One term, one year, and one month into Donald Trump’s presidency, analysts continue to debate how to best understand his foreign policy. Some have argued that Trump is adjusting Washington’s traditional approach to new global challenges. Others have argued that his ideological impulses uniquely misunderstand the sources of U.S. strength. For better or worse, it is clear Trump now faces far fewer constraints on foreign policy than in his first term.

We maintain that the best approach to understanding Trump’s diplomacy has less to do with the United States’ unique place in the world or the idiosyncrasies of Trump himself, and more to do with his populist form of governance. It has already become commonplace to compare Trump’s domestic policies to those of other populist leaders, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But it is striking how well this comparison holds in the realm of foreign policy as well. The United States is, after all, in a very different geopolitical position than Hungary, India, and Turkey. Yet under Trump, it approaches world politics in a very similar way.

One term, one year, and one month into Donald Trump’s presidency, analysts continue to debate how to best understand his foreign policy. Some have argued that Trump is adjusting Washington’s traditional approach to new global challenges. Others have argued that his ideological impulses uniquely misunderstand the sources of U.S. strength. For better or worse, it is clear Trump now faces far fewer constraints on foreign policy than in his first term.

We maintain that the best approach to understanding Trump’s diplomacy has less to do with the United States’ unique place in the world or the idiosyncrasies of Trump himself, and more to do with his populist form of governance. It has already become commonplace to compare Trump’s domestic policies to those of other populist leaders, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But it is striking how well this comparison holds in the realm of foreign policy as well. The United States is, after all, in a very different geopolitical position than Hungary, India, and Turkey. Yet under Trump, it approaches world politics in a very similar way.

Populist leaders differ vastly in terms of “the people” who they claim to represent. Viewed together, however, they employ similar narratives, modes, tactics, and channels of governing that not only affect politics at home but also distinctly shape behavior abroad. Recent studies show how populism can function as both strategy and ideology, how procedural aspects of decision-making differ from those of nonpopulists, the conditions shaping the intensity of foreign-policy change under populists, and impacts of the global rise of populism on the international order.

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Consider what we call the seven pillars of popular foreign policy: personalization, hyper-mediatization, “corrupt elites,” grand history, revisionism, extortion, and the (sometimes unsuccessful) pursuit of domestic dividends. In all of these realms, Trump acts all too much like his international populist counterparts. If nothing else, the similarities suggest that it would be a mistake to search too hard for a unique strategic logic animating Trump’s moves on the world stage.

1. Personalization

Like Trump, populist leaders—often initially elected freely and fairly—tend to hollow out and, if possible, capture democratic institutions that traditionally serve as checks on their rule.

Trump slashed bureaucratic positions in the name of “efficiency,” whereas Erdogan’s purges claimed to target coup-plotters and “terrorists.” Hungary’s Orban designed a new constitutional order. This gutting of institutional knowledge and replacement of skilled personnel with political appointees has serious consequences for foreign-policy decision-making, including unpredictability, high risk tolerance, incompetence, and executive enrichment at the expense of other national priorities.

2. Hyper-mediatization

Whereas all leaders engage in political communication, the populist style of politics includes extraordinary use of news and social media to create political spectacles—a form of media as politics.

The weekly TV shows of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and recently deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro; the near-daily speeches by Erdogan; and the 3D fireside chats with Modi’s virtual avatar serve to generate emotional connections with publics. Using these platforms to highlight an incumbent’s foreign-policy victories communicates the message that only the current leader can reassert greatness or bring back the status and respect that the people deserve.

Trump treats the Oval Office as an actual (newly gilded) stage on which he can alternately chastise or woo foreign leaders, all in front of an exclusively chosen set of media outlets. U.S. officials’ berating of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2025 is a particularly memorable moment—former TV producer Trump remarked that the proceedings would make “great television”—but the public-facing curation of state visits by Saudi and Turkish leaders also showcase the theatrics of populism.

Social media has also become a frequent site of politics. Trump uses platforms such as X and his own Truth Social to threaten leaders and signal policy change along with amplifying his accomplishments.

3. “Corrupt elite”

Populist leaders view international politics as an arena in which they assert themselves as rightful and necessary guardians of a “pure people” against economic and cultural elites of a corrupt establishment. Populists claim to securitize the interests of “the people” by demanding international status and defending the nation—people, values, territory—against nefarious foreign elites and their domestic conspirators.

Populists around the world are adept at framing their “corrupt elites” as in league with the United States, Europe, or the West. Chávez excoriated U.S. and EU immigration policies as “legalized barbarism” at a Mercosur summit in 2008. While hosting the G-20 summit in 2023, Modi, whom pro-government media touts as “Solar Superman,” condemned Western leaders who would impose restrictive policies on developing states.

Trump maintains this populist script, continuing to criticize the Western-designed order from a position of power in a Western capital. When accusing “liberals” of deliberately undermining the United States and making it a global laughingstock, he routinely suggests that they are operating in league with cosmopolitan and thus un-American interests. In twice withdrawing the United States from UNESCO, for example, Trump’s stated reason in the latter instance was that the international body had become “woke.”

