What is the Trump administration’s China policy? It’s not easy to get a straight answer. Depending on who you ask, you might hear “America First,” a broad term that can be interpreted in a variety of ways; or you might hear that the ambiguity is the point, and it’s an advantage over the self-imposed red lines and policy buzzwords of the Biden era.

On the latest episode of FP Live, I spoke with Kurt Campbell, who ran Asia policy for the Biden administration and served as deputy secretary of state. Campbell and other aides of former U.S. President Joe Biden coined “invest, align, compete” as a slogan for their China plans, a strategy that included planks such as the CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and a network of alliances. U.S. President Donald Trump has since unwound several of those policies. In a recent New York Times article, Campbell argued that Trump’s approach to China was “full of contradictions” but that his unpredictability had both advantages and disadvantages.

Subscribers can watch our full discussion on the video box atop this page. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript. Campbell is presently chairman and co-founder of the Asia Group.

Ravi Agrawal: So, what are the contradictions you see in Trump’s China policy?

Kurt Campbell: Let me just start with the things that we think we know. One of the most interesting things is that President Trump clearly is attracted to authoritarians. We saw in the first term his deep attraction to [Chinese] President Xi [Jinping]. We also know that we haven’t seen a chief executive in the United States that, frankly, has this much latitude to make decisions about China unconstrained by the right wing or by Congress more generally. He has an administration that is a big tent when it comes to China: He has some of the most pro-business, “let’s cut a deal” kind of guys, along with some of the hardest of the hard-liners. And they fight it out inside the government.

The biggest contradictions, however, are at the core of what President Trump seeks. In some instances, it appears that he’s seeking to build a completely different kind of relationship with China and believes that commercial deals which benefit him and the United States are the right approach. At other times, his approach suggests that this is a pause, that he’s seeking to take a timeout so we can build reserves of critical minerals and build up our own military. My sense is that this ambiguity is designed not just to keep China off balance, but frankly, to keep elements in American society guessing what President Trump’s ultimate outcomes and desires are.

RA: You used the term ambiguity. And then there’s “strategic ambiguity,” a fairly wonkish term, which in the context of the U.S.-China relationship refers to an intentional uncertainty over whether Washington would help Taiwan militarily were China to attack it. You wrote recently in the New York Times that Trump “has taken strategic ambiguity to a profound new level.” What did you mean by that?

KC: The idea here is that the strategic ambiguity, as it has applied to Taiwan, was: Would the United States, in a moment of crisis, come to Taiwan’s aid? The way that we’ve managed that historically is by being careful about directly saying which direction we would lean toward and also urging both sides to play it cool and to understand the benefits of continued existence of the status quo, of Taiwan’s ability to live in peace and prosperity.

What I’d suggest is that this larger strategic ambiguity really comes down to: What would President Trump do if the chips were down in a larger framework in the Indo-Pacific? Would he side with China? We’ve seen some ambivalence and uncertainty in the situation, for instance, between Russia and Ukraine. Many of our allies in the Indo-Pacific want to be reassured that the United States continues to support the traditional alliance structures. That means our partnerships with Japan and South Korea and Australia and our newfound friends such as India. Behind closed doors, there is some anxiety about just where President Trump stands. One of the reasons that Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, following her recent election, wants to come to Washington before President Trump goes to Beijing is to seek reassurances and to try to bolster President Trump to be firm with President Xi.

I think, though, at the core, what we will likely see when President Trump goes to China in April is an exchange of wants. The president clearly wants short-term deals in agriculture; some sales; would like to end fentanyl. I think he’s contemplating the idea of major Chinese investment in the United States.

The question is what does China want in return? The concerns are that China seeks complete access to our technology stack. Those are areas where we have some clear advantages, and we have to be careful to understand that this is a major global competition. China is also going to say, “Look, if we’re going to buy all this agricultural stuff, then you’re going to have to lift some of these tariffs.” We might find ourselves in a situation where the tariffs on China would be lower than for some of our close allies and partners. That’s problematic. But some recent statements from the president—ambiguous for sure, but still indications—and also the readout of a recent phone call between President Trump and President Xi suggest to me that the Chinese want to push the United States on Taiwan, get the president to move away from long-standing, bipartisan approaches, and get him to suddenly put pressure on Taiwan. We’re all watching very closely for that.

RA: Kurt, there’s a lot to unpack there, and I’ll come to a lot of it, bit by bit. But just on Taiwan, I should note that President Biden sometimes broke with the practice of strategic ambiguity when he would say that the United States would defend Taiwan—

KC: Not just sometimes. Almost always, actually. I think four or five times during the administration, he came right out.

RA: But Kurt, the Trump administration would say that precisely because Biden appeared to be so certain about defending Taiwan, which was not strategic ambiguity, that they feel this need to overcorrect a little bit, to be less reassuring. That might be because of either burden sharing—they want other U.S. allies to spend more on defense—or they’re trying to flip some of the narrative from the Biden administration, which they would say didn’t work well enough.

