The Kremlin’s shadow fleet is coming out of the shadows. In recent months, the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping has been unusually busy. The ships it is registering aren’t newly built ones, the kinds of ships that typically register in established maritime nations like Russia. Rather, they are old and in some cases not particularly safe—the sorts of vessels, in other words, that belong to the shadow fleet and have typically registered overwhelmingly in nations with minuscule maritime expertise, such as Togo, Cameroon, and the Cook Islands. At the end of 2024, a mere 4.3 percent of Moscow’s shadow tankers were flagged in Russia; by the first quarter of this year, their share had skyrocketed to 19.5 percent, according to a new report from the Kyiv-based KSE Institute.
The reason for all this re-registering is a draft presidential decree from Vladimir Putin intended to speed up the process of laying claim to the country’s shadow fleet. In other circumstances, this could represent a victory for transparency. In reality, though, it actually indicates something more alarming. Not only is Russia accepting ownership of the vessels that used to do its dirty business, but it is also arming them and giving them naval escorts. In other words, rather than use flags of convenience to disassociate itself from smuggling, the Kremlin is doubling down on its identity as a rogue nation. This creates a new and dangerous challenge for European nations that are struggling to crack down on illicit Russian shipping.
The Kremlin’s shadow fleet is coming out of the shadows. In recent months, the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping has been unusually busy. The ships it is registering aren’t newly built ones, the kinds of ships that typically register in established maritime nations like Russia. Rather, they are old and in some cases not particularly safe—the sorts of vessels, in other words, that belong to the shadow fleet and have typically registered overwhelmingly in nations with minuscule maritime expertise, such as Togo, Cameroon, and the Cook Islands. At the end of 2024, a mere 4.3 percent of Moscow’s shadow tankers were flagged in Russia; by the first quarter of this year, their share had skyrocketed to 19.5 percent, according to a new report from the Kyiv-based KSE Institute.
The reason for all this re-registering is a draft presidential decree from Vladimir Putin intended to speed up the process of laying claim to the country’s shadow fleet. In other circumstances, this could represent a victory for transparency. In reality, though, it actually indicates something more alarming. Not only is Russia accepting ownership of the vessels that used to do its dirty business, but it is also arming them and giving them naval escorts. In other words, rather than use flags of convenience to disassociate itself from smuggling, the Kremlin is doubling down on its identity as a rogue nation. This creates a new and dangerous challenge for European nations that are struggling to crack down on illicit Russian shipping.
The reflagging is the latest stage in the growth of the maritime tumor that is the shadow fleet. This fleet, a disparate collection of mostly aging vessels that sail outside the official shipping system, has been around since apartheid South Africa started using such ships to import oil in defiance of international sanctions. Then Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea began availing themselves of such vessels to import and export cargo that legally sailing vessels were not allowed to transport.
But it was when Russia turned to the fleet in late 2022 to export oil above Europe’s new price cap that it truly took off. For example, shadow vessels now account for around one-fifth of the global oil-tanker fleet. “The term ‘parallel fleet’ is increasingly becoming more used, and it’s the correct one,” said Brian Wessel, the director-general of the Danish Maritime Authority. “It really has become a fleet that operates in parallel to the official one.”
In response to this dramatic growth, coastal states whose waters the misbehaving fleet traverses have become more assertive. Estonia, Finland, and France have all boarded shadow vessels in recent months; within the course of a few weeks this spring, Sweden boarded no fewer than five. Last month, the United Kingdom, which announced this year that it would seize illegal vessels before appearing to get cold feet, boarded its first Russian shadow tanker in the English Channel.
In parallel, some shadow vessels’ owners have been reflagging their ships to Russia. Their decision makes sense: Coastal states are less likely to board their vessels, let alone detain them, if they sail under the flag of mighty Russia as opposed to a small nation like Togo or the Cook Islands. And now, the draft presidential decree shows that the Kremlin is eager to get even more ships under Russian flag.
The decree aims to simplify ships’ registration in Russia. According to Lloyd’s List, this signifies “a shift toward direct control of the shadow fleet as Western sanctions and vessel seizures intensify.” The maritime news website Safety4Sea adds that the “proposed system would also broaden the range of entities eligible to initiate vessel registration. Notably, foreign shipowners transporting Russian cargo would be permitted to apply directly for registration.”
