Thais head to the polls this weekend for the second time in three years. Although Thailand is rife with domestic political divisions, having gone through three prime ministers since 2023, another country will also play a role in the contest’s outcome—Cambodia, with which it has a long-running border dispute.

Both Thailand and Cambodia contributed to the escalation that led to border clashes last July. But the second round of fighting in December was more one-sided: Thai fighter jets struck targets more than 40 miles from the border in Cambodia’s Siem Reap province. Rights groups say Thai troops seized and razed Cambodian border villages. A fragile cease-fire has paused hostilities for now, but nationalist sentiment remains high on both sides

Thais head to the polls this weekend for the second time in three years. Although Thailand is rife with domestic political divisions, having gone through three prime ministers since 2023, another country will also play a role in the contest’s outcome—Cambodia, with which it has a long-running border dispute.

Both Thailand and Cambodia contributed to the escalation that led to border clashes last July. But the second round of fighting in December was more one-sided: Thai fighter jets struck targets more than 40 miles from the border in Cambodia’s Siem Reap province. Rights groups say Thai troops seized and razed Cambodian border villages. A fragile cease-fire has paused hostilities for now, but nationalist sentiment remains high on both sides

The fighting came against the backdrop of Thailand’s long-running domestic political turmoil, in which the Thai military has been a key player. With a national election on Feb. 8, the border conflict reignited Thai nationalism and pro-military sentiment when conservatives were in desperate need of a boost. They are now expected to prevail on Sunday—so much so that a cynic might wonder whether the Thai military intentionally escalated fighting for political purposes.

Following populist Thaksin Shinawatra’s meteoric rise to power in 2001, the Thai military overthrew first his government in 2006 and then his sister’s government in 2014, ushering in a period of military rule from 2014 to 2023. By the time of Thailand’s most recent election three years ago, the military’s meddling had deepened its unpopularity among the public.

The reformist Move Forward Party won the most seats in the House of Representatives in 2023 after pledging to limit the military’s involvement in politics. Together with the Shinawatra clan’s party, Pheu Thai, Move Forward had more than enough votes to appoint the next prime minister. At the time, however, members of the Senate, the parliament’s upper house, were directly appointed by the military, and they effectively vetoed a Move Forward-led government.

In a dramatic backroom deal, Pheu Thai formed an uneasy coalition with conservative and military-backed parties, in exchange for the conservative-royalist establishment allowing Thaksin to return from exile. Some supporters saw the move as a betrayal both of Move Forward and of Pheu Thai’s principles, since the latter had spent two decades locked in a power struggle with the military. Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra later became prime minister.

Much has changed in Thailand since then. The military-aligned Constitutional Court later dissolved Move Forward, forcing the reformist party to regroup under new leadership and a new name: the People’s Party. The Senate is now an indirectly elected body that will not be involved in choosing the next prime minister. In theory, this could open a lane for the People’s Party to take the premiership. But new challenges have also emerged—many of them related to the border conflict.

Pheu Thai’s popularity cratered following a leaked phone call last June between Paetongtarn and former Cambodian leader Hun Sen. In the call, Paetongtarn offered to find a solution to the border crisis, but she sounded overly deferential—calling Hun Sen “uncle” and promising to do what he wanted. She also seemed to criticize the Thai military.

After the Constitutional Court removed Paetongtarn from office last August, the People’s Party joined a vote of no confidence against the Pheu Thai government, agreeing to support the conservative Bhumjaithai Party’s efforts to form a government—but only if it called an election within four months.

The scandal hurt Pheu Thai. In Sunday’s election, even if the People’s Party forms a coalition with Pheu Thai, it may not be enough to claim a majority of the 500 seats in the House. (In 2023, Move Forward won 151 seats, while Pheu Thai came second with 141. The next largest party that allied with Move Forward had just nine.)

A former Pheu Thai party member told Foreign Policy that he left the party last year due to a “genuine desire for change” in Thailand’s political system. “I cannot overlook the hypocrisy when actions fail to mirror promises, creating a constant contradiction between words and deeds,” he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to share his personal beliefs.

---

Pheu Thai and the People’s Party haven’t ruled out working together in a coalition government, but both parties have reason to feel betrayed by the other. Paul Chambers, a fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said he expects Pheu Thai to ally with Bhumjaithai after the election, making a People’s Party government unlikely.

The People’s Party has another weakness: It has had to select a new leader each time it has been dissolved, undermining its continuity. The progressive movement struck gold with its first two leaders, when the popular Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was followed by the equally charismatic Pita Limjaroenrat. But Chambers said current leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut lacks the same “charisma and organizational ability” as his predecessors.

“The polls show that the current leadership have not yet been able to replicate Pita’s level of popularity,” said Ken Lohatepanont, a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Michigan.

Bhumjaithai, meanwhile, has seemed to benefit the most from the recent clashes with Cambodia. Recent polling shows Bhumjaithai poised to win between 140 and 150 seats, roughly double its showing from the last election, while the People’s Party is on track to win 120 to 130, nearly the same as Move Forward did in 2023. Pheu Thai’s support has collapsed to a projected 80 to 90 seats.

“I would say that the continuing border clashes, which intensify Thai nationalism, are helping to keep the popularity of the Thai military and Bhumjaithai high for many Thai people,” Chambers said, adding that the nationalist campaign environment doesn’t benefit the People’s Party.

Conservative, pro-military, and pro-monarchy, Bhumjaithai was a relatively minor party at the time of the 2014 coup, allowing it to escape association with the chaos that followed. But Bhumjaithai has also ridden the wave of nationalism and pro-military sentiment that has accompanied the border conflict with Cambodia. After the conservative vote in 2023 was split between Bhumjaithai and two parties led by former generals, it now appears to be coalescing around Bhumjaithai. Those other parties are polling poorly, and some of their members have jumped ship to Bhumjaithai.

Thailand has taken a more aggressive stance on the border conflict following the government turnover to Bhumjaithai. On the campaign trail, party leader and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has presented himself as a nationalist icon, in contrast with the People’s Party.

“The Cambodian border clashes have certainly put the People’s Party in an awkward position, as it has found itself on the defensive with its previous rhetoric on military reform,” Lohatepanont said.

At the same time, the recent deal with Bhumjaithai could hurt the People’s Party’s popularity with its progressive base, as could its more cautious approach to reform this election cycle. The party dropped its pledge to reform Thailand’s lèse-majesté law, likely to avoid another dissolution. Many young people were initially drawn to the People’s Party because of its uncompromising stance on the monarchy and military. It is unclear how much the party can compromise to navigate Thailand’s skewed political system without alienating its base.

Chambers predicts that the People’s Party will find itself in the opposition again. But he anticipates another military intervention if the progressives manage to pull out a shock victory or form an unexpected coalition instead.

The military retains a host of tools to preserve the status quo after the election. The Election Commission and National Anti-Corruption Commission can launch politically motivated investigations, the Constitutional Court can dissolve political parties or remove prime ministers, and the Supreme Court can sentence politicians to prison. Many of these officials are appointed by the Senate, which remains overwhelmingly conservative and can also block more structural reforms.

Thailand’s military establishment will be cautious about using these tools now, when conservatives appear likely to prevail at the ballot box—lest it spoil its moment in the sun.