In the mountainous northern regions of Pakistan, South Asia feels a world away. In Chitral and Gilgit-Baltistan, which share strong cultural ties with Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan region and Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province, some residents add ethnic identifiers such as “Tajik,” “Pamiri,” or “Badakhshani” to their names. While these identifiers don’t appear on official documents, they serve as markers of ancestry and cultural belonging. They also reveal an unofficial truth: Pakistan is far closer to Central Asia than it often cares to admit.
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has defined itself almost exclusively through a South Asian lens. Its economy, national security priorities, and even pop culture have been oriented eastward. However, by sidelining its deep cultural and historical links to Central Asia, Pakistan has limited its foreign-policy horizons. It is long past time for Pakistan to embrace the strategic benefits of these shared ties.
In the mountainous northern regions of Pakistan, South Asia feels a world away. In Chitral and Gilgit-Baltistan, which share strong cultural ties with Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan region and Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province, some residents add ethnic identifiers such as “Tajik,” “Pamiri,” or “Badakhshani” to their names. While these identifiers don’t appear on official documents, they serve as markers of ancestry and cultural belonging. They also reveal an unofficial truth: Pakistan is far closer to Central Asia than it often cares to admit.
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has defined itself almost exclusively through a South Asian lens. Its economy, national security priorities, and even pop culture have been oriented eastward. However, by sidelining its deep cultural and historical links to Central Asia, Pakistan has limited its foreign-policy horizons. It is long past time for Pakistan to embrace the strategic benefits of these shared ties.
All parties have much to gain from better regional integration. For Pakistan, Central Asia’s energy wealth and critical mineral potential align with its chronic energy needs. Better connectivity could give Pakistan a foothold in Central Asia’s booming tourism economy, which welcomed a record 28.6 million foreign tourists in 2024, as well as a strategic edge in developing its logistics economy and expanding its exports to Central Asia, including textiles, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products. It is already planning to upgrade its seaports, modernize port infrastructure, and expand commercial fleet capacity as part of its ambitious $100 billion “blue economy” plan.
Landlocked Central Asian nations regard Pakistan’s ports as their shortest and most cost-effective route to global markets, especially in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has forced supply chains to shift and opened new logistical opportunities through Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some Central Asia countries have already enjoyed sizable GDP boosts following this shift.
“Beyond economics, these countries are eager to reduce their dependence on Russia and diversify their connections to the world,” said Tariq Huda, a former head of Pakistan Customs. While Iran remains constrained by sanctions, and alternative routes through the Caspian Sea or Turkey are costly and logistically difficult, Pakistan offers Central Asian states not just a gateway but an affordable, practical path toward economic growth.
One solution starts with shifting Pakistan’s northern trade routes. Currently, Pakistan’s main land connection to Central Asia is the Torkham border crossing with Afghanistan. Relatively wide and low altitude, it has been a practical choice for large-scale trade since the British developed the connecting Khyber Pass for military and trade purposes in the late 19th century. However, this route is frequently disrupted by tensions between the two countries. Following a dramatic collapse of relations with the Taliban that accelerated last October, Islamabad closed the border, significantly disrupted trade, and even started mass deportations of Afghan refugees.
While state-to-state friction can be eased and border crossings can be reopened, this latest skirmish hints at the deeper challenges lying in the sociocultural landscape around Torkham.
Stretching across eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, the Torkham corridor is overwhelmingly Pashtun. Cross-border tribal ties often empower nonstate actors such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and local warlords, whose control of territory, smuggling routes, and informal taxation, along with the corridor’s role in narcotics and weapons trafficking, has long undermined state authority. Regional trade is hindered not just by geography or diplomacy but by a deeply rooted informal economy linked to militancy.
Better regional integration could start with reviving the Dorah Pass, which connects Pakistan’s Lower Chitral district to Badakhshan in Afghanistan. As the crow flies, it’s located roughly 140 miles north of Torkham and more than double that distance on existing roads. From there, it is a short distance to Tajikistan and the rest of Central Asia.
Although Dorah is currently unpaved and impassable for many months of the year, movement across the mountain pass long predates modern borders. For centuries, travelers, armies, and migrants passed along the route connecting China with western Asia. Residents of the surrounding regions have likewise filtered back and forth for trade, education, and refuge. Badakhshan is home to a largely Tajik and significant Ismaili population. Many Afghans who fled into Pakistan’s Chitral district following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent civil wars returned with affection for Pakistan, with some going so far as to name their neighborhoods after Chitral. Badakhshan is one of the few Afghan regions with relative goodwill toward Pakistan and historically far fewer direct confrontations compared with the Pashtun communities along the Durand Line. These cultural and historical affinities can be the first bridge where modern politics have failed.
