Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, China has dominated Afghanistan’s mining industry. But the mines, primarily located along both sides of the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, are now turning into a lethal minefield. Chinese nationals have been increasingly targeted by militants, with the most recent incidents resulting in the death of five Chinese miners and workers in Tajikistan in cross-border attacks from northern Afghanistan. Chinese mining is spurring resentment from locals, while the miners are also caught in the crosshairs of both anti-Taliban feeling and border tensions.

Since the Taliban takeover, Chinese nationals have been in a gold rush in northern Afghanistan due to record high gold prices. Some of the efforts are legal, with both the Chinese government and Taliban leadership’s support, but many are ad hoc arrangements, at best informally sanctioned by local Taliban leaders. The influx of inexperienced investors has resulted in a sense of lawlessness, with local Afghans clashing with both Taliban and Chinese miners in the area mostly over mining rights.

Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, China has dominated Afghanistan’s mining industry. But the mines, primarily located along both sides of the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, are now turning into a lethal minefield. Chinese nationals have been increasingly targeted by militants, with the most recent incidents resulting in the death of five Chinese miners and workers in Tajikistan in cross-border attacks from northern Afghanistan. Chinese mining is spurring resentment from locals, while the miners are also caught in the crosshairs of both anti-Taliban feeling and border tensions.

Since the Taliban takeover, Chinese nationals have been in a gold rush in northern Afghanistan due to record high gold prices. Some of the efforts are legal, with both the Chinese government and Taliban leadership’s support, but many are ad hoc arrangements, at best informally sanctioned by local Taliban leaders. The influx of inexperienced investors has resulted in a sense of lawlessness, with local Afghans clashing with both Taliban and Chinese miners in the area mostly over mining rights.

Clashes have also broken out between the Tajik and Taliban border forces, as some Chinese mining activity has altered border rivers, which threatens to reshape national boundaries. With the additional challenge of unidentified armed militants, as seen in November 2025 attacks on nationals in Tajikistan, Chinese citizens are in imminent danger.

While Beijing has urged citizens and enterprises to evacuate the area, Chinese workers engaged in illegal mining will likely stay and continue to incite security incidents. The Taliban and Tajikistan have not been able to prevent attacks, though they have pledged new efforts to impede them. Beijing has few good options; if pressure on Kabul and Dushanbe fails, it may have little recourse beyond ensuring that all citizens fully evacuate the area.

At least seven incidents have targeted Chinese citizens in the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border area since November 2024, killing at least nine Chinese nationals and injuring at least 10 more. Around 80 percent of these attacks were directly related to gold mining.

The string began when a cross-border attack from Afghanistan by unidentified armed militants struck a gold mine camp in Tajikistan in November 2024, killing one and injuring four Chinese nationals as well as a Tajik citizen. This was a turning point for China, which subsequently issued an advisory against traveling to Afghanistan for the first time since December 2021.

Further incidents involving Chinese nationals occurred throughout 2025: in January in Takhar, when a Chinese gold mine worker was targeted while getting supplies, and in July and October in Badakhshan. In the July incident, a Chinese mining engineer’s bodyguard was reportedly caught in a clash over mining rights. The October incident also involved Chinese mining companies.

Two late November cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, including an explosive-laden drone attack and a shooting, then killed five Chinese nationals. The militants involved were never identified. The Chinese embassies in Afghanistan and Tajikistan consequently issuedmultiple advisories to evacuate. Most recently, clashes with locals over gold mining in Takhar in early January 2026 resulted in protesters setting equipment on fire. Takhar sees the largest Chinese investment in Afghanistan—worth $310 million-350 million—after the Mes Aynak copper and Amu Darya oil projects.

This grim situation results from the fragile environment for gold mining in the border area. To cope with security challenges, most Chinese mining projects in northern Afghanistan rely on the Taliban for security, and the Taliban also take a cut from the operation. For example, 56 percent of the profits of the Takhar project reportedly go to Taliban authorities.

Yet this can also make Chinese projects a target, as locals resent the Taliban for handing over mining rights to China without their participation. While locals are more frustrated with the Taliban than the Chinese, the Chinese workers on the ground offer targets of opportunity.

