U.S. President Donald Trump knows that boards don’t do deals and mediate complex historic conflicts. Mediators do. That’s why he has turned much of U.S. diplomacy into a family business, deploying his son-in-law and one of his best friends to negotiate simultaneously conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Gaza, and Iran. But he also knows that boards can raise money, help him reprise his Apprentice role as chairman (for life), and create camera-ready moments even if serious movement toward implementing his Gaza deal isn’t on the horizon yet. On the more serious side, internationalizing the Gaza problem may actually make sense given the many hands that will be required to fix what now seems hopelessly unfixable. As the Board of Peace meets in Washington this week, reportedly to announce funding for Gaza and the contributors to the much-anticipated international stabilization force, here are some takeaways.

Who’s In and Who’s Not

U.S. President Donald Trump knows that boards don’t do deals and mediate complex historic conflicts. Mediators do. That’s why he has turned much of U.S. diplomacy into a family business, deploying his son-in-law and one of his best friends to negotiate simultaneously conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Gaza, and Iran. But he also knows that boards can raise money, help him reprise his Apprentice role as chairman (for life), and create camera-ready moments even if serious movement toward implementing his Gaza deal isn’t on the horizon yet. On the more serious side, internationalizing the Gaza problem may actually make sense given the many hands that will be required to fix what now seems hopelessly unfixable. As the Board of Peace meets in Washington this week, reportedly to announce funding for Gaza and the contributors to the much-anticipated international stabilization force, here are some takeaways.

Who’s In and Who’s Not

Initially, Trump invited around 60 countries to join the Board of Peace. At its launch in Davos, Switzerland, some 25 had signed on; the number has now reached at least 35. It’s a curious collection of countries that seem to fall into three groups with considerable overlap: those that are friendly with Trump; those that want to get into his good graces; and those that don’t have legal and constitutional constraints that might prevent them from joining a board whose self-appointed chairman has a veto over all proposals. Hungary is there, as is Turkey, Argentina, and key Arab states—all authoritarians, who have a stake in managing Gaza and in shaping the United States’ Middle East policy—including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan. India steered clear, perhaps worried about Trump’s interest in Kashmir. Indonesia joined, and its officials have publicly talked about contributing troops to police Gaza under the right circumstances.

Key U.S. democratic allies in Europe and Asia are conspicuously absent from the board. Trump made it easy for Canada by rescinding its invitation. Russia said it was studying the matter. China expressed doubts about the board undermining the United Nations, even though the board is empowered to an uncertain degree by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803, which endorsed Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza. Israel, perhaps the most eager not to offend Trump, joined. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s relationship with the Board of Peace is awkward—his right-wing coalition partners distrust Qatar and Turkey, and they fear the board will make decisions on Gaza that are inimical to Israel. And opposition parties want to remind the public of Netanyahu’s funding of Hamas via Qatar—so much so that Netanyahu moved up his recent meeting with Trump, which allowed him to avoid attending the board’s first full meeting.

What’s A Board of Peace to Do

The Board of Peace’s mandate is somewhat obscure. It’s still not entirely clear whether its sole function is to oversee the 20-point plan or to start with Gaza and evolve into an instrument of global conflict resolution, as absurd as that may appear. What’s unmistakably clear is whose board it is and how Trump is going to control it. In the board’s 13-article charter, there are no fewer than 33 references to the chairman, who has the authority to do just about anything related to the board, including issue invitations, determine renewals for membership, set the agenda, approve decisions with a vote to break a tie, and hold exclusive authority to create, modify, and dissolve entities as necessary to fulfill the board’s mission.

A collection of some 35 states, tied together in an inchoate form and with a preamble so general that it feels generated by artificial intelligence, could no more reach a consensus and then mediate a conflict than the five permanent members of the Security Council have been able to do. In defending the board, U.S. Ambassador Mike Waltz described it as “focused multilateralism.” Previous U.S. administrations relied on smaller groupings acting in concert, such as the Quartet dealing with the peace process in the Middle East, though hardly very effectively. Could the Board of Peace replace the U.N.? Trump’s own animus toward the organization led many to think that was his goal, with the United States acting unilaterally when it suited Trump’s definition of “America First.” Indeed, Trump said the board might replace the Security Council.

More to the point, could the board do serious conflict resolution on a global scale? Trump’s own modus operandi seems to rule that out. His approach seems to toggle between personal intervention and deploying people he trusts, such as Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Trump has eschewed multilateral initiatives and doesn’t seem to like big groups unless they’re for show, acclamation, or fundraising. At this year’s Munich Security Conference, European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas was on to something when she slammed the board as Trump’s personal vehicle.

Could the Board Play a Positive Role in Gaza?

Right now, Gaza is a mess—divided, dysfunctional, and sporadically violent. The challenges of governance, security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction loom large while the structure, capacity, and purpose of the Board of Peace and its committees raise serious questions about its effectiveness. Palestinians seem to be an appendage in the process as they have no senior figures representing them on the higher-level committees. Instead, a National Committee for the Administration of Gaza comprised of respectable but unelected Gazan technocrats (who have yet to enter Gaza) will contend with a Hamas that controls roughly half of Gaza. Israel, whose prime minister won’t attend the board’s meeting this week lest he be photographed with Qatari and Turkish leaders and outnumbered by states who support Palestinian statehood, has increased the tempo of its strikes against Hamas commanders, is adamantly refusing to allow Gaza’s reconstruction until Hamas is demilitarized, and is worried that the board might bigfoot him when it comes to rebuilding and securing Gaza.

Of all the positive roles the board might play, funding is surely the least controversial and most productive. Gaza’s reconstruction is estimated to cost tens of billions of dollars. It’s certainly no coincidence that the board’s members can buy a permanent seat beyond the initial three-year term for a cool $1 billion, with Trump controlling how the funds are spent.

This week’s Board of Peace meeting will likely produce some very impressive pledges. The UAE has reportedly committed $1 billion, and the United States appears willing to match that. But delivery is another matter. The challenge of demilitarization will be far more difficult. It’s likely that, at least on paper, the board meeting may yield several offers to participate in an international stabilization force called for in the U.N. resolution. Indonesia has offered as many as 8,000 troops. But we’re a long way from the reality of deploying troops into what is now and could easily remain a free-fire zone of the Israel-Hamas conflict. It’s worth noting that the decommissioning process in Northern Ireland, which was part of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, took seven years—even with the guarantee that former Republican and Unionist combatants would share power.

Can the board contribute to a better future for Gaza? The odds are long but it’s possible. One of the most intriguing aspects of the Israel-Hamas war is that Gaza has become internationalized. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803 passed with only two abstentions: Russia and China. It called for a new transitional and international body—the Board of Peace—to oversee and supervise temporary transitional governance by a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee. The board will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza. The resolution’s mandate expires in 2027 and no one knows whether Russia or China will decide to oppose it then. But for now, one might dare to imagine that the board, under willful and skillful leadership, could play a consequential role in Gaza’s future. Can it make Gaza whole, secure, and prosperous? No, not without wise and determined leaders in Israel and Palestine—and not without a serious effort to resolve the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Uncertainties abound. But one thing is unmistakenly clear: Trump’s 20-point plan and the Board of Peace are the only game in town unless something better comes along. And until then, if left only to the current Israeli and Hamas leaders, Gaza’s future will be marked by desperation, division, dysfunction, and violence.