Rising exports: LNG dual-fuel ro-ro carrier BYD Jinan loads new cars for overseas markets, Taicang, Jiangsu province, China, 2 October 2025
Feature China · Future publishing · Getty
China is on track to set a new record for exports in 2025; Bloomberg even predicts a trade surplus of $1.2tn. This is due partly to China consolidating its dominance in sectors where it has historically had a competitive advantage (textiles, steel, smartphones), but also to accelerating growth in exports of green tech such as electric vehicles, solar panels and lithium ion batteries – the ‘new three’ products which Beijing believes will play a vital role in the global ecological transition (see China’s great green leap forward, in this issue).
The West attributes this strong performance to a strategy based on what former Canadian finance minister Chrystia Freeland in 2024 called an ‘intentional, state-directed policy of overcapacity’. aimed at boosting competitiveness by making it easier to dump surplus goods on international markets. According to this analysis, Western companies face unfair competition from a production apparatus cosseted by the Chinese government.
Yet six of China’s biggest solar panel and cell makers – Jinko Solar, Longi, JA Solar, Trina Solar, Tongwei and TCL Technology – are in the red after making a collective loss of $2.8bn in the first half of this year (Financial Times, 4 September 2025). Profits on electric vehicles have also fallen owing to a price war. BYD, which leads the Chinese EV sector and globally is neck-and-neck with Tesla, has negative working capital; its local competitors are faring still worse (Financial Times, 13 June 2025). Paradoxically, though production output and exports have risen, the companies involved seem to be growing weaker and, behind China’s apparent economic success, the survival of these strategic industries is at risk.
This is nothing new. Ten years ago Robert Boyer, a leading exponent of the regulation school of economics, was already describing the Chinese economy as being in ‘a permanent state of overinvestment’ with ‘cut-throat competition, declining (…)
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(9) National Development and Reform Commission and State Administration for Market Regulation, ‘Announcement on regulating disorderly price competition and maintaining sound market price order’ (in Chinese), 28 September 2025.

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