KC: The Trump administration is making an effort to say that the reason there might be changes in Taiwan policy, from the president on down, is because of previous governments’ actions. At the core of it is, to the extent that President Trump has a fundamental ideology, his idea that big countries should have more sway over their immediate environment. You see that as the president talks about Latin America and the idea of the Monroe Doctrine on steroids. You see it as he sometimes describes Russia and Ukraine. And I think you see that a little bit with China and Taiwan.

The key to an effective diplomacy with respect to China is to make clear that we do not support Taiwan’s independence, that we believe the maintenance of this peace and stability has actually served the interests of both China and Taiwan for decades, and that a premeditated conflict initiated by Beijing would have absolutely catastrophic consequences, not just militarily, but for the global economy. That has been the abiding bipartisan belief for decades in the United States. Yes, there are nuances on both sides, but I think President Trump—we don’t know, and we’ll see as we go forward—may represent a bit of a departure in that overall approach.

RA: Speaking of departures, it strikes me that between about 2016 and 2024, there was this big, bipartisan trend toward lawmakers and policymakers becoming more hawkish on China and having a more clear-eyed sense of the challenge and security threats that China represented. It seems to me now that this trend is changing, is shifting, could even be over. Do you agree with that assessment?

KC: I wouldn’t go so far as to say it is over, Ravi. I think that is an exaggeration, but I believe the fundamentals of it are being challenged. That kind of challenge is actually healthy. If you look over the last 10 years, one of the only areas of bipartisan agreement can be found in the Indo-Pacific. I believe that is still the prevailing wisdom, although it’s being challenged now by a couple of different efforts. There is a commercial group that wants to cut deals and do business. That’s animated largely in the Trump administration, but you see it also in the investor class—less in manufacturing and other areas—who are still encouraged and interested in doing deals in China. There are some on the left who say that this was overdone, that we overestimated China’s negative impacts globally, and that we’ve got to give peace a chance more generally.

So yes, I do believe the dominant bipartisan consensus is being questioned now, but ultimately, if you went behind closed doors on Capitol Hill and talked to most strategists, they would agree with the larger abiding principles of a bipartisan consensus that we are dealing with a China that is competitive, seeking to usurp American power, and wants to be the dominant country on the global stage for the remainder of the 21st century.

RA: You mentioned some companies there, and one of them, of course, is Nvidia. I’m curious how damaging you think it is that the United States has reversed some of the restrictions on selling high-end chips to China.

KC: The abiding belief among some technologists and in the Trump administration is that these restrictions don’t serve American interests, that we want to have China use even our very best chips. That if we cause them to be tied into the American tech stack, they won’t be able to diversify on their own capabilities.

I think that’s just wrong. That’s a misunderstanding of the dominant features of President Xi’s China. He’s made clear in every speech, in every doctrine, that China’s determination to be self-sufficient and dominant in technology is job no. 1, probably more important even than some areas of military capacity. They are absolutely determined to go down this path. Technology leadership is one of the few areas that the United States needs to maintain certain areas of advantage in AI, in quantum, in semiconductor manufacturing. It is one of the things that allows us to work closely with our allies and partners. This open-door policy on technology in some circumstances has been misguided and not attentive to American strategic interests.

RA: Looking at the bigger picture of the Biden administration’s foreign policy on China, there was a big component of buying time to build infrastructure to have more of an advantage. Now, chip restrictions are being rescinded, and the network of alliances is in worse shape than it was five years ago—the G-7, for example, and the relationship with India, which has faced real setbacks in the last 12 months. As the architect of much of that strategy, how much damage do you think we’ve done to the United States’ standing vis-à-vis China?

KC: At the beginning of the Biden administration, we were in the middle of a period in which President Xi and his wolf warriors were beating up every country in the Indo-Pacific. Part of our response was to erect a series of innovative initiatives like the Quad, AUKUS, and technological and strategic partnerships with India. Given the size and immensity of the China challenge, the only way that the United States is going to effectively meet that challenge is if we work with other partners and allies.

The anxiety and uncertainty are on full display in Europe about the future of relations with the United States. Asia is a much more subtle and dynamic place when it comes to thinking about the U.S., and many of those countries are determined to keep their relationships with the U.S. if they can. Japan is at the top of the list, along with South Korea, Australia, and even India, though it is deeply disappointed by the Trump administration. I was in India talking to Indian friends the day after the U.S. election, and they were confident that they would do well under President Trump. But the last year has seen relations plummet to a level we have not seen since the battle days of the Cold War in the 1960s. I hope that relationship can be repaired and relaunched toward a positive trajectory.

But ultimately, many of these countries are practicing a nuanced strategy, investing more in their military capacity, doing what they can to sustain relations with the United States, and trying to carefully cut deals with China. Most importantly, we are seeing a dynamic set of engagements among like-minded states: Europe’s deal with India, India and Japan. Many of the countries that had formerly partnered with the United States are now, without the United States, working more intensively together. I think at the core is a hope that the United States will return to play a more active role, but ultimately, they’re going to be prepared to work together no matter what.

