Recent violence in Yemen raised fears that the four-year truce between the Saudi-led coalition and Ansar Allah, the Houthi political movement, might collapse. On July 13, Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport on behalf of the internationally recognized government (IRG) in Aden, prompting Ansar Allah to retaliate with missile strikes targeting Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi subsequently threatened Saudi oil facilities. On July 20, Ansar Allah’s military spokesman announced a full blockade on Saudi Arabia, in response to the Saudi blockade on Houthi territory. The IRG responded that it would resume oil exports from the territory it controls in southern Yemen, which had been halted since Ansar Allah damaged oil export facilities in 2022. As of Wednesday, four ships had changed course, heading north towards the Suez Canal rather than risking transit through the strait.
Yet despite the escalation, neither side wishes to return to full-scale war.
Recent violence in Yemen raised fears that the four-year truce between the Saudi-led coalition and Ansar Allah, the Houthi political movement, might collapse. On July 13, Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport on behalf of the internationally recognized government (IRG) in Aden, prompting Ansar Allah to retaliate with missile strikes targeting Abha International Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi subsequently threatened Saudi oil facilities. On July 20, Ansar Allah’s military spokesman announced a full blockade on Saudi Arabia, in response to the Saudi blockade on Houthi territory. The IRG responded that it would resume oil exports from the territory it controls in southern Yemen, which had been halted since Ansar Allah damaged oil export facilities in 2022. As of Wednesday, four ships had changed course, heading north towards the Suez Canal rather than risking transit through the strait.
Yet despite the escalation, neither side wishes to return to full-scale war.
The exchange of fire and threats followed a perceived shift in the regional balance of power after Iran’s success in the war with the United States and Israel. Seeking to capitalize on its ally’s gains, Ansar Allah welcomed an Iranian commercial flight to Sanaa on July 3 that then carried a Houthi delegation to Tehran for the funeral of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This was the first commercial flight between Sanaa and Tehran in about a decade, as Saudi Arabia restricts air and maritime traffic in and out of Houthi-controlled territory.
The flight crossed Riyadh’s red line. Saudi Arabia fears regular flights between Sanaa and Tehran would strengthen Ansar Allah’s de facto authority and ties with Tehran. After Ansar Allah refused demands that the plane not return to Yemen, Saudi Arabia bombed the runway at Sanaa airport. But having enforced this red line, Riyadh appears reluctant to escalate further. Instead, it sought a partial compromise: On July 17, Jordan announced the resumption of commercial flights between Sanaa and Amman, a move welcomed by both Riyadh and Sanaa. However, Ansar Allah’s subsequent announcement of a full blockade on Saudi Arabia suggests the concession fell short of its demands.
Nonetheless, Saudi and Houthi leaders both have good reason to avoid escalation. Saudi Arabia wants tourists flying in, not missiles. Concerns that Houthi attacks could frighten away the investors and travelers necessary to transform the Saudi economy under Vision 2030 are what drove Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to agree to the truce in 2022. After failing to oust Houthi forces over seven years—including with a devastating blockade that killed at least 85,000 children under age 5—Saudi Arabia now looks to manage its southern neighbor rather than return to war.
Saudi Arabia needs the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to stay open. In recent months, the Houthis have largely refrained from attacking ships in the Red Sea or obstructing the Bab al-Mandeb, the route on which the Saudis have increasingly relied during the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Riyadh’s plans to expand oil export through the Red Sea depend on this route, which will become increasingly important the longer the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.
The Houthis likewise wish to avoid an all-out war. There are two explanations for their apparent restraint: In contrast to attacks on Israel, a move that bolstered the group’s legitimacy both at home and abroad, joining the war on Iran’s behalf would not play well domestically. Sanaa also wishes to avoid a resumption of U.S. bombardment: Although they withstood Operation Rough Rider, they sustained damage.
Despite the bellicose rhetoric, Ansar Allah’s primary aim is to increase the pressure on Saudi Arabia to implement the U.N. road map outlined in December 2023. The road map includes the opening of Sanaa airport and Hodeidah’s port, a resumption of oil and gas exports, and the payment of public-sector salaries. Ansar Allah wants to lift the ongoing restrictions on free movement into its territory, which Riyadh justifies to prevent Iran from sending weapons, many of which reach Houthi territory despite the restrictions.
The U.N. process was largely suspended following Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and on Israel in late 2023. Under the original terms of the U.N. road map, in addition to lifting the blockade, Saudi Arabia agreed to pay many public-sector salaries, including in areas under Houthi control. After the Trump administration designated Ansar Allah a foreign terrorist organization in March 2025, such payments fell afoul of U.S. law. While Riyadh does send significant support to the IRG—it pledged $1 billion to cover public-sector salaries earlier this year—at present it cannot send funds to Houthi territory. Given the designation of Ansar Allah, it is not clear how Saudi Arabia could implement the road map: The Houthis may be under the impression that Riyadh could convince Washington to lift the designation.
Now, both sides hope to strengthen their bargaining positions. Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia hoped events were shifting in its favor. In early 2026, it seemed as if Riyadh had consolidated control over the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen after years of weakness and division. Following a dramatic confrontation with the United Arab Emirates-backed separatist forces in 2025, Saudi Arabia took full responsibility for the IRG. Yet due to ongoing frustrations among separatists, driven in part by a decline in basic services like water and electricity in the south of Yemen, a coalition of anti-Houthi Yemeni forces has still failed to cohere. Amr al-Bidh, the son of the last president of the former South Yemen and a prominent separatist figure, posted on X that the Saudi military action against the UAE and the separatists had unwisely weakened their position vis-à-vis the Houthis.
After the Houthis used drones to attack Yemen’s oil export facilities in 2022, the IRG depends entirely on the financial support of Saudi Arabia. Yet this also cut off any potential oil revenues for Ansar Allah, which now relies on taxation and port fees. Now, heavy Israeli bombardment has damaged the ports of Hodeidah, Ras Isa, and al-Salif, reducing both revenue and the availability of fuel in Houthi territory.
Ansar Allah, for its part, still believes that Iran’s success in closing Hormuz gives it greater leverage. It hopes to use the current regional conditions to pressure Riyadh to implement the U.N. road map by lifting its blockade and paying salaries. Now, the Saudis and the IRG are likely to ask the U.S. to resume its bombing campaign. A military coalition of the United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly other Gulf states could emerge to target Houthi positions.
For Yemenis, this is likely to bring more suffering with no major change in the balance of power. Following the recent violence, a U.N.-brokered prisoner exchange of nearly 1,700 detainees, hailed by U.N. special envoy Hans Grundberg as a key trust-building measure, was postponed, though both sides claim they remain committed to it. Meanwhile, the conflict’s devastating human toll remains. Yemen is one of the world’s largest food insecurity crises, with famine conditions already present in parts of Houthi-held territory and nearly half the population in IRG-controlled areas facing acute food insecurity. And yet the 2025 Yemen humanitarian response plan received only $688 million, about a quarter of the $2.48 billion requested, the lowest funding level in 10 years. Meanwhile, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is driving up food, fuel, and fertilizer prices, while cuts to humanitarian aid by the U.S., the U.K., and Germany threaten to push millions closer to catastrophe.
A durable peace in Yemen will not be secured by another exchange of bombs and missiles, nor by the illusion that one side can finally impose a military solution. The July escalation demonstrated that the truce remains fragile, but neither Riyadh nor the Houthis believe a return to full-scale war serves their long-term interests. While a dramatic collapse into nationwide conflict remains possible, the more likely outcome is a prolonged equilibrium of periodic violence, political paralysis, and humanitarian decline.