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Over the last year, reportsfromUkrainehave described the development of a new ecosystem of drone innovation. Rather than working through the centralized system of funding and procurement that has characterized the modern defense industrial base, Ukraine is “front-brewing”: equipping infantry with weapons produced through a decentralized model and designed in close collaboration with soldiers.

These drones have substantially frozen the front and have also enabled a campaign of interdiction against Russian logistics. In addition to the battlefield impact, the development of this ecosystem may represent a turn in the evolution of the defense industrial base. Yet leading powers may not be able to reproduce this model; ironically, this ecosystem may originate in the weakness of Ukraine’s central government.

Over the last year, reportsfromUkrainehave described the development of a new ecosystem of drone innovation. Rather than working through the centralized system of funding and procurement that has characterized the modern defense industrial base, Ukraine is “front-brewing”: equipping infantry with weapons produced through a decentralized model and designed in close collaboration with soldiers.

These drones have substantially frozen the front and have also enabled a campaign of interdiction against Russian logistics. In addition to the battlefield impact, the development of this ecosystem may represent a turn in the evolution of the defense industrial base. Yet leading powers may not be able to reproduce this model; ironically, this ecosystem may originate in the weakness of Ukraine’s central government.

In this fifth year of the war, small industrial workshops develop and produce drone designs, which are then shipped to the front lines and reworked extensively by local technicians before they are deployed in combat. The lessons learned are then fed back into industry to produce the next wave of drones. This approach, although costly in terms of time and duplicated effort, has generated an exponential rate of innovation at the front.

The remarkable new “front-brew” process is born of necessity; Ukraine needs the cycle of substantial drone rework at the front to generate and maintain any tactical success. While some innovations are coming from remote labs, most are developed in close proximity to the front line. Both iterative improvements by Ukrainian forces and tit-for-tat cycles of measure and countermeasure against Russian innovation have led to update cycles of as little as three weeks. In this environment, older models rapidly become useless.

Is this kind of rapid local adjustment the future of infantry warfare, or are there factors unique to Ukraine that will constrain its spread? If it is a sign of things to come, will the effect on military procurement and practice be revolutionary? Will this model spread on its own, can it be exported, or does it represent either a dead end or a stage of development in a process that will eventually resume historical trends?

The Russia-Ukraine conflict shows a particularly intense version of an arms race microclimate, but across the world, many of the same patterns are emerging. In Sudan, both the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces are using increasingly sophisticated drones against each other. The conflict in Myanmar shows two sides rapidly adjusting their technologies to maintain an advantage. While India and Pakistan have only engaged in limited skirmishing, both are working hard to innovate aggressively.

One of the most striking innovations is the use of fiber-optic cables as a method to guide a drone in the face of electronic countermeasures, in use in Ukraine since March 2024. This has now been adopted by sub-state actors such as Hezbollah against Israeli troops in Lebanon, forcing decentralized innovation by Israel, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) against government forces in Mali.

Although for now the technological impact is limited, all of these examples show a strong pattern of centrifugal development, a major break with centuries of centripetal military production practices.

Even before the mass production of weapons and materiel yielded significant cost advantages, states worked to centralize and standardize production, if only to keep the receipts simple. The development of modern taxation and industrial production processes in the 17th and 18th centuries—the creation of central banking in Sweden in 1656, for example—led to the standardization of this model. A major step in this direction was the Land Pattern Musket (known affectionately as “Brown Bess”), introduced in 1722 and a standardized design for British forces for more than 100 years.

By the mid-19th century, most industrialized nations had developed production processes that were sophisticated enough to yield weapons with interchangeable parts. Mass-produced in a handful of locations, these weapons were then crated and shipped directly to soldiers at their training barracks or the front lines. This is not to say it was all seamless—the United States (and others) stutter-stepped in the 19th century and more thanonceimprovised in the 20th. But centralized mass production became such a core part of military operations that the expectation that every good a soldier handled would be standard issue spontaneously generated the term “government issue” (GI), which in turn became the nickname for the soldiers themselves.

The contrast with contemporary Ukrainian practice is striking. Ukrainian drone producers finance themselves through a combination of government spending, foreign direct assistance, foreign investment, and direct contracts with front-line units. They operate not through a central hub (although the Ukrainian government has facilitated the innovation environment) but rather in direct contact with front-line warfighters. This seems to be less a liability to their operations than the key to their success.

The hour is still early. These development patterns may be a temporary fluke. Every entity engaged in drone conflicts right now—with the exception of the United States and India—either has a very low state capacity (Pakistan, Myanmar) or is a sub-state actor (Hezbollah, FLA). It is possible that the absence of strong central control has led to local innovation running wild, a phenomenon that may be real but nonetheless difficult for a high-capacity state to capture.

A drone ecosystem may also stand in as a cheap replacement for real military capacity; Ukraine and other drone operators must invest heavily in these ecosystems because they either lack military manpower or traditional industrial capacity. This seems plausible (and flatters traditionalist views within the military), but it is striking that Russia and Israel—to say nothing of the United States—are getting caught flat-footed by rapid developments in drone warfare.

Finally, It is also possible that what looks like local innovation may simply be Chinese and Turkish drone manufacturers selling Ukrainian innovations to their other customers. That could plausibly explain the fiber-optic cables used by Hezbollah, for example.

This may just be a temporary stage of drone technology development. Soon someone will crack the code of production and innovation, and this process will become standardized. The evolution of the PC in the 1970s and 1980s and the internet in the 1990s is indicative of this path. PC innovation was pushed forward by home-brewhobbyists, and in the 1990s, the internetsurged forth on a tide of a million frothybusiness plans. Today, a few platforms hold sway. This scenario seems the most likely, but the time window seems uncertain, and that uncertainty makes a big difference. If drone best practices are locked down in the next two years, then this “revolution” is, at best, a footnote. If it takes 10 or 20 years, well, then it might matter quite a lot.