4. Grand history

Populist narratives about history invoke nostalgia for idealized pasts, establish continuity with the current leader, and blame previous administrations for lost material and reputational greatness. Erdogan invokes an Ottoman past to justify Turkey’s regional assertiveness. Modi draws on Hindu nationalist history to position India as a civilizational global power. Orban wields history to justify a pro-Russian stance that aims, in turn, to strengthen Hungary.

Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda challenges the previous narrative at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Instead of taking pride in U.S.-designed multilateral organizations, Trump frames them as constraints on American power. He argues Washington bankrolls NATO while European states act as free riders, and that the rules-based, post-Cold War order is a betrayal of U.S. interests orchestrated by the aforementioned globalist cabal. These claims were used to justify a shift to unilateralism, transactional relations with allies, and withdrawal from previous agreements such as the Paris climate accord and the Iranian nuclear deal.

5. Revisionism

By conflating the international community with “corrupt elites,” populists can often embrace revisionism that brings them into conflict with longtime allies. Populist-led states that aren’t superpowers also seek revisions of the international order that elevate their status.

Erdogan’s frequent admonishments at United Nations assemblies that “the world is bigger than five”—referring to U.N. Security Council’s permanent members—aim to disrupt the traditional power balance in Turkey’s favor. At a regional level, Orban used Hungary’s term in the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union to “bulldoze” the bloc’s norms and challenge the multilateral structure from within.

In Trump’s case, the “Jacksonian populist nationalism” that statecraft scholar Walter Russell Mead first identified in 2017 has expanded exponentially. In his second term, Trump behaves like an “emperor abroad,” in the words of Elizabeth N. Saunders. The widespread tariffs in the name of “America First,” challenges to the authority of international institutions, and territorial claims against NATO allies all suggest a revisionist approach that looks more like that of rising powers in the global south than a onetime hegemon.

6. Extortion

Populists believe that any foreign-policy action requires a payoff. And populists don’t shy away from artificially creating their own opportunities to secure them. This is often achieved by rocking the boat and then demanding concessions for returning to normalcy. Indeed, a striking feature of populist leaders is that, despite their emphasis on dramatic, transformative changes to the status quo, they are often prepared to reach a modus vivendi with existing arrangements in return for side payments.

True revisionism is revolutionary. Populists, however, are pragmatic. They start with fiery rhetoric and dramatic but limited—and, more importantly—cheap displays of power. Alternately, they position themselves as dealmakers by negotiating with opposing sides for leverage and disrupting alliances to draw concessions. Then, if properly plied with rewards, they claim to have achieved complete victory and return to business as usual.
As Syrians fled civil war in 2015, Erdogan threatened to send migrants to Europe. Then, within months, he had a deal with the European Union that promised 6 billion euros in funds. Later, he repeated his threats when funds weren’t forthcoming as quickly as he would have liked.

Washington’s unique position simply gives Trump more leverage for securing payoffs. The examples are all too numerous: Blanket tariffs on allies were rolled back upon individual negotiations. Threats of seizing Greenland morphed into an ambiguous deal creating redundant pockets of U.S. sovereignty on the island. Trump threatened sanctions on but then agreed to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in exchange for promises of high investment in Russia. The U.S. president threatened Colombia with intervention, then called its president to negotiate. He dismissed a Venezuelan opposition activist, then wrangled her Nobel Peace Prize for himself.

7. Domestic dividends

Traditional leaders generally prefer to avoid blame. Not so for populists, who frequently provoke and perpetuate conflict with the goal of claiming international outcomes as victories. Populists engage in risky ventures as the people’s champion, showcasing that they are fighting for them and winning on their behalf.

Because the world—unlike, say, domestic media—often remains beyond populists’ control, this is an area in which leaders sometimes struggle. Erdogan faced a significant public backlash against his EU refugee deal. The #GoBackModi campaign followed the India’s spectacle-infused hosting of the 2023 G-20 summit and involved sharp criticism in India that Modi’s many international visits weren’t reaping any benefits for his own people.

As time goes on, Trump risks increasingly finding himself in the same boat. Only 1 in 5 Americans surveyed by Ipsos in January supported the annexation of Greenland. And 9 in 10 polled by Quinnipiac University opposed taking it by force. Another poll found that a majority of Americans do not support the United States “running” Venezuela, as Trump proclaimed.

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Far from delivering the transformative results that he promised, Trump’s foreign policy has largely failed on its own terms. His vow to end the United States’ wars has met with no success in Ukraine so far and produced a shaky cease-fire in Gaza. Instead of reducing U.S. military commitments abroad, Trump escalated the conflict with Iran and ordered a military operation against Venezuela. Despite his promises to strike better deals on trade and security, his tariff war with China ended inconclusively. Indeed, even when viewed domestically, Trump’s policies have failed to generate the polling boost that he sought.

The problem though, is that populist foreign policy is self-reinforcing. As seen in Turkey, India, and Hungary, setbacks are unlikely to change behavior. The circular logic is too strong. The personalization of foreign policy and dismissal of elites isolate leaders from feedback loops that could generate a course correction. In-house media production and curation of news amplify this loop. Populists’ “corrupt elite” framing and grandiose narrative of history lead them to see global backlash as further confirmation of their vision. And distributing even modest gains from global extortion secures the loyalty of key constituencies despite domestic criticism.

The result is likely to be more unpredictability, conflict, and corruption around the globe.