Last month, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte unveiled a “Trump Trillion” chart at a press conference in Washington in a bid to flatter, and perhaps even tutor, U.S. President Donald Trump. He described how U.S. NATO allies had spent more than a trillion dollars on defense since Trump first came to power in 2017 and created hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans.

There’s reason to wonder if Rutte’s numbers entirely add up, but what’s indisputable is that his performance set the stage for this week’s NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, where Trump’s diplomatic approach to Washington’s allies may be shaped on who exactly has met the 5 percent pledge made at The Hague summit last year.

Last month, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte unveiled a “Trump Trillion” chart at a press conference in Washington in a bid to flatter, and perhaps even tutor, U.S. President Donald Trump. He described how U.S. NATO allies had spent more than a trillion dollars on defense since Trump first came to power in 2017 and created hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans.

There’s reason to wonder if Rutte’s numbers entirely add up, but what’s indisputable is that his performance set the stage for this week’s NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, where Trump’s diplomatic approach to Washington’s allies may be shaped on who exactly has met the 5 percent pledge made at The Hague summit last year.

Diplomatic sources said the Europeans were geared up to impress Trump, with billions of dollars in tow for U.S. manufacturers. The allies are loosening their purse strings and financing the U.S. defense industry in exchange for continued security coverage in critical areas. Germany has announced its intention to build the largest European army by the 2030s, committing 750 billion euros to its rearmament. Germany spends roughly 60 percent of its defense expenditure on U.S. equipment, a trend likely to continue as that mammoth influx of cash finds its way to businesses able to fill the capability gaps.

There is a broad-based consensus among European allies that U.S. nuclear assets and some of its key capabilities are much needed and that Trump must be prevented at all cost from storming out of the summit. There is also unanimity on the need to acquire missing capabilities and expand their arsenals.

Yet, as the allies prepare to take on NATO’s leadership and usher in NATO 3.0—a European-dominated defensive alliance—divisions are deep, and often industrial interests clash. Some of the questions they are mulling but struggling to answer include: What do they build themselves, and what do they buy from the United States? How much to integrate their defense equipment? How many assets to contribute to their collective defense? And how to reconcile conflicting priorities and rivalries as national defense industries compete for lucrative defense projects?

Hours before Rutte met Trump in June, a relatively new grouping called the E5—France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom—met in Berlin. In a joint statement, they expressed commitment to a “stronger European role within NATO.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said more cooperation was needed not just with the United States but also within Europe.

Merz’s remark could be completely innocuous, an appeal for more camaraderie and coordination. But it can equally be interpreted as an admission that desired cooperation among allies was not yet on the table.

Behind closed doors, the allies struggled over how to make up for the assets the United States intended to pull out sooner than later. Not all allied members were offering all of their key capabilities for the NATO Force Model—a three-tier plan that lists number of troops and assets to be deployed in case of an attack.

In May, the United States warned NATO allies that it would reduce the number of fighter jets listed for crisis scenarios by a third, slash the provision of strategic bombers needed to hit installations deep within enemy territory by half, and reduce destroyers, submarines, air-to-air refueling aircraft, and reconnaissance drones.

But diplomatic sources said there was a fear that some countries, including France, might be saving some of their best kit for national security or other theaters. The week before the Ankara summit, the allies appear to have discussed the matter and satisfactorily resolved it.

The exact contributions of each ally have not been made public, but according to NATO’s top U.S. general, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the allies will largely manage to bridge the gap anticipated by U.S. asset withdrawal.

Diplomatic sources say France and others may have delivered at the last hour, but the entire experience still left some in the alliance rattled. France-Germany ties have been strained since a much-touted fighter jet deal collapsed after a dispute between Dassault and Airbus’s German-based defense division. Germany is now trying to find an alternative path to acquiring a next-generation fighter jet that opens up “new opportunities for industry,” Merz said in June.

Similar industrial preferences are blocking cooperation on other projects.

A duplication of systems in the name of sovereignty has been cited as a major waste of taxpayers’ money and an impediment to the interoperability of NATO forces. Historian Timothy Garton Ash noted recently that while the United States has “33 main weapon systems, Europe has 174—including 12 different kinds of tank and 14 kinds of combat jet.”

Smaller countries, particularly those on the front line with Russia, have their own concerns with a European-led NATO. They are worried about being subject to the whim of larger European powers and still prefer to bank on the United States and its military might. Poland has backed more European defense spending and capability acquisition, but it doesn’t want to necessarily replace U.S. kit with homemade European equipment, if mostly to keep the United States involved in the security architecture.

However, others worry about Poland’s advantage. They fear the United States’ good ally-bad ally strategy could divide the alliance.

Trump threatened to pull U.S. troops from Germany and Poland. He later withdrew the threat against Poland. Trump has often said he is fond of the country’s far-right president, and it is quite likely that he admires the government for quickly upping its defense expenditure to 4.8 percent.

There are also egotistical clashes and power struggles over a few bathing in all the limelight while ignoring others. Many felt left out when the leaders of the E3—Germany, France, and the U.K.—met to discuss a joint strategy on Ukraine and Russia in early June. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has taken offense and demanded that countries directly threatened by Russia’s aggressive policies be “represented in all forums.”

There is, however, less division over who will lead NATO as the structure undergoes a makeover. According to two sources, in the new structure, the three joint commands that plan military campaigns will be led by a British, a German, and an Italian commander. France will continue to lead Allied Command Transformation, which decides NATO’s technological integration. The SACEUR will remain an American, and the component commands for air, land, and sea will stay with the Americans.

In the run-up to the summit, Rutte is shuttling between capitals to strengthen funding commitments. He doesn’t always coordinate strategy with the allies, nor do the allies seek his counsel every step of the way, two European experts familiar with NATO policy told Foreign Policy.

In short, Europeans are on the same page when it comes to containing Russia and managing Trump. But they are still trying to figure out what a European-led NATO could look like and the limits of cooperation.

Some in the alliance are still hoping that the decline in trans-Atlantic ties is only temporary and will be reversed if there is a change of guard in Washington in 2028. Others, like France, are pushing for radically less dependence on the United States, while Germany, with fewer fiscal constraints, is trying to tie the German and U.S. defense industries closer together and has suggested domestic production of U.S. equipment.

“No one has said that aiming for more independence in the defense industry means being committed only to purely European systems,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said last week. He surely hopes Trump heard that comment.