Chinese mining expansion and river dredging for gold have also changed the natural course of the border river between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and therefore the national boundary to facilitate dredging further out, which incited the August 2025 clashes between the Taliban and Tajik border forces. Further clashes between the two sides in October prompted the aforementioned incident in Badakhshan that killed Chinese nationals.

Chinese workers are also targets of unidentified armed groups operating in northern Afghanistan, such as those that carried out the November cross-border attacks. Tajikistan claims that drug smugglers and criminal groups were the culprit, while the Taliban claims vaguely that there are certain groups trying to harm the organization’s relations with other countries. Neither Tajikistan nor the Taliban wants to take responsibility, and they both point fingers.

The Taliban, for their part, made some efforts. They condemned the November attacks, sought a joint probe with Tajikistan, announced a new unit to secure the border, and conducted raids resulting in one or two arrests while Taliban-sympathetic media suggested that the attacks were planned outside of Afghanistan. Tajik officials have, in turn, blamed the Taliban for not preventing armed incursions, also strongly condemning the attacks and pledging to immediately upgrade security measures. This spat reveals the challenges to any effective cooperation.

China has no perfect options to address this situation. Beijing could cease the mining operations, pressure the Taliban and Tajikistan to do more, or it could intervene directly. None of these approaches, however, solve the problem.

Beijing has tried to rein in Chinese mining operations, and it even attempted to shut down all mines in 2025. In January, March, June, and July, the Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan first warned against illegal mining. With the escalation of attacks, the embassy has now issued evacuation advisories for all mining companies, legal and illegal. This approach is the simplest solution for China to protect workers at legitimate projects, some of whom have now evacuated and relocated to provincial capitals, which are safer.

The challenge is illegal mining. There is no guarantee that Chinese workers at illegal mines will leave, and they will continue to instigate further problems. While these miners are responsible for their own actions, especially now that Beijing has encouraged them to evacuate, it would still reflect poorly on the government for more nationals to be killed in attacks.

Alongside attempting to cease mining operations in the border area, China has been pressuring the Taliban and Tajikistan to stop cross-border attacks. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing met with Taliban officials throughout December to seek Taliban cooperation to deter “attempts by malicious actors to harm the strong and growing relationship between Kabul and Beijing.” Pressure on Tajikistan was acute: China’s ambassador to Tajikistan called the country’s foreign minister and a high-level national security official on Dec. 1 to demand that Tajikistan take all necessary measures to protect Chinese enterprises and citizens.

China has also stated its demand at the United Nations for Afghanistan to investigate and severely punish the perpetrators and called on both sides to take effective measures to protect Chinese “personnel, projects, and institutions.”

This strategy has had some efficacy; despite tensions with Dushanbe, the Taliban claimed in December that the two sides were taking bilateral measures, including by establishing joint security committees. The impact limited, however. The Taliban do not control all armed groups in Afghanistan, and the group can have different definitions of “terrorism.” China’s permanent representative to the U.N. alluded to this by calling on the Taliban government to “correctly understand the issue of counterterrorism” and “take more resolute and forceful actions to eliminate all terrorist forces in Afghanistan.”

On the Tajik side, the border is far from secured, with border force corruption further complicating attack prevention. Tajikistan could also seek assistance in securing the border; a program facilitated by the regional Collective Security Treaty Organization to strengthen the country’s border was reported in January 2025. This could help on the Tajik side of the border, but it would not eliminate the cross-border attacks from Afghanistan and could also dilute China’s influence.

The option that China is least likely to pursue is direct intervention, although it is an option. While China has provided Tajikistan’s military with counterterrorism support and training, Chinese forces will not likely directly intervene to protect their nationals’ interests due to China’s principle of noninterference and reluctance to send troops abroad.

Beijing has no perfect options and will likely continue to urge citizens to stay away from the country. As Beijing eyes a longer-term strategy to increase economic linkages, officials will continue to work with and pressure Tajikistan and the Taliban to adopt measures to foster a stable security situation. Stronger connectivity projects are unlikely to happen unless and until Tajikistan and the Taliban have effectively mitigated the risks.

Note: This analysis also draws from events highlighted in Stimson’s “Update on China-Afghanistan Relations.”