction matters. Recent abuses by Syrian government forces and allied groups in Alawite and Druze areas would make it even harder to sell a Syrian intervention as a stabilizing mission.
Many Lebanese Christians and Druze oppose Hezbollah’s weapons, but they are unlikely to welcome a Syrian military advance as the instrument for disarming it. For Christians, Syrian intervention evokes years of coercion and assassinations. For Druze, the massacres and abuses in Suwayda would hang over any discussion of Syrian forces crossing into Lebanon. Even among Sunnis, the reaction would be complicated. In northern Lebanon and parts of the Bekaa, Sharaa has become a symbol for some of Assad’s defeat and the reversal of Hezbollah’s old dominance in Syria. But sympathy for Sharaa does not necessarily translate into support for a Syrian military return. Reporting from the Sunni areas on the Lebanese-Syrian border suggests that many Sunnis who resent Hezbollah still fear that a Syrian intervention would ignite a “sectarian confrontation no one could contain.”
The United States should not give Hezbollah the rally-around-the-flag moment it is looking for. Washington’s objective should be to prevent the group from rearming, and Syria can play a far more useful, less counterproductive role in that effort.
Washington can support Syria’s ongoing efforts to pack up Hezbollah’s smuggling networks in two ways. First, it needs to build on the emerging Syria-Israel security mechanism designed to manage friction and prevent escalation. Such a mechanism could allow intelligence sharing on Hezbollah-linked weapons transfers and smuggling routes, giving Damascus the tools to act against Hezbollah from Syrian territory. Second, the United States should work with regional partners such as Jordan—which has spent years confronting drug and weapons smuggling along its own border with Syria—to help Damascus develop the technical capacity to control porous frontiers.
Syria appears serious about opposing Iran’s regional network and can do more to fight Hezbollah on Syrian soil. But Washington should be clear that taking this fight across the border would ultimately be bad for U.S. interests, not to mention the Syrian and Lebanese people.
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