An ugly chapter of World War II history is causing tensions between Poland and Ukraine, straining relations as the two countries seek to deepen their cooperation against Russia. On May 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky formally named a unit in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces after “the heroes” of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In Ukraine, the soldiers of the UPA are seen as patriots and freedom fighters, celebrated for their World War II-era struggle against Soviet occupation. In Poland, however, they are better remembered for carrying out what the Polish parliament has defined as a genocidal campaign against Polish civilians.
Just a week before Zelensky’s announcement, Ukraine also held a formal reburial ceremony for Andrii Melnyk, another deeply controversial figure. Alongside with Stepan Bandera, Melnyk co-founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a right-wing political party intertwined with the UPA. There are discussions of reburying Bandera in a similar fashion next.
An ugly chapter of World War II history is causing tensions between Poland and Ukraine, straining relations as the two countries seek to deepen their cooperation against Russia. On May 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky formally named a unit in the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces after “the heroes” of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In Ukraine, the soldiers of the UPA are seen as patriots and freedom fighters, celebrated for their World War II-era struggle against Soviet occupation. In Poland, however, they are better remembered for carrying out what the Polish parliament has defined as a genocidal campaign against Polish civilians.
Just a week before Zelensky’s announcement, Ukraine also held a formal reburial ceremony for Andrii Melnyk, another deeply controversial figure. Alongside with Stepan Bandera, Melnyk co-founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a right-wing political party intertwined with the UPA. There are discussions of reburying Bandera in a similar fashion next.
In Poland, these moves have created a backlash across the political spectrum; the only debate is over how forcefully Warsaw should respond. Polish President Karol Nawrocki signaled on June 19 that he was stripping Zelensky of the prestigious Order of the White Eagle, which he received in 2023. More significantly, Polish politicians from both the right and center-left have called for Warsaw to put new conditions on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.
Needless to say, these historical tensions have only played into Russia’s hands. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has cynically taken both sides of the debate, both calling the UPA fascists for a Polish audience while also warning Ukrainians that Poland is only bringing up this history to seize Ukrainian territory.
Now, it remains to be seen whether Warsaw and Kyiv can confront the past while keeping their eyes firmly focused on the present.
Since 2022, Ukraine’s cemeteries have become a sea of graves of those who have fallen defending their country from Russia. Decorated with flowers and the national blue and yellow colors, they are often topped with another flag as well—the red and black of the UPA.
The story of the UPA goes back to the formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929. Drawing inspiration from fascist movements in Italy and Germany, this far-right political party sought to create an independent and ethnically pure Ukrainian state. During World War II, OUN members saw an opportunity to realize their dreams amid the conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1942, leaders from the OUN and other Ukrainian nationalist groups founded the UPA, which conducted an insurgent struggle in Western Ukraine that continued until 1950.
This legacy of anti-Soviet and anti-communist struggle has led many Ukrainian nationalists to see Bandera, the OUN, and the UPA as heroes who kept the dream of Ukrainian statehood alive throughout the Cold War. After the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Maidan protests, this narrative formed the cornerstone of Ukraine’s national memory politics, culminating in Bandera achieving formal status as a “Hero of Ukraine” in 2010.
Largely absent, though, is any discussion of Nazi collaboration. Before joining the UPA, some OUN nationalists served in Nazi German auxiliary police battalions in occupied Ukraine, becoming complicit in the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity.
In Poland, the UPA and OUN are better known for the premeditated ethnic cleansing of Poles conducted between 1943 and 1945 in Volhynia and other areas of what is now Ukraine. Polish historians estimate that as many as 100,000 people were killed in this campaign. Entire villages were systematically destroyed. Civilians were murdered in their homes, churches, forests, and fields, often with crude farming tools such as axes, pitchforks, and scythes. In 2016, the Polish parliament declared this a genocide, prompting criticisms from Ukraine’s parliament.
Since 1990, Poland has prioritized exhuming the remains of Polish victims and providing proper burials for them. In 2023, then-Polish President Andrzej Duda and Zelensky commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Volhynia massacre together, and Zelensky personally promised to allow exhumations in some areas. A formal decision on this came in early 2025, which Polish officials praised as a “breakthrough” in relations. However, subsequent progress has been slow, with surveys from 2025 suggesting that a majority Poles expect their politicians to prioritize exhumations and burials for the Volhynia victims.
Needless to say, Moscow has not played a constructive role in addressing this historic wound. While discussing the Volhynia massacre, for example, in 2023, Putin stated that both Russians and Poles know that the responsibility lies with Bandera’s nationalists. Yet Putin continues to also suggest that Poland’s exhumation drive is actually a cover for its purported territorial ambitions.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has amplified these tactics. One statement linked “Banderites” massacring Poles with axes in 1943 to “[t]oday’s Ukrainian neo-Nazis … committing atrocities against civilians both in Russia & Ukraine.” In 2023, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova explicitly called on Polish authorities “to stop their unconditional support for the Kyiv regime out of respect for the memory of those who perished in the horrific massacre in Volhynia.”
Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry has offered Ukrainians a separate set of conspiracies. A rumor spread on Telegram, for example, holds that Poland’s friendly solidarity with Ukraine is merely a mask for the “bloody revenge for Volhynia” that Poland plans to launch at any moment.
In fact, Poland continues to support Ukraine in its war. Poles are perfectly aware that Ukrainian soldiers are the ones keeping Russia at bay and forestalling a more direct threat to Poland. With this in mind, Warsaw is spending close to 5 percent of its GDP on defense while at the same time sending military aid to Ukraine. A poll conducted in November 2025 showed that 44 percent of Poles still backed this effort—only a slight drop from 54 percent in February 2024.
There is, however, a growing belief that Poland’s support has been forgotten or underappreciated in Ukraine. As a result, many Poles want their government to be firmer with Kyiv. This will not come in the form of restricting the flow of weapons, which would only hurt Poland. Rather, it is likely to come in the form of conditions for Ukraine’s EU or NATO membership. According to a public opinion poll conducted in December 2024, nearly 60 percent of Poles couldn’t imagine Ukraine acceding to NATO or the EU without first coming to terms with its past, specifically the Volhynia massacre. Given this strong public sentiment, Warsaw may try to use its EU veto to distance Kyiv from the UPA legacy.
In the long run, Ukraine and Poland need each other. Now would be the ideal moment for Kyiv and Warsaw to address their shared history in a spirit of openness, not grievance and resentment.
In May, Polish and Ukrainian historians came together to discuss rival perspectives on the UPA and OUN. Progress was slow, but they should nonetheless redouble these double efforts. Kyiv, for its part, should cut through the red tape and grant Poland unobstructed access to conduct exhumations. And Warsaw should push back against Russian meddling. Whenever Moscow raises its concerns about Volhynia, Polish historians, elected officials, and diplomats can be clear that “help” from the perpetrators of the Katyn and Bucha massacres is not wanted.