RA: A lot of these countries are democracies, and they have people who feel let down, and that they had to make sacrifices to get on board to trust America. That trust will probably not return as soon as people might think in the United States.

KC: If you believe that resurrecting allied partnerships are going to be important, it’s hard to know what that trip back is going to look like. I was in the Biden administration after the Trump administration, and there was very little fear about talking to us. So we heard an earful about whether the United States could be trusted, and lots of anxieties, whining, and concern about the proceeding years. It will be even worse next time if there is a new president that openly desires better relations with these countries. I think it’s the most important part of American strategy, but getting back on that path will not be easy.

RA: There was certainly frustration among allies with the Biden administration, too. What do you think you got wrong about America’s China policy?

KC: I do not believe it’s going to be possible for the United States to sustain a long-term, optimistic, open engagement in Asia without a constructive trade policy. This is not simply a condemnation of the Democratic Party or the Biden administration.

Rebuilding a degree of confidence in certain kinds of trade engagements in Asia is going to be essential. Our offerings to countries about working with us on critical minerals and other things were insufficient and underwhelming. The pull of the China market made it very hard for us to come up with a strategy that also abided by our domestic politics. So I would not give us particularly high marks in the trade arena, and some of the sanctions and tariffs on the Chinese economy did not make a terrible amount of economic sense.

RA: These are the Trump administration’s tariffs that the Biden administration continued.

KC: That’s right. I could make a powerful argument that you could redo those in a way that were more targeted in key areas where we had particular concerns, but there was concern about domestic politics.

I will say I’m very pleased we had substantial engagement in the Indo-Pacific. I’m pleased at the trajectory of the Quad—after a rocky start, that has become a major strategic initiative. Against all odds, we built a very consequential set of engagements with India. Ultimately, do we have enough resources aimed at the Indo-Pacific? No. And that will require some reapportionment in our own system, which is hard to do and takes time.

RA: You mentioned the relationship with India as one of the accomplishments of the Biden administration, and how that seems to have been unwound. Critics would say that the pivot to Asia, which you designed, is over. Do you agree with that?

KC: I do not—I think that is shortsighted and belied by evidence. If you look at every metric of measurement—GNP, defense spending, innovation, climate change contributions, risks of nuclear proliferation—the lion’s share of the history of the 21st century is going to be written in the Indo-Pacific. The general trajectory of American foreign policy over the last hundred years is treating Asia as a secondary theater. The idea of recognizing, through our institutions, innovation, and capacity building, that Asia is where it’s at, is going to be a long-term process with fits and starts. Where we are today compared to 20 years ago is night and day.

The key is to recognize that we are in a period of uncertainty and ambiguity. 2026 is going to answer a lot of questions: Where are U.S.-India relations going? How will the president treat our traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific? Most importantly, where are U.S.-China relations going, with the potential for several engagements between our two leaders?

RA: After the 2024 election, the Chinese were very curious about what Trump would be like in his second term. Speaking for the analyst class and journalists, most of us were quite surprised at the differences between Trump 2.0 and Trump 1.0. How prepared were the Chinese for Trump in his second term?

KC: It would be hard to find a country that was less well-prepared than China for Trump 1.0. Xi was deeply troubled. They did not think that President Trump would win that election. Through much of the first term, Chinese interlocutors were off-balance.

The second time around, there has been much greater care given to thinking about a strategy. President Xi, his senior interlocutors, and the press treat President Trump with great respect, always referring to him in glowing terms. But at the same time, when the United States takes a blunderbuss approach and threatens major tariffs, for instance, China immediately responds with a scalpel-like approach, whether on rare earths or another area, to make it clear that China has cards and is prepared to play them. This has been extremely effective.

So I do think they’re better prepared at the time. The Chinese do not like international unsettlement. I don’t think they are completely comfortable with President Trump, even though they have a strategy to deal with him. I also wonder if they fully appreciate that Trumpism is not a passing phase. It’s here to stay in a very different form, and I’m not sure China fully understands how dynamic the changes are in American domestic politics.

RA: What do you think America tends to underestimate about China, and what does it overestimate?

KC: Over the course of the last five or six years, people have fluctuated between saying that China’s in the lead and we’re declining, and that we’ve secured our alliance structure and China’s on the back foot. The most important thing is not to take those immediate snap judgments seriously and recognize that this is a much longer-term set of challenges. This will be the biggest test of American foreign policy in our history, and the only way that we are going to be successful is to have programs and approaches that transcend administrations—whether it’s munitions programs or investment in technology. That requires a degree of bipartisanship to find areas that will not be immediately revoked each election. Constructing, or reconstructing, and sustaining, that bipartisan approach in the Indo-Pacific, is one of the most important tasks of U.S. political leadership at this time.