Compared with the Torkham crossing, Dorah offers a shorter and safer alternative from the Arabian Sea to Central Asia. Consider the overland route from Karachi Port to Ishkashim, on the Tajik border. The traditional route via the Torkham corridor and Kabul is about 2,460 kilometers (1,530 miles); 45 percent of that distance lies in Afghan territory. Via the Lowari Tunnel, Chitral, and the Dorah Pass, it would be roughly 1,950 kilometers (1,210 miles) and 95 percent through Pakistan, according to Abdus Samad Khan, a former member of Pakistan’s National Highway Authority (NHA).
Progress toward a revived Dorah Pass has so far been uneven. Last June, Afghan authorities announced the completion of a 120-mile road linking Panjshir province through Badakhshan to Chitral in Pakistan. On the Pakistani side, however, the 55-mile road leading to the pass is still highly underdeveloped, unpaved, and unpassable without four-wheel drive.
To make the route viable for all-weather use would require a dual-carriageway tunnel of approximately 9 miles at the Dorah Pass, at an altitude of roughly 12,000 to 14,000 feet above mean sea level, according to Samad, who also served as a former project director of Pakistan’s Lowari Tunnel, one of South Asia’s most significant high-mountain infrastructure projects. In his assessment, the Dorah project is both technically and financially viable. The NHA has already completed feasibility studies and design work for the 55-mile Chitral-Dorah road, and some construction is beginning. Once the tunnel and connecting highways are completed, the overland journey from Chitral to Ishkashim—where there is currently no direct route—would take less than two hours.
Pakistan’s room for improvement with Central Asia goes far past trade. The mountainous glacial region that spans northern Pakistan, northeastern Afghanistan, and eastern Tajikistan has been called the “pulse of the planet” for its critical environmental significance.
“Regional cooperation would mean working together on issues that no single country can manage alone in this landscape,” said Ajaz Ahmed, an assistant director at the provincial forest department in Chitral. Agricultural practices, water systems, and flood patterns are shaped by the glaciers of Gilgit-Baltistan and the Hindu Kush-Karakoram ranges, which form part of a shared Central Asian ecosystem. It could also include joint monitoring of glaciers and snowpack, coordinated early-warning systems for floods and glacial lake outburst events, and the development of transboundary protected areas to conserve rare plants and wildlife. Collaboration could extend to research partnerships among universities, joint projects under international climate funds and the Global Environment Facility, and cross-border agreements aimed at ecosystem resilience.
Education, for that matter, is also one of the most underutilized areas in Pakistan’s engagement with Central Asia. “As compared to trade and security, education can serve as a more viable, durable, and people-centered tool for building trust and partnership between Pakistan and Central Asia,” said Mir Afzal Tajik, a Pakistani academic at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan.
Countries such as Turkey, China, Russia, and severalEuropean states have established visible educational networks in Central Asia, including branch campuses and high-quality schools. Yet Pakistan currently has “very little influence” in the region’s education ecosystem, according to Tajik. “Students and academics in Central Asia do not have any desire to study or work in Pakistan,” he said. Visa barriers, limited direct flights, and weak institutional promotion, combined with Pakistan’s negative image in global media—fundamentalism, terrorism, and political instability—discourage them. But a concerted effort could change that.
“Dual-degree programs, short study abroad modules, joint summer schools, and co-taught online courses would be feasible starting points,” Tajik said, which would build “trust and academic capacity without requiring extensive institutional restructuring.” Such initiatives could gradually expand Pakistan’s academic footprint, foster long-term people-to-people connections, and strengthen institutional ties across the region.
It is time for Pakistan to recognize Central Asia’s broader development potential; historical and cultural connections can be used for modern diplomatic and economic advantage. Its northern communities stand as living proof that such engagement would be not new but a return to centuries-old ties.
The gains would be significant. Deep engagement with its northern neighbors can expand Pakistan’s trade routes, attract investment, and strengthen energy and infrastructure linkages. Upgraded ports and roads would center Pakistan as a trade and transit hub in an age of volatile supply chains. Cultural and educational exchanges can foster goodwill, build trust, and create long-term networks that enhance sustainable economic and political partnerships. At the same time, Pakistan’s northern regions offer a natural gateway for Central Asian tourists, with adventure, ecotourism, and cultural experiences that can grow the tourism economy and strengthen Pakistan’s soft power and image.
Considering these opportunities and prospects, Pakistan’s connection with Central Asia is as much about people and shared heritage as it is about commerce and corridors. Pakistan should adopt a cultural reorientation of strategy, one that recognizes that true regional connectivity flows from people and their history and shared values, not merely from roads or borders.
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