In the last week, the Islamic Republic perpetrated the greatest massacre in modern Iranian history. In response to massive popular protests against its rule, the regime has killed thousands of unarmed protesters. Just how many remains unclear, but plausible estimates put it in the range of 12,000 to 20,000 dead. Many others were also caught in the crossfire.

Some analysts and commentators claim the latest series of events to be the end of the Islamic Republic. But while the regime has been greatly weakened by dissent, war, and sanctions, it has nevertheless proved resilient and ruthless. The Iranian opposition is divided, and foreign intervention is not a panacea.

However, the regime can still be overthrown if cracks within the ruling elite widen dramatically and if security forces start to defect in great numbers. The United States can also play an important role in disrupting the regime’s ability to shut off the internet and conduct crimes against humanity in the cover of darkness.

The current uprising against the regime began with protests in Tehran’s bazaar, triggered by a major currency crisis. Soon, students, laborers, and many Iranians fed up with the grinding misery of everyday life joined the bazaar strikes. The protests spread to smaller western and southwestern towns that, like the capital, have been hit hard by mismanagement of water by the regime. These included Lordegan, Malekshahi, and Abdanan, where a majority of the town’s residents were reported to have come out in protest.

The regime let the protests play out for a few days before it responded with force, initially using regular security forces, mostly police. But by Jan. 3, the regime’s rhetoric and force posture hardened: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said “rioters” should be “put in their place,” while messaging linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime’s brutal paramilitaries, declared that “tolerance” was over and that the state would not “yield to the enemy”—a clear inflection point in the crackdown. On Jan. 8, the Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet and telecommunication shutdown, and the killing escalated under cover of the blackout.

The IRGC shot thousands of unarmed protesters, not just in bigger cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad but in countless smaller towns and villages across the country. There have even been reports of the regime using Russian-made heavy machine guns against peaceful demonstrators. Witnesses have described the level of violence as shocking, with parts of the country resembling war zones. One witness said there was a stark difference to the suppression of the 2009 protests, when most security forces used batons and even armed units used their weapons carefully; this time, they said, IRGC-linked anti-riot units fired sustained bursts at full capacity, including using machine guns.

The regime has framed the uprising as a Mossad plot and branded protesters as “terrorists”—a dangerous escalation that, in the state’s own logic, expands the justification for lethal force and extreme punishment. On Wednesday, Iran’s justice minister told media that from Jan. 8 onward, the protests would be considered an “internal war”; on Jan. 7, Iran’s top judge said there would be “no leniency for whoever helps the enemy against the Islamic Republic and the calm of the people.” Public claims by some Israeli politicians recklessly implying Israeli involvement risk compounding that danger for the thousands now under threat of execution by reinforcing Tehran’s espionage narrative.

In addition to framing the protesters as Israeli-controlled “terrorists,” the regime seeks to sow fear among the population and prevent more people from taking to the streets by weaponizing grief. Families are not allowed to retrieve the bodies of their loved ones from morgues or hold funerals for them. The message is clear: Dissent won’t only get you killed—it can deny your family dignity, closure, and even the right to mourn.

In that climate, fear doesn’t just deter protest; it isolates people from one another and makes participation feel like a trap with consequences that extend beyond the individual. When the state can punish the living through the dead, many will think twice—not because they accept the regime but because the cost has been made unbearably personal.

The opposition may hope the regime’s end is in sight, but there are several reasons why it could survive this phase of the popular revolts. The Islamic Republic appears cohesive and united under the command of Khamenei, though there have been rumors of dissent and dissatisfaction against the supreme leader within the regime’s ranks—especially as he stands in the way of nuclear concessions that could ease the regime’s existential crisis.

While the majority of Iranians despise the regime, it still has a significant base of support among the population and can command hundreds of thousands of armed supporters. Many sectors of Iranian society worried about instability and chaos, such as the oligarchs and senior bazaaris, have decided not to come out against the regime. Though battered, the regime could survive in a weakened state, and the uprising could even turn into an armed civil war, especially given the number of Iranians slaughtered by the IRGC.