Russia is, in other words, acknowledging its connection to the shadow fleet—and its dependence on it. “In the early months and years of using the shadow fleet, the Russians said nothing about it [the fleet],” said retired Rear Adm. Nils Christian Wang, a former chief of the Royal Danish Navy. “They were trying to convey the idea that the flag states were entirely responsible. Now that coastal states like Sweden and France and even the U.K. are taking off their kid gloves, Russia has to respond. It can tolerate one or two ships being detained, but regular detentions will start affecting Russian oil exports.”
Wessel pointed to a hypothetical upside of the increased reflagging. “If Russia lives up to the obligations flag states have, great,” he said. “Now we at least have someone we can direct our questions to at the IMO [International Maritime Organization].” The IMO is the international body responsible for maritime security, though it has limited purview and depends on its member states being collaborative.
In recent months, some shadow-fleet flag registers, such as that of Tonga, have expelled shadow vessels or closed the privately operated registries that flagged the vessels. That, Wessel said, is a sign of success: “The reflagging shows that we’ve been successful in convincing some other countries that they shouldn’t flag shadow vessels.”
The problem, though, is that Russia is unlikely to play the role that the IMO and the international community expect of it. Though flag states are responsible for enforcing maritime regulations on ships under their flag, and ports are responsible for ensuring that departing ships are seaworthy, Russia is unlikely to execute its flag-state obligations. “Russian port state control was already not fulfilling its obligations, which makes it unlikely that the ship register will,” Wessel said. With Russian ports allowing a steady procession of shadow vessels to dock and depart despite various deficiencies, it does indeed seem doubtful that Russia will monitor the rule compliance of the ships under its flag.
Worse, more ships transporting valuable crude under Russian flag is likely to lead to more Russian naval escorts. In recent months, the Russian Navy has escorted a string of shadow vessels through the Baltic Sea and the English Channel, a none-too-subtle effort to deter nations’ coast guards from executing their legal right to board the rule-breaking ships. Expanding this “escort service,” though, could drain the Russian Navy, which is already extremely busy.
But if Putin’s navy is too busy, Russian ships have other aggressive means at their disposal to thwart international inspections. That may explain an astonishing sight in Estonian waters this spring: a Russian-flagged liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker with mounted machine guns. “What they’re doing now is hoping that reflagging will create deterrence as the coastal states are likely to be more apprehensive about detaining Russian-flagged vessels,” Wang said. “There can be weapons on board. There can be drones on board. There can be machine guns on board. The message is: If you try to board, it will be dangerous.”
Indeed, the Russian reflagging makes it politically riskier for coast guards to board. That’s precisely why Russia reflagged the shadow tanker Bella 1 as the United States was pursuing the ship across the Atlantic this January. And if the Russian-flagged ships turn up equipped with weapons, it puts coast guards in a more perilous position still. Coast guard officers trying to board an armed vessel would not only face the prospect of being shot at; there would also be a risk of the situation escalating into a military standoff. “If you stop boarding ships that are violating maritime rules when in the past you did board them, you signal that Russia has won,” Wang said. “And if you continue your zero-tolerance approach, you run a bigger risk.” In fact, an LNG tanker equipped with a machine gun would have been virtually unimaginable on a vessel flagged in another country.
Somewhat counterintuitively, that provides the Baltic Sea countries, France, the U.K., and other nations committed to maritime order with an opening. If more shadow vessels start mounting machine guns, that could trigger a snowball development across the world’s oceans. Like other international organizations, the IMO suffers from the effects of growing global disorder and a lack of discipline among some member states.
Last November, Russia dramatically failed to secure reelection to the IMO’s governing body. Now, the IMO’s members should unite in formally condemning the practice of placing machine guns on tankers in waters that are completely free of pirates. To be sure, an IMO condemnation of Russia’s latest maritime steps would not stop the Kremlin. But there are other steps IMO member states could take individually. One would be for governments to announce that they will not provide armed merchant tankers with port state control—that is, they will not service them or clear them for departure when they dock. Another would be to say they will not let their citizens serve on armed Russian ships.
Russia’s actions are reckless. The world must show that such actions will only leave Russia and its fleet more isolated.