The Iranian opposition’s division has also greatly helped the regime. Former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi may have emerged as the leader of the opposition on social media, but the reality is different on the ground. Iran is a diverse nation of 92 million people, and while Pahlavi has a notable base of support in Iran, he by no means has the support of the majority of Iranians inside or outside Iran. Pahlavi has also proved himself to be an unaccountable and divisive leader by splitting rather than unifying the opposition.

His credibility gap has grown by his failure to deliver on his own promises. He claimed last year that he had achieved the defection of 50,000 regime personnel through a QR code TV broadcast. However, there appears to be no evidence of major defections among regime forces, at least not on the scale promised by Pahlavi. Instead, the protesters have been left exposed to the regime’s killing machine, reinforcing the suspicion that Pahlavi’s defection campaign was a publicity stunt.

During the crucial early days of unrest, Pahlavi’s role was mostly performative: statements, appearances, and encouragement to the masses. He has never held public office and has not built a credible, on-the-ground organization capable of leading protesters. Rather, Pahlavi tends to ride the waves of the uprisings, commanding media attention as the self-proclaimed leader of demonstrations and strikes that started days before his involvement.

On Monday, CBS News anchor Norah O’Donnell asked Pahlavi a question that most Iranians inside the country cannot safely ask and most in the diaspora won’t ask out loud: “As you are urging people to protest and go to the streets, the death toll is rising in Iran. This violent crackdown continues, just as it has in past attempted revolutions. I mean, is it responsible to be sending citizens in Iran to their deaths? Do you bear some responsibility?”

Pahlavi’s answer came off as condescending and aloof, especially as he has called Iranians to take to the streets without any planning, organization, or support.

“This is a war,” he said, “and war has casualties.”

A fair and simple follow-up question: What happened to the 50,000 regime defectors he had promised? If they existed, why did they not prevent, disrupt, or at least reduce the scale of the massacre?

The seemingly callous response to the question will no doubt offend many Iranians. But Pahlavi may have a larger problem—he has already made enemies among many members of the opposition by declaring himself as the leader of the revolution. His advisors’ constant threatening and harassment of other opposition leaders have also harmed the chances for unity.

Iran’s ethnic minorities are also largely distrustful of Pahlavi and his ultranationalist advisors. Notably, Iran’s large Kurdish population (estimated at roughly 10 percent) is especially opposed to Pahlavi. The Iranian Kurdish political parties are the best armed and perhaps most organized of the opposition groups, thanks to contacts with the wider Kurdish movement.

Promising protesters help without delivering while countless people are slaughtered is likely to result in long-lasting distrust, whether being done by Pahlavi or U.S. President Donald Trump.

A protester who fled Iran this week told us that many people flooded the streets after Trump’s first remarks backing the uprising and warning the regime of consequences. After the massacre, he said, that initial surge has curdled into disappointment and anger.

Yet the Trump administration can play a crucial role in helping the struggle for freedom in Iran by hampering the regime’s ability to shut down the internet. This may be done through cyber-operations, though analysts have indicated both in public comments and private statements to us that kinetic strikes against regime targets are necessary to fully disrupt the regime’s capability.

Trump should be careful not to favor one opposition leader or group over another. Pahlavi may have a degree of support among Iranians, but he does not represent the majority of the population and has no capacity to lead a revolution.

What’s missing in Iran isn’t courage. What’s missing is a revolutionary machine led by capable leaders.

In 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini built a revolutionary machine and coalesced with many non-Islamist groups to overthrow the Shah—groups he would eventually betray and, in many cases, execute. No one has that capability in Iran today.

Even if the Islamic Republic really is collapsing, it will go down fighting to the death. The people of Iran need more than TV speeches and mass social media campaigns. They need material support, real leadership, and a common vision for the future that can save their country from destruction.